The same proposed move can face a different starting point across a state line. This dated survey separates what the court weighs, who carries the burden, and what notice and objection procedures require.
The statute calls the starting point a presumption against the move. Terry applies a shifting burden. The presumption has domestic-violence, initial-custody, and distance exceptions.
Authority
Ala. Code 30-3-160 to 30-3-169.10
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden shifts to the objecting parent after a threshold showing
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
yes
What the court weighs
There is a rebuttable presumption that a change of principal residence is not in the child's best interest, unless the objecting party has been found to have committed domestic violence or child abuse (30-3-169.4). The court weighs the seventeen factors in 30-3-169.3(a): relationships, impact on the child, travel time, communication, feasibility of visitation, child preference, uprooting compared with a custody change, the pattern of promoting or thwarting the other parent, quality of life, support system, family stability, each party's reasons, domestic violence, and others. The presumption does not apply to an initial custody determination. There, 30-3-169.7 directs the court to consider the 169.2 and 169.3 factors (Lackey v. Lackey, 18 So. 3d 393, 398-99 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), restated in Stanford v. Anaya (Ala. Civ. App. 2025)). Sections 169.1–169.7 do not apply where the new residence is within 60 miles of the nonrelocating parent entitled to custody or visitation, or nearer that parent than before, unless the child will live in another state (§ 30-3-162(b)); Williams (2026) addresses the within-60-mile branch.
Who carries the burden
The relocating parent first must prove the move is in the child's best interest. After that showing, the burden shifts to the objecting parent to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the move is not in the child's best interest. Ex parte Terry, 154 So. 3d 1002 (Ala. 2013), requires both parents to present their whole cases at one hearing. The statutory presumption against the move supplies the mover's initial burden. It does not apply where the objecting parent has been found to have committed domestic violence or child abuse. Initial custody, moves within the statutory distance exception, and a separate request to change custody require their own analyses.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. 45 days before the intended move, by certified mail to the last known address of every other person entitled to custody or visitation (30-3-165(a)). If the information could not reasonably be known in time, notice is due no later than the 10th day after it becomes known. The notice must state the new address, the dates, the school, the reasons and a proposed revised schedule. It must also warn that an objection is due within 30 days or the relocation will be permitted (30-3-165(b)). There is a continuing duty to update within 10 days (30-3-165(d)). The duty falls on the person with the right to establish the child's principal residence (30-3-163).
Which moves trigger the rule
A change in the child's principal residence for 45 days or more, where custody was set by a prior court order (30-3-161(1), (11)). The objection and hearing machinery (30-3-169.1 to 169.7) does not apply if the new residence is 60 miles or less from the non-relocating parent, or nearer to that parent, unless the move puts the child in a different state (30-3-162(b)). Williams v. Williams (Ala. Civ. App. 2026): the move was within the 60-mile line because an agreed route of about 58 miles existed, even though a quicker driving route was longer. Whether distance is measured in a straight line or by road is left open. Non-parents with visitation may seek a revised schedule but cannot object (30-3-169.1(b)).
Objections and the effect of silence
The non-relocating person must file a proceeding for a temporary or permanent order within 30 days of receiving notice. If none is filed, the person entitled to set the child's residence may move after giving notice (30-3-169). Silence for 30 days authorizes the move. The court may extend or waive the 30 days for good cause, excusable neglect, or defective notice (30-3-169.1(c)).
The modification threshold
Not needed to invoke the Act: a proposed move is challenged directly under 30-3-169.1. After a temporary order or final judgment permitting the move, the court may treat a proposed or actual change of principal residence as a factor supporting a change of custody, weighing the 169.3(a) factors (30-3-169.3(a)). Failure to give notice is itself a factor in custody modification and in ordering the child returned (30-3-168(a)). Outside the Act (for example, a move within 60 miles), a change of residence standing alone is only one factor in the ordinary material-change analysis (Williams, 2026, citing Means v. Means, 512 So. 2d 1386 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)).
Other qualifications
A hard mileage carve-out is written into the objection machinery: sections 30-3-169.1 through 169.7 do not apply to a move of 60 miles or less from the nonrelocating parent, or to a move nearer that parent, unless the move is to a different state (30-3-162(b)), and Williams (2026) counted an agreed route of about 58 miles although a quicker route ran longer. Military: the Act does not apply to non-voluntary military transfers, except for a notice without the 30-day warning (30-3-162(a), 30-3-165(c)).
Important qualification
The statute calls the starting point a presumption against the move. Terry applies a shifting burden. The presumption has domestic-violence, initial-custody, and distance exceptions.
Burden summary
Shifting burden
Notice summary
45 days; exceptions apply
Trigger summary
Objection provisions: more than 60 miles or out of state; nearer-parent exception applies in state
General best-interest factors with a symmetrical comparison. The modification threshold is identified. No further relocation allocation identified. No general relocation-notice rule identified; order-specific duties may apply.
Authority
Case law (Moeller-Prokosch line, Outwater 2025)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
ordinary modification threshold; no further relocation allocation identified
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
no relocation-specific statutory or rule distance threshold identified
Effect of silence
No generally applicable deemed-consent procedure identified; custody-order duties remain separate
What the court weighs
Two steps. First, is the move legitimate, meaning not primarily motivated by a desire to make visitation more difficult? Second, what custody order serves the child's best interests under AS 25.24.150(c), 'with no presumption favoring either parent' (Ott v. Runa, 463 P.3d 180, 185-86 (Alaska 2020), as quoted in Outwater)? A legitimate move cannot be held against the relocating parent. The court must run a 'symmetrical' analysis: assume the move happens, then compare the child's life with each parent in each location, including relational stability. The court may not restrict where a parent lives. It decides only where the child lives. Legal custody is analyzed separately (Moeller-Prokosch I-III, Mengisteab, Outwater).
Who carries the burden
The party seeking modification must show a substantial change in circumstances under AS 25.20.110(a). Outwater treats an anticipated significant relocation as sufficient to reconsider physical custody; legal custody is analyzed separately. The relocation analysis first asks whether the move is legitimate, then determines the child’s best interests without a presumption favoring either parent, using a symmetrical comparison. No general relocation-specific allocation identified beyond these steps.
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable statutory relocation-notice requirement identified. In Mengisteab v. Oates, 425 P.3d 80 (Alaska 2018), the court upheld an illegitimate-motive finding based in part on inadequate notice and contact information to the court and no forwarding address to either the court or the father; it remanded for a symmetrical best-interests analysis. A custody order may contain notice duties.
Which moves trigger the rule
Judge-made, not statutory. A parent's anticipated out-of-state move triggers the analysis. Since Outwater v. Ahmasuk (Alaska August 1, 2025), so does a significant in-state move that makes the existing schedule unworkable (there, Nome to Palmer).
Objections and the effect of silence
No generally applicable statutory or rule procedure identified. The other parent opposes by responding to, or filing, a motion to modify custody under AS 25.20.110(a). No generally applicable objection deadline or consent-by-silence provision identified.
The modification threshold
Yes as to physical custody: a parent's anticipated significant relocation is a substantial change sufficient to consider modifying physical custody (Ott v. Runa (2020), quoted in Outwater). Not automatically as to legal custody, which is analyzed separately (Outwater).
Other qualifications
No separate relocation statute identified. Mengisteab requires a symmetrical best-interests comparison that assumes the relocating parent leaves and considers the child living with each parent, including the effects of moving with that parent or remaining without that parent. The court decides the child’s custody; this does not require awarding custody to the parent who stays.
Burden summary
Modification threshold; further allocation not established
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Statutory relocation factors. On the moving parent. 45 days; exceptions apply.
Authority
A.R.S. 25-408
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
No automatic authorization stated: after 30 days, relief to prevent relocation requires good cause; existing court orders remain in force unless otherwise ordered (§ 25-408(C), (E)).
What the court weighs
The court decides according to the child's best interests, considering all relevant factors, including the 25-403 factors and these: the good faith of the move or the objection. The advantage of the move in improving the general quality of life for the custodial parent or child. The likelihood of compliance with parenting-time orders. Realistic parenting time for each parent. The effect on the child's emotional, physical or developmental needs. Motives and any financial advantage. And the effect on stability (25-408(I)). To the extent practicable the court must make appropriate arrangements for a meaningful relationship with both parents (25-408(G)).
Who carries the burden
On the parent seeking to relocate, who bears the burden of proving what is in the child's best interests (25-408(G)). It does not shift. A parenting-plan or written-agreement clause on relocation carries a rebuttable presumption that it is in the child's best interests, so the party departing from it must show it no longer is (25-408(H)).
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes, where both parents are entitled by agreement or order to joint legal decision-making or to parenting time, and both live in Arizona. At least 45 days' advance written notice to the other parent, by certified mail with return receipt requested or as the Arizona family court rules provide (25-408(A)-(B)). This covers a parent with sole legal decision-making whenever the other parent has parenting time (see 25-408(F)(1)). The court must sanction a parent who fails to comply without good cause (25-408(B)).
Which moves trigger the rule
Relocating the child outside Arizona, or more than 100 miles within Arizona (25-408(A)). The notice section does not apply where relocation was provided for by a court order or written agreement dated within one year of the move (25-408(D)).
Objections and the effect of silence
The nonmoving parent may petition to prevent relocation within 30 days after notice; after that, relief requires good cause (§ 25-408(C)). Subsection (E) requires continued compliance with existing orders unless the court otherwise orders and does not state that silence authorizes a move. Pending a petition or application to prevent relocation, subsection (F)(1) permits a parent with sole legal decision-making, or joint legal decision-making and the child’s primary residence, to relocate temporarily when health, safety, employment or eviction circumstances of that parent or spouse require relocation less than 45 days after written notice. Under (F)(2), a parent with joint legal decision-making and substantially equal parenting time who meets those same necessity and timing conditions may relocate temporarily only if both parents execute a written agreement.
The modification threshold
A proposed move alone does not establish a material change when the residential parent would remain in Arizona if relocation were denied (Owen ¶¶ 15–16; Backstrand fn. 2). In Backstrand, the actual move to another state changed the child’s home, school, community and implementation of the existing order, supporting a material change (¶¶ 15–17). These holdings do not make every actual move automatically material.
Other qualifications
The statute creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of any relocation clause the parents put in a parenting plan or written agreement (25-408(H)). The notice duty also switches off when either parent lives outside Arizona.
The presumption requires both a primary-custodian designation and significantly more parenting time. The designation alone is insufficient.
Authority
Case law (Hollandsworth, Singletary, Cooper)
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
presumption for the move
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
none defined by statute or rule
Effect of silence
not addressed (no objection procedure in statute or rule)
What the court weighs
The Hollandsworth presumption favors relocation by a custodial parent with sole or primary custody. Since Cooper (2017) it applies only where the relocating parent is both the designated primary custodian and spends significantly more time with the child than the other parent. In true joint custody there is no presumption (Singletary, 2013): the court asks whether a material change in circumstances occurred and then what is in the child's best interest. The polestar throughout is the child's best interest. In Davis v. Vondran, 2025 Ark. App. 142, the Court of Appeals affirmed use of Singletary and Cooper despite the mother’s primary-custodian label. It considered the father’s approximately 156 visitation days a year together with shared decision-making responsibility and his meaningful involvement in the child’s life; it did not adopt a day-count cutoff. The appellate court found no Hollandsworth analysis necessary, although the circuit court had made an alternative presumption-rebuttal finding.
Who carries the burden
Under the presumption, the noncustodial parent must rebut it with proof that the move is not in the child's best interest. Under the joint-custody path, the party seeking modification must show a material change and best interest.
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable statutory relocation-notice requirement was found. Individual custody orders may require notice: Beverly v. Murphy, 2022 Ark. App. 4, p. 2, reproduces the parties’ order requiring at least ninety days’ advance notice of the specified residential move. That was an order-specific term, not a statewide notice period.
Which moves trigger the rule
Judge-made, with no mileage line: a custodial parent's request to relocate with the child. Which test applies depends on the custody arrangement (a primary custodian who spends significantly more time, versus joint custody).
Objections and the effect of silence
None statutory. The custodial parent petitions the circuit court for permission, or the other parent petitions to modify custody. There is no objection deadline, and silence creates no authority.
The modification threshold
No by itself: relocation by a custodial parent is not, alone, a material change in circumstances justifying a change of custody (Hollandsworth, as restated in Cooper). In joint-custody cases the ordinary material-change-then-best-interest test governs (Singletary). In Hildreth v. Hildreth, 2026 Ark. App. 193, the court affirmed a modification where relocation was considered together with other circumstances, rather than in isolation.
Other qualifications
Arkansas still applies a judge-made presumption favoring relocation by the custodial parent, but only when that parent is primary and spends significantly more time with the child. The Supreme Court has narrowed it twice (2013, 2017).
Important qualification
The presumption requires both a primary-custodian designation and significantly more parenting time. The designation alone is insufficient.
Burden summary
Presumption for a designated primary custodian with significantly more time. No presumption for joint custody.
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
The favorable starting point concerns a qualifying custodial parent. Joint physical custody requires a different analysis. Domestic-violence rules can also change the analysis.
Authority
Cal. Fam. Code 7501, 3024 (Burgess, LaMusga)
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
presumption for the move
Notice classification
court-ordered only
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
not addressed (no objection procedure in statute or rule)
What the court weighs
At an initial custody determination the test is best interests, and the relocating parent bears no burden to show the move is necessary (Burgess). After a final judicial custody order, a parent with sole or primary physical custody has a presumptive right to relocate. The objecting parent must show the move would cause detriment to the child, which triggers a best-interests re-evaluation using the LaMusga factors (LaMusga, Brown & Yana). Where parents share joint physical custody under an existing order and in fact, there is no presumption. The court decides primary custody de novo under the best-interest standard (Burgess fn. 12, Fam. Code 3087). Fam. Code 3040 says there is no presumption for or against joint or sole custody. In determining whether the § 3044 presumption is rebutted, the court may not rely on the statutory preference for frequent and continuing contact with both parents or with the noncustodial parent (§ 3044(b)(1)); Jessica held that the court’s reliance on that preference through its LaMusga analysis was error.
Who carries the burden
The objecting (noncustodial) parent carries the initial burden of showing detriment to the child before the court revisits custody. The relocating custodial parent has no burden to prove the move is necessary (Burgess, LaMusga, Brown & Yana). In initial determinations and in true joint-physical-custody cases, neither party has a presumption. The burden does not shift to the mover.
Notice and safety exceptions
Not automatically. Under Fam. Code 3024, in a custody order the court may direct a parent to notify the other parent of a plan to change the child's residence for more than 30 days, unless there is a prior written agreement. Notice goes by mail, return receipt requested, before the move, with a copy to counsel. To the extent feasible it must come within a minimum of 45 days before the move, so mediation can occur. The section applies only where the court has entered such an order and does not affect orders made before January 1, 1989.
Which moves trigger the rule
Statute 7501: any change of residence by a parent entitled to custody. Case law focuses on a move that would prejudice the child's rights or welfare. The notice trigger under 3024 is a move for more than 30 days, not a mileage line.
Objections and the effect of silence
No statutory objection deadline. The other parent moves the court to restrain the move (7501(a), a removal 'that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child') or to modify custody or visitation. Silence does not by itself waive anything.
The modification threshold
Not by itself. The changed-circumstance rule governs modification of a final custody order, and a move alone does not justify a change of custody without a substantial showing of detriment (Brown & Yana, quoting the move-away cases). A proposal to relocate is the occasion to raise it, not itself the change. In joint-physical-custody cases, modification runs under 3087 best interest (Burgess fn. 12).
Other qualifications
The Legislature wrote the Supreme Court's Burgess rule into the Family Code in 2003 (7501(b)), so a statute declares a case to be state public policy. Notice is at the court's option (3024) rather than required.
Important qualification
The favorable starting point concerns a qualifying custodial parent. Joint physical custody requires a different analysis. Domestic-violence rules can also change the analysis.
Burden summary
Qualifying custodial parent has a favorable starting point. Joint physical custody receives a fresh best-interest determination.
Statutory relocation factors. Neither parent favored. Notice required; no fixed day count.
Authority
C.R.S. 14-10-129
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
equal burden (neither parent favored)
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
functional (move that significantly affects the parenting arrangement)
Effect of silence
not addressed (no objection deadline; the move is decided on a motion to modify parenting time)
What the court weighs
Best interests of the child, considering all relevant factors, including domestic violence (proved by a preponderance), the 14-10-124(1.5)(a) factors, and nine relocation factors: the reasons for the move. The reasons for the objection. The history and quality of each party's relationship with the child. Educational opportunities at both locations. Extended family at both locations. The advantages of remaining with the primary caregiver. The anticipated impact of the move on the child. Whether a reasonable parenting schedule can be fashioned. And other relevant factors (14-10-129(2)(c)(I)-(IX)). There is no presumption for either parent, and the court must weigh both parents' constitutional interests, including the relocating parent's right to travel (Ciesluk).
Who carries the burden
Both parents share the burden equally of demonstrating what is in the child's best interests. There is no presumption for the majority-time parent and no burden shift (In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2005)).
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes, but with no day count. A party intending to relocate with the child to a residence that substantially changes the child's geographical ties to the other party must give that party written notice 'as soon as practicable' of the intent to relocate, the new location, the reason, and a proposed revised parenting-time plan (14-10-129(1)(a)(II)).
Which moves trigger the rule
A party with whom the child resides a majority of the time intends to relocate to a residence that substantially changes the geographical ties between the child and the other party (14-10-129(1)(a)(II), (2)(c)). No mileage threshold.
Objections and the effect of silence
No statutory deadline. The relocation is decided on a motion to modify parenting time, and the hearing is given priority on the court's docket (14-10-129(1)(a)(II), (2)(c)). Silence does not authorize the move.
The modification threshold
For a modification that substantially changes parenting time and changes the majority-residence party, § 14-10-129(2) requires facts arising since, or unknown to the court at, the prior decree showing a change in the child’s or majority-residence party’s circumstances and that modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interests. The court retains the prior schedule unless a listed exception applies; subsection (2)(c) lists the majority-time party’s intent to relocate with the child in a way substantially changing geographical ties to the other party. Section (1.5) separately excepts that qualifying intended relocation from the two-year restriction on repeat substantial-modification motions. In Ciesluk the Colorado Supreme Court read the statute so that a majority-time parent’s intended relocation is itself the change in circumstances that lets the court consider modification; the court must still find that modification serves the child’s best interests under the § 14-10-129(2)(c) factors, and the endangerment standard for restricting parenting time does not apply in relocation cases (§ 14-10-129(1)(b)(II)). Subsection (1.5) has not been construed in the cited authority.
Other qualifications
The statute gives a relocation hearing priority on the court's docket and lists domestic violence, proved by a preponderance, as defined in § 14-10-124(1.3) since May 27, 2026, as the first relocation factor. Ciesluk puts the best-interest burden on both parents equally.
Postjudgment § 46b-56d places the burden on the moving parent and sets no advance relocation-notice period. In the listed pending proceedings involving a child, while Practice Book § 25-5 automatic orders are effective, a party vacating the family residence must give the other party or counsel a written communication address within 48 hours of the move, subject to a prior contradictory judicial order. The same order also bars permanent child removal from Connecticut without the other party's written consent or a judicial order.
Authority
Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-56d
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
functional (move that significantly affects the parenting arrangement)
Effect of silence
not addressed (no objection procedure in statute or rule)
What the court weighs
In a postjudgment relocation proceeding governed by § 46b-56d, the relocating parent must prove, by a preponderance, that (1) the relocation is for a legitimate purpose, (2) the proposed location is reasonable in light of that purpose, and (3) the relocation is in the child's best interests. The court considers, among other things: each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move. The quality of each parent-child relationship. The impact on the quantity and quality of future contact with the non-relocating parent. How far the relocating parent's and child's lives may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally. And the feasibility of preserving the relationship through visitation (46b-56d(a)-(b)). The factors are not exclusive, and Ireland's family-unit reasoning still applies (K. S. v. R. S., 350 Conn. 692 (2024)). At an initial judgment, relocation is an ordinary 46b-56 best-interest question, and the Ireland/46b-56d factors are guidance only (Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn. App. 173 (2002), N. R. v. M. P., 227 Conn. App. 698 (2024), C. D. v. R. C. (Conn. App. 2026)). K. S., a dissolution-stage case, described relocation orders broadly under § 46b-56d and noted the trial court considered factors in §§ 46b-56(c) and 46b-56d(b). In the later initial-custody case C. D., the Appellate Court quoted K. S. for consideration of the family unit while expressly distinguishing the postjudgment reach of § 46b-56d(a).
Who carries the burden
On the relocating parent for all three elements, by a preponderance of the evidence. It does not shift (46b-56d(a)). The statute 'removed the burden shifting scheme set out in Ireland,' which had put the best-interest burden on the noncustodial parent (C. D. v. R. C. (Conn. App. 2026), citing Lederle v. Spivey, 113 Conn. App. 177, 187 (2009)).
Notice and safety exceptions
Section 46b-56d contains no relocation-notice provision. Practice Book § 25-5 automatic orders apply in the listed dissolution, civil-union dissolution, legal-separation, annulment, custody and visitation proceedings. They take effect for the plaintiff or applicant upon signing and for the defendant or respondent upon service, and remain during the action unless terminated, modified or amended by judicial order on a party's motion. In cases involving a child, whether or not the parties are married or in a civil union, and subject to a prior contradictory judicial order, a party vacating the family residence must provide the other party or counsel, in writing within 48 hours of the move, an address where that party can receive communication. While effective, the same child-case order also prohibits permanent removal of a minor child from Connecticut without the other party's written consent or a judicial order (§ 25-5(a)(1)–(2); 2026 Practice Book, last amended effective January 1, 2025). Individual orders may impose additional duties.
Which moves trigger the rule
Any post-judgment proceeding, after a judgment awarding custody of a minor child, involving relocation of either parent with the child, where the relocation would have a significant impact on an existing parenting plan (46b-56d(a)). No mileage figure.
Objections and the effect of silence
No statutory objection deadline. A relocation that significantly affects the plan is decided in a Superior Court proceeding in which the relocating parent must carry the burden, and the other parent opposes there. Silence does not authorize the move.
The modification threshold
Not required by the statute's text: a relocation with a significant impact on the plan brings 46b-56d into play. Whether a threshold finding of substantial change is also required was left open (Dolan v. Dolan, 211 Conn. App. 390, n. 8 (2022)). Prospective employment in another state, without evidence on the other factors, does not meet the burden (annotation citing 155 Conn. App. 848).
Other qualifications
The relocating parent carries the full burden on all three elements by a preponderance, and 46b-56d applies only after a custody judgment. A relocation resolved at the initial judgment stays an ordinary best-interest question under 46b-56.
Burden summary
On the moving parent
Notice summary
No advance period in § 46b-56d; conditional 48-hour address notice during pending proceedings
Statutory relocation factors. No allocation found. No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required.
Authority
13 Del. C. 734, 721(d)
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
no allocation found
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
functional (move that significantly affects the parenting arrangement)
Effect of silence
No silence procedure; § 721(d) injunction applies once effective
What the court weighs
Best interests under 722 (factors including the parents' wishes, the child's wishes, interaction with family, adjustment to home, school and community, health, compliance with duties, domestic violence and criminal history), plus, since 2021, eight mandatory relocation factors under 734: the nature and quality of the child's relationships with the relocating and non-relocating individuals and others. The child's age, needs and the likely impact of the move. The feasibility of preserving the relationship through visitation. The child's preference. Whether the individual seeking relocation has an established pattern of conduct either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the nonrelocating individual. Whether the move enhances quality of life for both the relocating individual and the child. Each side's reasons. And any other best-interest factor. When both parents seek to relocate, the Family Court may adapt the 734 factors (Green v. Fletcher, Del. 2025). Before 2021 the court could, but need not, consider the Model Relocation Act factors (Worthington v. Bachman, Del. May 31, 2017).
Who carries the burden
The statute is silent. No burden allocation identified, including in the Supreme Court orders applying 734. Unclear. Price v. Boulden (2014) and Nash v. Wilson (2019) also allocate no burden.
Notice and safety exceptions
No general relocation notice statute found. Instead, section 721(d) imposes an automatic mutual preliminary injunction: when a custody or visitation petition is filed, both parties are enjoined from removing a child then residing in Delaware from the jurisdiction without the parties' prior written consent or the Court's permission. It binds the petitioner on filing and the respondent on service.
Which moves trigger the rule
In the course of custody or visitation litigation, a proposed relocation of a child for 60 days or more that is either a move outside Delaware or a move that materially affects the current custodial and residential arrangement or order (734).
Objections and the effect of silence
No statutory objection deadline is identified. Relocation may be litigated in a custody or visitation proceeding. Under § 721(d), the preliminary injunction prohibits removal from the court’s jurisdiction of a child then residing in Delaware without the parties’ prior written consent or the court’s permission; it is effective against the petitioner upon filing and the respondent upon service. Outside that injunction, § 721(d) does not establish a silence procedure.
The modification threshold
No separate material-change threshold appears in § 734. Section 729 distinguishes modification of custody or residence orders: a consent order, interim order, or written agreement may be modified at any time under § 722. For an order after a full hearing on legal custody or primary residence, an application filed within two years requires a finding after a hearing that continued enforcement may endanger physical health or significantly impair emotional development; an application filed more than two years after the most recent order requires consideration of harm and advantages, compliance with prior orders and duties, and the § 722 factors. Section 729(a) separately addresses visitation. See 13 Del. C. § 729.
Other qualifications
Upon filing a custody or visitation petition, § 721(d) directs a preliminary injunction against removal from the court’s jurisdiction of a child then residing in Delaware without the parties’ prior written consent or court permission. It binds the petitioner on filing and the respondent on service. Under § 727(d), a custody order entered when a parent is being deployed is an interim order.
Burden summary
No allocation found
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Best interest is primary. Courts also weigh additional relocation factors from Estopina when a custody petition includes a relocation request. A party seeking to modify custody carries the burden. No general relocation-notice period identified. Individual custody orders can impose notice.
Authority
Case law (Estopina 2013)
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
none defined by statute or rule
Effect of silence
not addressed (no objection procedure in statute or rule)
What the court weighs
Best interest is primary under §16-914(a)(3). Estopina requires consideration of additional relevant relocation factors when a custody petition includes a relocation request, including an initial request; it describes ten factors adopted from Samuel v. Person (D.C. Super. Ct. 2010). They concern: the child’s relationship with each parent; the child’s resources, temperament and special developmental needs; the relocating parent’s psychological stability and both parents’ parenting effectiveness; the success, stability and continuity of the existing arrangement; comparative advantages and disadvantages, including school, social, health and extracurricular opportunities; benefits to the child from improved parental circumstances; feasible alternative access and travel arrangements; the parents’ motivations; the effect on the noncustodial relationship, including past support for or interference with it; and parental conflict and how recent the marital separation is. Estopina affirmed although the court did not specifically address motivations, because neither party alleged an ulterior motive. Duguma’s different posture limits automatic application to every custody dispute with a past move. Macklin reaffirmed that joint custody need not mean equal time and cited Estopina for stability and continuity; Macklin itself was a divorce custody award, not a geographic-relocation holding. No relocation-specific presumption for or against a move appears in these four opinions.
Who carries the burden
Section 16-914(f)(1)–(2) places the ordinary custody-modification burden on the party seeking a change, by a preponderance of the evidence: a substantial and material change in circumstances and the child’s best interest. Builta (2024) also required an unforeseen change for the physical-custody agreement incorporated but not merged into the divorce decree. The objecting mother, as modification movant, failed to prove that the father’s planned move to Severna Park, Maryland warranted changing their shared custody. These are modification rules, not a relocation-specific shift or the standard for an initial custody award.
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable relocation-specific advance-notice provision identified. Individual custody orders can impose notice. Builta quotes this case’s requirement that a party changing the residence in which that party will live with the child provide the new address to the other party at least 30 days before the move, or as much time as possible if 30 days is not possible. The order separately requires at least 14 days of notice if either party wishes to travel with or send the child more than 100 miles from D.C. Those are terms of the parties’ order, not generally applicable District notice periods.
Which moves trigger the rule
No generally applicable mileage trigger identified. Estopina addressed a custody petition with a prospective relocation request. Duguma distinguished children already living and attending school in D.C. when litigation began, with credited testimony of the parents’ prior agreement concerning the children’s schooling there. Builta concerned modification of an existing equal-time arrangement and later quoted a case-specific motion requirement for a move with the child more than 100 miles from D.C.; that term is not a general statutory trigger.
Objections and the effect of silence
No general relocation objection deadline or consent-by-silence procedure identified. A parent may raise relocation through custody or modification proceedings, and §16-914(f)(1) also permits the court to act on its own motion. An existing order may prescribe a route: Builta quotes a requirement to seek a hearing before a move with the child more than 100 miles from D.C. unless both parents approve the residence change in writing. Neither parent challenged that particular term; it is not a generally applicable 100-mile rule.
The modification threshold
No automatic result follows from the moves in these cases. Builta v. Guzmán (D.C. October 3, 2024) upheld the failure-of-proof finding on a planned Severna Park move in an existing equal-time arrangement; unsupported predicted harms, continuity in the child’s D.C. school and activities, and the credited commute evidence mattered. Duguma v. Ayalew, 145 A.3d 517 (D.C. 2016), treated the case as an initial custody determination rather than relocation litigation: the children already lived and attended school in D.C. when suit began, and the mother supplied no evidence contradicting the father’s testimony that the parents had agreed to their schooling there. Duguma remanded for inquiry into the children’s custody wishes.
Other qualifications
Estopina adopted ten additional relevant relocation factors from Samuel v. Person, a Superior Court opinion, while applying statutory best interests and joint-custody principles. It did not require findings on an inapplicable motivation issue. Duguma and Builta show why the actual posture matters: Duguma concerned children already living and attending school in D.C. when litigation began, with credited testimony of the parents’ prior agreement concerning their schooling there; Builta concerned modification of an existing custody arrangement.
Important qualification
The four appellate opinions address different custody postures. Builta’s 30-day address notice, 14-day travel notice and 100-mile hearing provision are case-specific order terms.
Burden summary
Ordinary modification
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
The mover must first prove best interests. The burden then shifts to the objector. Harman holds that an evenly balanced record at the second step defeats the objection.
Authority
Fla. Stat. 61.13001
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden shifts to the objecting parent after a threshold showing
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
yes, qualified
What the court weighs
No presumption for or against relocation (§ 61.13001(7)). The court evaluates eleven statutory factors (§ 61.13001(7)(a)-(k)): the child's relationships. Age and developmental needs. Feasibility of preserving the relationship with the nonrelocating parent. The child's preference. Quality-of-life gain. Each parent's reasons. Economic circumstances. Whether the relocation is sought in good faith and the extent to which the objecting parent has fulfilled financial obligations to the relocating parent (child support, spousal support, marital property and marital debt). Career and other opportunities for the objecting parent. Substance abuse or domestic violence history. And any other relevant factor. The burden rule in (8) is sequential (see burden).
Who carries the burden
The moving parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that relocation serves the child. If that burden is met, § 61.13001(8) shifts the same burden to the objecting parent to prove that it does not. Section 61.13001(7) disclaims a presumption for or against relocation.
Harman v. Alonso, 425 So. 3d 674 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025), applies the first step to the mover's evidence. At the second step, an evenly balanced record means the objecting parent has failed to carry the shifted burden. If the mover fails the first step, the objector has no burden to carry. A sworn petition alone does not satisfy the first step at an evidentiary hearing.
Notice and safety exceptions
A parent or other person seeking relocation must file a sworn petition and serve the other parent and every other person entitled to access to or time-sharing with the child (§ 61.13001(3)(a)–(b)), unless all required persons enter the agreement described in subsection (2). When a relevant action, judgment or decree already exists, subsection (2)(b) directs the parties to seek court ratification of that agreement. The statute sets no minimum number of days before the move.
Which moves trigger the rule
A change of a parent's or other person's principal residence at least 50 miles from the residence at the last time-sharing order (or at filing of the pending action), for at least 60 consecutive days, excluding temporary absences for vacation, education or the child's health care (§ 61.13001(1)(e)). In Ramos v. Hunter (4th DCA 2026), § 61.13001 did not apply where the mother moved the child before the father filed the paternity action; the request was treated as part of the initial time-sharing determination.
Objections and the effect of silence
An objecting response must be written, verified, filed and served within 20 days after service of the petition (§ 61.13001(3)(a)7., (5)). If the other parent and every other person entitled to access or time-sharing fail to file a timely objecting response, the relocation is presumed to be in the child's best interest, and absent good cause the court enters an order adopting the petition's schedule, possibly without a hearing (§ 61.13001(3)(d)). If a response is timely filed, the parent may not relocate without court permission at a temporary hearing or trial. In Fitzgerald v. Dostie (6th DCA 2026), a hearing noticed only for temporary relief did not supply notice for permanent relief; the court affirmed temporary relief and reversed permanent relief for a final hearing.
The modification threshold
Not required for a relocation petition. Only a § 61.13(3) modification requires a substantial and material change (Lally, 4th DCA December 10, 2025). Separately, since ch. 2023-301, if the parents lived more than 50 miles apart at the last order and a parent moves to within 50 miles of the other, that move 'may be considered' a substantial and material change for modifying time-sharing (§ 61.13(3)).
Other qualifications
If the other parent and every other person entitled to access or time-sharing fail to file a timely objecting response, the statute creates a presumption that the relocation is in the child's best interest and should be allowed, and absent good cause the court enters an order adopting the petition's schedule, possibly without an evidentiary hearing (61.13001(3)(d)). Florida also has a reverse-relocation rule: moving to within 50 miles of the other parent can itself support modification.
Important qualification
The mover must first prove best interests. The burden then shifts to the objector. Harman holds that an evenly balanced record at the second step defeats the objection.
General best-interest factors. Ordinary modification. 30 days; exceptions apply.
Authority
O.C.G.A. 19-9-3(f)(3) (Bodne)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
not addressed (no objection procedure in statute or rule)
What the court weighs
Georgia applies its ordinary two-step modification test: first a material change in condition affecting the child since the last award, then best interests. Bodne (2003) forbids any presumption that a relocating custodial parent will lose custody and any presumption in favor of relocation, and rejects bright-line tests. Scott v. Scott (2003) restates (quoting Ofchus) that Georgia law does not permit modification based solely on a custodial parent's relocation, and holds that a self-executing change-of-custody clause triggered by a move or remarriage, which ignores the child's best interests at the time, violates public policy. Dellinger (2004) extends Scott to self-executing changes of visitation triggered by a move, allowing them only in narrow conditions. Hether v. Campbell (2025) applies all three. In the June 15, 2026 appeal (A26A0347), the court held that the unappealed May 2024 no-material-change finding remained binding and did not authorize a new trial after remittitur; it reversed the new custody/decision-making rulings, vacated the duplicate domestication ruling, and remanded with direction. Footnote 4 leaves a new petition based on later events available and expresses no opinion whether the actual move or later interference would constitute a material change.
Who carries the burden
On the parent seeking a change of custody: first a material change affecting the child, then that the change serves the child's best interests. No relocation-specific shift. Bodne overruled cases that gave the custodial parent a prima facie right to retain custody unless the objector proved endangerment.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes, for any change of residence. Unless a court order provides otherwise, a parent who changes residence must notify the other parent (and, if the mover is the custodial parent, anyone with visitation or parenting time) at least 30 days before the anticipated change, including the full new address (§ 19-9-3(f)(3)). The subsection says 'notification' and specifies no delivery method. (f)(2) requires writing only for a pickup-address change.
Which moves trigger the rule
Any change of residence by a parent under a custody judgment triggers the notice provision unless the court order provides otherwise. No mileage threshold and no in-state or out-of-state distinction.
Objections and the effect of silence
None in the statute. The other parent's remedy is to file for modification. No objection deadline and no consent-by-silence rule.
The modification threshold
No per se rule, and a move alone is not enough (Scott, Brazil v. Williams, 359 Ga. App. 487, 859 S.E.2d 490 (2021) ). A trial court that finds no material change cannot shift custody conditionally on the move (Hether). But under § 19-9-3(b), parenting-time provisions can be reviewed and modified without any showing of changed conditions, no more than once every two years.
Other qualifications
Unless the court order provides otherwise, the notice duty attaches to a change of residence, however short, and a two-year no-showing review of parenting time lets a court redo the schedule after a move without proving material change. Deployment moves are handled separately in § 19-9-3(i), including a 30-day address-change notice for the non-deploying parent under a temporary order.
Fisher declines a requested primary-caretaker preference and gives no single factor presumptive paramount weight. No modern decision allocates a general relocation burden; Gillespie’s 1953 burden statement was narrowed by Estrella in 1959, and later-treatment review is limited. Electronic visitation cannot justify relocation.
Authority
HRS 571-46 (Fisher, Waldecker)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
no general modern allocation identified
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
no relocation-specific distance threshold identified
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent procedure identified in the custody provisions or named opinions
What the court weighs
Hawaii applies the child's best interests under HRS § 571-46. Fisher v. Fisher, 111 Haw. 41, 137 P.3d 355 (2006), rejected a primary-caretaker preference and refused to give any single factor presumptive paramount weight. It did not establish a formal relocation burden rule. Under § 571-46(a)(16)(B), remote electronic visitation cannot justify or support a custodial parent's relocation. DJ v. CJ (2020) requires procedural fairness where an out-of-state move affects the other parent's substantive liberty interest.
Who carries the burden
No modern Hawaii appellate decision allocates a general relocation burden of persuasion. The modern cases state the standard rather than a burden: the governing consideration is whether relocation is in the child’s best interests (DJ v. CJ, 2020), with no statutory presumptions or ‘super-factors’ and no single factor given presumptive paramount weight (Fisher, 2006; KP v. EM, 2025). Gillespie v. Gillespie, 40 Haw. 315 (1953), did place on the parent seeking to remove the children the burden to show the change would clearly serve their best interests, on a post-decree record with no proof of benefit; Estrella v. Estrella, 43 Haw. 210 (1959), confined Gillespie to that record, rejected a near-necessity reading, and made the child’s welfare the ‘pole star,’ with each case decided on its own facts. Maeda (App. 1990) upheld a custody award conditioned on the mother proving in court that a move would serve the child. No later majority has reaffirmed or overruled Gillespie’s burden sentence. Waldecker (2016) separately requires a best-interest finding before enforcing an automatic custody transfer and rejects a separate material-change prerequisite. DJ reproduces a trial court’s ‘carried her burden’ finding without reviewing the custody merits; KP’s affirmance is record-specific.
Notice and safety exceptions
No general advance relocation-notice period was identified in § 571-46, § 571-46.1 or the named opinions. Section 571-46.1 addresses joint custody, not the claimed statewide 60-day notice rule. DJ’s own decree required 60 days’ written notice, an order-specific obligation.
Which moves trigger the rule
None defined by statute. Relocation is litigated in a custody or post-decree proceeding, typically a request to move the child out of state or to the mainland.
Objections and the effect of silence
No relocation objection deadline or deemed-consent procedure identified in the custody provisions. Tetreault’s statement about filing an objection and requesting a hearing concerns attorney fees, not the relocation merits burden. Applicable orders and generally applicable motion procedures require separate attention.
The modification threshold
No separate material-change threshold. Waldecker (2016) overruled Nadeau and Hollaway to the extent they require a material change before the court considers the child's best interests in modifying custody. It requires one best-interest inquiry under HRS § 571-46, and held that the court could not enforce the decree's automatic transfer from joint physical custody to the father's sole physical custody without finding that transfer was in the child's best interests at the expected relocation.
Other qualifications
No general advance relocation-notice period identified. Section 571-46(a)(16)(B) bars using electronic visitation to justify or support a custodial parent’s relocation. DJ addresses procedural fairness where an interstate move affects the other parent’s liberty interest; that decision did not review the underlying custody merits.
Important qualification
Fisher declines a requested primary-caretaker preference and gives no single factor presumptive paramount weight. No modern decision allocates a general relocation burden; Gillespie’s 1953 burden statement was narrowed by Estrella in 1959 and has not been reaffirmed or overruled. Later-treatment review is limited. Electronic visitation cannot justify relocation.
Burden summary
General modern allocation unresolved
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Trigger summary
No relocation-specific distance threshold identified
Court-made relocation factors. On the moving parent. No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required.
Authority
Case law (Bartosz, Danti)
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
none defined by statute or rule
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent procedure identified in the custody provisions or named decisions
What the court weighs
Best interests govern, using the § 32-717 factors plus relocation factors approved in Danti (2009) that courts 'may' consider, repeated in Raber (2025) and Bickerstaff (2026): motives for relocating or opposing. The quality of each parent's relationship with the child. The child's attachment. The harm of continued parental hostility. Economic, emotional and educational benefit. The quality of the child's lifestyle if the move is allowed or denied. The effect on extended family. And whether suitable visitation can preserve the relationship with the non-custodial parent. Courts must also account for Idaho's presumption favoring frequent and continuing contact with both parents (Bartosz). Bartosz held there is no presumption against relocation. Raber I vacated and remanded a judgment adopting a two-week Idaho–Texas shared-custody schedule because the court had not made findings explaining why that custody arrangement served the child’s best interests.
Who carries the burden
The parent seeking permission to relocate must prove the move is in the child's best interests. Once proved, the parent is allowed to move (Bartosz, Bickerstaff 2026, which states that the relocating parent bears the burden of proving best interests). No shift to the objector.
Notice and safety exceptions
No general advance relocation-notice requirement was identified in § 32-717, § 32-717B or the named relocation decisions. Individual custody orders remain separate.
Which moves trigger the rule
None defined. Relocation is decided when a parent asks the court for permission to move with the child, or when a custody judgment addresses where the child will live.
Objections and the effect of silence
The cited relocation proceedings involve requests for court permission and opposition. No separate objection deadline or deemed-consent procedure was identified in the custody provisions or named decisions. Individual orders and generally applicable motion rules remain separate.
The modification threshold
Partly answered. A post-decree request to relocate is decided as a relocation question on best interests, with the burden on the moving parent, not as a change of custody (Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 64 P.3d 327 (2003)). After an actual move, a court may modify custody when the move's effects show a material, permanent and substantial change, but not simply because of the move (Ford v. Ford, 108 Idaho 443, 700 P.2d 65 (1985)). No Supreme Court case says a proposed move alone is or is not such a change.
Other qualifications
A statutory joint-custody presumption sits on top of a purely case-law relocation test, and the Idaho Supreme Court issued three decisions involving custody and relocation in 2025–2026: Raber I and Raber II, successive appeals in one case, and Bickerstaff. Military: Section 32-717(6) says that when an active Idaho National Guard member is ordered or called to duty, or a reservist is ordered to active federal service, that service is not 'a substantial or material and permanent change in circumstance' to modify by reducing the member's previously decreed custody and visitation.
Burden summary
On the moving parent
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Statutory relocation factors. On the moving parent. 60 days; exceptions apply.
Authority
750 ILCS 5/609.2, 5/600(g)
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
no (consent or court order required)
What the court weighs
The court modifies the parenting plan or allocation judgment according to the child's best interests, considering eleven factors in § 609.2(g): reasons for the relocation. Reasons for the objection. The history and quality of each parent's relationship, including any substantial failure to exercise allocated responsibilities. Educational opportunities at each location. Extended family at each location. Anticipated impact on the child. Whether a reasonable allocation of responsibilities is possible after the move. The child's wishes. Possible arrangements for exercising parental responsibilities. Minimizing impairment to the parent-child relationship. And other relevant factors. Best interests are paramount (Fatkin, 2019).
Who carries the burden
On the parent seeking to relocate, by a preponderance of the evidence. The burdens of production and persuasion both stay with the petitioner. Although § 609.2 dropped the old removal statute's express burden language, In re Marriage of Levites, 2021 IL App (2d) 200552, held that § 609.2(f) implies the burden rests on the relocating parent. Kenney (2023) and Burmood (2023) follow, and Eckert (1988) is the pre-2016 source. No shift.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. Written notice to the other parent under the parenting plan or allocation judgment, with a copy filed with the circuit clerk, at least 60 days before the move, unless that is impracticable (then the earliest practicable date) or the court orders otherwise. The notice must state the intended date, the new address if known, and the expected length if not permanent (§ 609.2(c)-(d)). The court may waive or seal information where there is a history of domestic violence. Failing to comply without good cause may count against the mover's good faith and may support an award of fees (§ 609.2(d)).
Which moves trigger the rule
§ 600(g): a change of the child's primary residence (1) from Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry or Will County to an in-state residence more than 25 miles away. (2) from any other county to an in-state residence more than 50 miles away. Or (3) to a residence outside Illinois more than 25 miles away, measured by an internet mapping service over surface roads, using the shortest route. Only a parent with a majority of parenting time, or equal parenting time, may seek to relocate with the child (§ 609.2(b)).
Objections and the effect of silence
If the nonrelocating parent signs the notice and the relocating parent files it, relocation is allowed without further court action (§ 609.2(e)). If the other parent objects or does not sign, or the parents cannot agree on modification, the relocating parent must petition for permission (§ 609.2(f)). No fixed objection deadline. Silence does not authorize the move.
The modification threshold
Yes. § 609.2(a): a parent's relocation constitutes a substantial change in circumstances for purposes of § 610.5.
Other qualifications
Mileage triggers depend on the county: 25 miles in Cook and the five collar counties, 50 miles elsewhere, and 25 miles for any move out of state. Only the parent with majority or equal parenting time may petition to relocate at all.
Burden summary
On the moving parent
Notice summary
60 days; exceptions apply
Trigger summary
25 or 50 miles in state by county, or out of state more than 25 miles
burden shifts to the objecting parent after a threshold showing
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
principal-residence move; statutory definitions and exceptions apply
Effect of silence
yes
What the court weighs
The relocating individual first proves the move is in good faith and for a legitimate reason. If so, the burden shifts to the nonrelocating parent to show the move is not in the child's best interest (IC 31-17-2.2-5(e)-(f)). In deciding whether to modify custody, parenting time or support, the court takes into account six factors: distance. Hardship and expense for the nonrelocating individual. Feasibility of preserving the relationship. An established pattern of conduct by the relocating individual, including promoting or thwarting contact. Each side's reasons. And other best-interest factors (-1(c)).
Who carries the burden
The relocating individual bears the initial burden (good faith and legitimate reason). It then shifts to the nonrelocating parent to show the move is not in the child's best interest (IC 31-17-2.2-5(e)-(f)). Applied in D.C. v. J.A.C. (Ind. 2012), Lynn v. Freeman (2020), Pilkington (2024) and V.D. (2024). Carrell v. Schurman (Ind. Ct. App. September 29, 2026) remanded where the trial court put the initial burden on the nonrelocating father, confusing the order of proof with the burden of proof.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. A relocating individual (a person who has or seeks custody or parenting time and intends to move their principal residence) files a notice of intent to move with the clerk of the court that issued the custody or parenting-time order, or, if that does not apply, the court with jurisdiction over the proceedings. The notice is served on each nonrelocating party at least 30 days before the move, or within 14 days after learning of the move, whichever is sooner. Nonparties get it by registered or certified mail on the same timing (IC 31-17-2.2-1(a), -3(1)-(2)). The notice must state the new address and any different mailing address, all telephone numbers, the move date, a brief statement of the specific reasons, whether the relocating individual believes a revision of parenting time or grandparent visitation is necessary, that a response is due within 20 days, that a party may petition to prevent the relocation and a nonrelocating individual may petition to modify, and that all existing orders remain in effect until modified (-3(3)). No filing is required if a prior order addressed the move, or under § 31-17-2.2-1(b)(2), which as printed requires that the move will decrease the distance between the two residences or increase it by no more than 20 miles, with a separate trailing condition that the move 'allow the child to remain enrolled in the child's current school.' The school condition is printed outside both distance alternatives; no appellate decision construes whether it also conditions a distance-decreasing move. Collins v. Pugh, a 2026 nonprecedential memorandum, paraphrases the exception in a footnote while deciding a contempt question under the parties' own agreement, and does not construe the clause. A court may protect identifying information or waive notice to the extent necessary upon the specified significant risk of substantial harm finding (-4).
Which moves trigger the rule
A “relocating individual” includes a person who has or seeks custody or parenting time and intends to move their principal residence (IC 31-9-2.1-208). Separately, “relocation” means a change of primary residence for at least 60 days for purposes of IC 31-14-13 and IC 31-17-2.2 (IC 31-9-2.1-209) (both definitions relocated from former IC 31-9-2 by P.L.145-2026, effective July 1, 2026). Section 31-17-2.2-1(a) states the filing duty in terms of a relocating individual; subsection (b) describes filing exceptions. The Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines commentary states that the notice requirement applies to a change of primary residence for at least 60 days; the statutory filing exceptions and any applicable order must also be considered.
Objections and the effect of silence
Unless the parties execute and file a written agreement resolving all custody, parenting-time, grandparent-visitation and child-support issues resulting from the relocation (with a signed support worksheet attached if support is modified), the nonrelocating parent must file a response within 20 days after service: no objection. No objection but a motion to modify. Or an objection with a motion to prevent the move and to modify (IC 31-17-2.2-5(a)). If the nonrelocating parent does not respond, the relocating individual may relocate (-5(g)). The court holds a full evidentiary hearing on request (-5(d)). Existing custody, parenting-time, grandparent-visitation and support orders remain effective until modified (§ 31-17-2.2-1(e)).
The modification threshold
No separate showing needed. Baxendale v. Raich (Ind. 2008) held that when relocation prompts a modification, the § 31-17-2-21 requirement of a substantial change in a § 31-17-2-8 factor does not apply. The relocation factors govern. Relocation alone does not require a change in custody.
Other qualifications
Notice is filed with the court clerk, not just sent to the other parent. The mover first proves good faith and a legitimate reason; the nonrelocating parent then must show the move is not in the child’s best interest. Failure to respond within the statutory 20-day window permits relocation, but existing custody, parenting-time, grandparent-visitation and support orders remain effective until modified.
The 150-mile provision permits a material-change finding. It does not automatically establish one or decide the child’s best interests.
Authority
Iowa Code 598.21D
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
not addressed in § 598.21D
What the court weighs
No relocation-specific best-interest test in the statute. For a move of 150 miles or more, the court 'may consider' it a substantial change. If it does, the court must modify the order to at least preserve, as nearly as possible, the child's relationship with the nonrelocating parent, and may order extended visitation during summer vacations and school breaks, phone contact, a transportation allocation, and a cash bond where there has been past interference. Whether physical care changes is decided under Frederici and Hoffman: the parent seeking the change must show a material and substantial change and a superior ability to care for the child, with Frederici's relocation considerations (including the reason for the move) weighed.
Who carries the burden
On the parent seeking to modify physical care: preponderance, and a 'heavy burden' to prove a material and substantial change and that they can minister more effectively to the child (Frederici, Hoffman, Lydolph 2021). The relocating parent need not prove the move is in the child's best interests to defeat a physical-care change, but under Frederici a relocating parent who asks to modify visitation carries the burden on that request.
Notice and safety exceptions
Section 598.21D does not contain a relocation-notice period. No general relocation-notice statute identified; individual custody orders may impose notice obligations.
Which moves trigger the rule
Section 598.21D applies when a parent with joint legal custody and physical care, or with sole legal custody, moves the child's residence 150 miles or more from the residence at the time custody was awarded. The statute is permissive. The Court of Appeals holds a shorter move may still count (Lydolph 2021), citing footnote 10 of Justice Waterman's dissent in Hoffman, not the Hoffman majority.
Objections and the effect of silence
Section 598.21D sets no objection deadline or consent-by-silence rule. The other parent may seek modification; a custody order may impose its own notice obligations.
The modification threshold
Discretionary. Section 598.21D says the court may treat a move of 150 miles or more as a substantial change. Lydolph (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) holds a shorter move may qualify on the facts, relying on a footnote in the Hoffman dissent. The Hoffman majority found a 70-mile move did not justify changing physical care on its facts.
Other qualifications
A 150-mile trigger permits, but does not require, a substantial-change finding. Section 598.21D sets no notice or objection procedure.
Important qualification
The 150-mile provision permits a material-change finding. It does not automatically establish one or decide the child’s best interests.
Burden summary
Ordinary modification
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Trigger summary
150 miles (court may treat as a substantial change)
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent procedure specified in § 23-3222; existing order terms remain separate
What the court weighs
On a modification motion based on a change of residence or removal, the court 'shall consider all factors the court deems appropriate including, but not limited to' (1) the move's effect on the child's best interests, (2) its effect on any party with rights under the article, and (3) the increased cost the move imposes on any party exercising those rights (K.S.A. 23-3222(c)). This is a short, nonexhaustive, relocation-specific statutory list, read together with the general best-interest factors of 23-3201 and 23-3203. No presumption for or against the move.
Who carries the burden
The party seeking modification bears the burden to establish a material change of circumstances; if established, the court then determines whether the requested modification serves the child’s best interests (D.B. v. M.P. (2026, unpublished), citing State ex rel. Secretary, DCF v. M.R.B., 313 Kan. 855, 861–62, 865 (2021)). Grippin (2008) reversed a placement order that put the burden on the relocating parent when the other parent had moved to change placement. Section 23-3218(a) does not allocate the burden.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. A parent entitled to legal custody, residency or parenting time must give the other parent written notice at least 30 days before changing the child's residence or removing the child from Kansas for more than 90 days, sent by restricted mail, return receipt requested, to the last known address (K.S.A. 23-3222(a)). Subsection (d) excuses a parent entitled to legal custody or residency from giving notice to the other parent if that other parent was convicted of a specified crime in which the child was the victim; the exception is not stated for a parent whose only entitlement is parenting time.
Which moves trigger the rule
Any change of the child's residence (no mileage threshold), or removal from Kansas for more than 90 days (K.S.A. 23-3222(a)(1)-(2)).
Objections and the effect of silence
None in the statute: no objection deadline and no consent-by-silence rule. The other parent may move to modify custody, residency, support or parenting time. The move 'may be considered' a material change (-(c)). Failure to give notice is indirect civil contempt and may lead to fees and expenses (-(b)).
The modification threshold
Discretionary: a change of residence or removal 'may be considered a material change of circumstances which justifies modification' (23-3222(c)). In D.B. v. M.P. (2026, unpublished) the district court acknowledged relocation as a material change. Affirmed.
Other qualifications
Notice must go by restricted mail, return receipt requested, and noncompliance is expressly indirect civil contempt. The statute also covers removing the child from Kansas for more than 90 days, not just a change of residence. Military: under K.S.A. 23-3217(b), the absence, relocation or noncompliance of a parent who has received deployment, mobilization, temporary duty or unaccompanied tour orders is not by itself a material change warranting permanent modification.
Burden summary
Ordinary modification
Notice summary
30 days; exceptions apply
Trigger summary
Child residence change or removal from Kansas over 90 days
General best-interest factors; the relief sought determines the custody or timesharing modification standard. The statewide rule requires filing and service before the move and provides twenty-day motion windows; local rules and orders may add requirements.
Authority
FCRPP 7(2), KRS 403.320, 403.340
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
The rule has twenty-day motion windows but does not state that silence supplies consent to relocation
What the court weighs
Pre-decree: KRS 403.270 best interests, which since 2018 carries the rebuttable joint-custody and equal-parenting-time presumption. Marshall v. Marshall (Ky. Ct. App. 2025, unpublished) applied it to a pre-decree move request and vacated a ruling that had treated the request as a KRS 403.320 relocation motion. No preference for the primary residential parent (Frances v. Frances, 266 S.W.3d 754 (Ky. 2008), Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003), overruled in part). Post-decree (Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2008)): a relocation motion is a modification either of timesharing (KRS 403.320(3): best interests 'whenever', a 'less than reasonable' restriction requires serious endangerment) or of custody (KRS 403.340: within two years only serious endangerment or placement with a de facto custodian, after two years change in circumstances plus best interests). Layman v. Bohanon, 599 S.W.3d 423 (Ky. 2020): the 2018 joint-custody/equal-time presumption of KRS 403.270(2) applies to initial custody determinations and (via KRS 403.340(5)) to custody modifications, but not to timesharing modifications under KRS 403.320. 'less than reasonable' does not mean less than 50 percent.
Who carries the burden
The party seeking modification bears the burden of bringing the motion (either the relocating parent under 403.320/403.340 or the objecting parent). Pennington frames the question as whether 'the party opposing relocation has met his burden' when that parent is the movant. No presumption for or against relocation and no burden-shifting. If a custody change is ordered, the 403.340(5) equal-time presumption applies (Layman).
Notice and safety exceptions
Under the statewide court rule: Written notice filed with the court and served on the non-relocating joint custodian (joint custody) or on the non-custodial parent (sole custody) before the custodian relocates. Must state proposed address, date, and effect on court-ordered timesharing. That rule specifies no minimum advance period; local rules and individual orders may add requirements. Commentary: a relocating custodian with an EPO/DVO against the other parent need not disclose the destination. Form AOC-241, Notice of Relocation (Rev. 9-21), implements the rule: it states the 20-day windows and provides a sealed envelope for the address and reasons where an EPO or DVO is active against the other parent.
Which moves trigger the rule
A custodian 'seeks to relocate'. No mileage threshold and no in-state/out-of-state distinction in the rule text.
Objections and the effect of silence
Joint custody: relocating custodian must file an agreed order or motion to modify timesharing within 20 days of filing notice if timesharing is affected. Non-relocating joint custodian may move to modify custody or timesharing within 20 days of service. Sole custody: non-custodial parent may move to contest the timesharing change within 20 days of service. Rule does not say silence authorizes the move.
The modification threshold
Not required for a timesharing change under KRS 403.320(3). A change of custody under KRS 403.340 needs endangerment/de facto custodian (within two years) or a change in circumstances of the child or custodian plus best interests (after two years). A proposed move alone is not a stated trigger.
Other qualifications
The statewide rule provides court filing/service and twenty-day motion windows without a minimum advance-notice period or distance threshold. Layman, a timesharing-modification case, holds that the equal-time presumption does not govern timesharing modification under KRS 403.320; it is not itself a relocation holding.
Burden summary
Ordinary modification
Notice summary
Court filing before move; statewide rule has no fixed advance period
Statutory relocation factors. On the moving parent. 60 days; exceptions apply.
Authority
La. R.S. 9:355.1 to 9:355.17
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
yes
What the court weighs
Court considers all relevant factors on best interest, including the 12 listed in 9:355.14(A) (relationships, age and needs, feasibility of preserving the relationship, child's views, pattern of promoting or thwarting, quality of life, reasons, employment and economics, objector's financial compliance, feasibility of objector's relocation, substance abuse or violence, other). Court may not consider whether the mover would relocate without the child if denied or whether the objector would also move (355.14(B)). 2012 revision comment (a) to 9:355.10, as quoted in Owens v. Owens, 140 So. 3d 865 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2014) and Narcisse-Thomas (2024): 'there is no presumption in favor of or against relocation.'
Who carries the burden
For relocation contested under R.S. 9:355.7, the person proposing the move must prove good faith and the child’s best interest by a preponderance on contradictory hearing (R.S. 9:355.10, revision comment (a); Narcisse-Thomas). Gathen, citing Curole, called that allocation a very heavy burden, placing no relocation burden on the nonrelocating parent. A separate request to modify custody is subject to the applicable modification standard, including Civil Code art. 138; it is not resolved solely by the relocation burden.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. No later than the 60th day before the proposed relocation, by registered or certified mail return receipt requested or commercial courier, to the last known address of any person recognized as a parent and any other person awarded custody or visitation. Or within 10 days after the mover learns the required information if it could not reasonably have been known in time and the move cannot reasonably be delayed. Notice must include new address, date, reasons, proposed revised schedule, and a statement of the 30-day objection right.
Which moves trigger the rule
'Relocation' is a change in the child's principal residence for 60 days or more. Subpart applies to an intent to establish the child's principal residence outside Louisiana, or within Louisiana more than 75 miles from (a) the other parent's domicile if no custody order, (b) the child's principal residence at the most recent decree, or (c) a person entitled to object's domicile if no designated residence or equal custody. Exempt: express written agreement for relocation and specified protective/restraining orders. From January 1, 2027, miles are measured by the shortest distance publicly accessible by motor vehicle or public ferry from the child’s principal residence to the new intended residence (Act 287). The Act does not apply to relocation litigation pending on its effective date, but applies to any subsequent relocation after final disposition of that litigation. To the extent the Subpart conflicts with an existing custody order, it does not apply to that order's relocation terms (9:355.2(C) before January 1, 2027; 9:355.2(B) under Act 287 thereafter, subject to its applicability provision).
Objections and the effect of silence
Written objection by registered or certified mail or commercial courier within 30 days of receipt (9:355.7). No timely objection: the mover may relocate after giving notice (9:355.9), so silence effectively authorizes the move. Timely objection: mover must initiate a summary proceeding within 30 days. Approval only after contradictory hearing. No relocation pending final order absent written consent or a temporary order (355.11-355.12). Trial assigned within 60 days of the motion (355.13). Equal-physical-custody parents need not object. Mover needs court authorization or express written consent (355.4(B)). Non-parents may object only if awarded custody (355.8).
The modification threshold
Under R.S. 9:355.17, notice of a proposed relocation alone does not constitute a change warranting custody modification; relocation without prior notice where a custody order exists, relocation in violation of a court order, or a change in the child’s principal residence including below the threshold, may constitute one. When modification of a custody award is sought, Civil Code art. 138 supplies different tests depending on the decree and elapsed time; Gray applied the former considered-decree standard to a modification request in a relocation dispute. The effect of article 138 on a particular pending or prior judgment requires separate analysis.
Other qualifications
The mover alone carries a two-part good-faith and best-interest burden, and 9:355.14(B) bars asking whether the mover would stay if the child cannot go.
Enacted change, not yet effective on the survey date: Act 287 of 2026 specifies the shortest route open to a car or public ferry for measuring distance, beginning January 1, 2027. It does not change the 75-mile figure.
General best-interest factors. Ordinary modification. 30 days; exceptions apply.
Authority
19-A M.R.S. 1653(14), 1657(2)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent procedure specified in §§ 1653(14) or 1657(2)
What the court weighs
Decision rests on the child's best interest under 1653(3), with a balance between the relocating parent's right to travel and choose a residence and the other parent's right to continuing contact (Light v. D'Amato, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 20; Low v. Low, 2021 ME 30, ¶ 9, citing Light). Riemann v. Toland, 2022 ME 13, n.5: the relocating parent's reasons need not be 'compelling' and need not 'outweigh' the child's best interest. Motives are one factor among the 1653(3) factors. The court may condition primary residence on staying in Maine (Light) or award it 'whether in Maine or Ohio' (Riemann). No statutory presumption for either parent. The 1653 factor list does not mention relocation.
Who carries the burden
No statutory burden allocation for relocation. No shifting found. The modification movant must show a substantial change (supplied by 1657(2) for qualifying relocation and receipt of required notice), then best interest (Gooley recites the trial court’s finding that the relocating mother met her burden of substantial change).
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes, but through the court order: the order 'must require' notice of intended relocation of a child by a parent awarded shared or allocated parental rights. At least 30 days before the move the parent gives notice to the other parent. If the move must happen in under 30 days, notice as soon as possible. If notice endangers the mover or child, the mover notifies the court and the court gives the other parent appropriate notice safely. Method of service not specified.
Which moves trigger the rule
Notice: any intended relocation of the child by such a parent, no distance threshold. Modification triggers (1657(2)): where shared or allocated parental rights exist, relocation or intended relocation of a Maine-resident child to another state when the other parent lives in Maine, or relocation or intended relocation that will disrupt contact, presumed if more than 60 miles from either parent's residence. Receipt of the 1653(14) notice.
Objections and the effect of silence
No statutory objection deadline. Receipt of the notice is itself a substantial change (1657(2)(A-2)), so either parent moves to modify. Statute does not say silence authorizes the move.
The modification threshold
Yes, by statute: 1657(2)(A) interstate relocation of a Maine-resident child when the other parent resides in Maine and shared or allocated rights exist; (A-1) relocation that will disrupt contact when shared or allocated rights exist (60-mile presumption); and (A-2) receipt of required relocation notice each constitute a substantial change in circumstances.
Other qualifications
The notice duty is written into the court order rather than imposed on every parent, and qualifying relocation or intended relocation, and receipt of required notice, count by statute as a substantial change.
Equal footing applies after the party seeking modification establishes a material change. Ninety-day notice exists only if the court orders it.
Authority
Fam. Law 9-106, 9-202(b)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
equal burden (neither parent favored)
Notice classification
court-ordered only
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
No consequence of silence specified in § 9-106; a qualifying petition triggers an expedited hearing.
What the court weighs
Maryland uses the general best-interest framework. Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486 (1991), recognizes that relocation may support modification without a bright-line rule. Braun v. Headley, 131 Md. App. 588, 605–09 (2000), explains the parents' equal footing after the material-change threshold. Since October 1, 2025, Family Law § 9-201 supplies sixteen factors the court may consider, with findings required under subsection (b).
Who carries the burden
Neither parent bears a burden to prove which arrangement serves the child (Braun). The party seeking modification must show a material change first. No shifting.
Notice and safety exceptions
Notice is required only if the court includes it in the custody or visitation order. Family Law § 9-106(a)(1) permits a requirement of at least 90 days' advance written notice to the court, the other party, or both. The court sets the form and content. Under subsection (b), the court must waive notice on a showing that notice would expose the child or either party to abuse, or for other good cause. Subsection (c) permits a defense to a notice violation where an earlier move was necessary for financial or other extenuating circumstances and the required notice was given within a reasonable time after learning of the necessity to relocate.
Which moves trigger the rule
Any relocation of the permanent residence of the party or child, within or outside Maryland. No mileage threshold in the codified text (a '40 or more miles' phrase in the 2023 bill was struck). Separately, 9-202(b): a parent's proposal to relocate in a way that would make physical custody impracticable is a material change.
Objections and the effect of silence
Petition filed within 20 days of the written notice: court 'shall set a hearing on an expedited basis' (a)(4)(i). Since October 1, 2023, any petition on a proposed relocation that would significantly interfere with the other parent's ability to maintain the predetermined parenting schedule also gets an expedited hearing (a)(4)(ii). Statute does not say silence authorizes the move.
The modification threshold
Yes by statute since October 1, 2025: Fam. Law 9-202(b) makes a relocation proposal that would cause physical custody to be impracticable a material change. Before that, common law (Domingues, Braun: 'relocation of a child may constitute a change in circumstances').
Other qualifications
The 90-day notice is not mandatory. It exists only if the court writes it into the order.
Important qualification
Equal footing applies after the party seeking modification establishes a material change. Ninety-day notice exists only if the court orders it.
Burden summary
Neither parent favored on best interests, after a material change is established.
Court-made relocation factors. On the moving parent. No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required.
Authority
G.L. c. 208, s. 30 (Yannas, Mason)
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
out-of-state and some disruptive in-state moves
Effect of silence
no (consent or court order required)
What the court weighs
Four case-law inquiries. Sole physical custody: Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704 (1985), 'real advantage' (good, sincere reason) then best interests, applied whether parents are divorced, separated or never married (Smith v. McDonald, 2010). Shared physical custody: Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass. 177 (2006), best interests with no real-advantage step, described in Smith as 'more protective of the interests of the parent who is not relocating.' No prior order: Miller v. Miller, 478 Mass. 642 (2018), functional analysis to classify as sole or shared, then the matching test. Out-of-state non-custodial parent seeking custody and removal: E.K. v. S.C., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 403 (2020). Yannas does not apply. The judge first finds whether that parent's original out-of-State move was meant to interfere with the in-State parent's relationship or to set up a custody change. If not, the judge asks whether that parent is rooted in the new community, which may count as a real advantage. The best-interest analysis then follows, and the requesting parent must first show a material and substantial change.
Who carries the burden
Yannas puts the real-advantage showing on the custodial parent seeking removal. Under Mason, where physical custody is shared, removal 'upon cause shown' means a showing that removal is in the children's best interests, with no real-advantage step. The Court quoted with approval the view that a true joint custodian proposing a move should have to prove best interest. In the E.K. posture the parent seeking modification must show a material and substantial change. No shifting found.
Notice and safety exceptions
No statutory notice period. Section 30 requires the consent of both parents (or the child's, if of suitable age) or a court order 'upon cause shown' before a covered child is removed from the Commonwealth.
Which moves trigger the rule
Statute: removal out of Massachusetts of a minor child of divorced parents who is a native of, or has resided five years in, the Commonwealth and over whose custody a probate court has jurisdiction. Extended by case law to nonmarital children once there are two legal parents (Smith v. McDonald, 458 Mass. 540 (2010)), and to long-distance in-state moves that would significantly disrupt existing parenting arrangements (Altomare v. Altomare, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 602-603 (2010), a 75-mile in-state move, applying the rule of D.C. v. J.S., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 351, 355-356 (2003), 'not routinely' but where the move would significantly disrupt the other parent's time and the parents cannot agree, also Smith n.13). Before paternity is established, the mother may move freely (Smith).
Objections and the effect of silence
None in the statute. Without the other parent's consent, the parent seeking removal petitions the court. A parent who moves without consent or order can be ordered to return. Silence is not addressed.
The modification threshold
Section 30 is a leave-to-remove inquiry with no material-change gate. Where removal is sought through a custody modification (e.g., the E.K. setting), the requesting party must first show 'a material and substantial change in circumstance' and that the change is in the child's best interests (E.K., 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 408, as quoted in Hill v. Del Plato, Mass. App. Ct. 2025). Whether a proposed move alone meets that test was not found.
Other qualifications
The removal statute reaches only children of divorced parents leaving the state, yet case law extends it to nonmarital children and long in-state moves, and the test changes with the custody arrangement across four inquiries.
Burden summary
On the moving parent
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Applicable statutory relocation factors and custodial-environment analysis. Sole legal custody exempts the parent from the 100-mile factors; Sulaica requires the further environment inquiry where physical custody is shared. Out-of-state court approval and prompt address reporting are separate requirements.
Authority
MCL 722.31, MCR 3.211(C)
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
no (consent or court order required)
What the court weighs
Rains v. Rains, 301 Mich. App. 313 (2013), four steps: (1) mover proves by preponderance that the 722.31(4) factors support the move (improved quality of life for child and mover, compliance and motive, ability to preserve parenting time, objector's financial motive, domestic violence). (2) is there an established custodial environment. (3) would the move alter it. (4) if so, best interests under MCL 722.23 by clear and convincing evidence. Spires v. Bergman, 276 Mich. App. 432 (2007): 722.31 does not apply to a sole legal custodian, and MCR 3.211(C) does not require D'Onofrio findings for one. Brecht v. Hendry, 297 Mich. App. 732, 742–43 (2012), addressed a parent with sole legal and physical custody. Sulaica v. Rometty, 308 Mich. App. 568, 583 (2014), distinguished Brecht, Spires and Brausch where the parents shared physical custody: the court must assess whether the move would change an established custodial environment, with clear-and-convincing best-interest proof if it would.
Who carries the burden
Where MCL 722.31(4) applies, the moving party must show by a preponderance that its factors support the move (Rains). Sole legal custody exempts the parent from that statutory factor inquiry. Sulaica nevertheless requires the established-custodial-environment inquiry in its shared-physical-custody setting; if the proposed move alters that environment, the moving party must prove best interests by clear and convincing evidence under § 722.27(1)(c).
Notice and safety exceptions
No general relocation-specific advance-notice period identified. MCR 3.211(C)(2): every custody judgment or order must provide that the custodian 'promptly notify the friend of the court in writing when the minor is moved to another address' (after-the-fact notice to the FOC, not the other parent). Every custody or parenting-time order must also contain the parents' agreed residence-change provision or the default sentence requiring compliance with MCL 722.31 (722.31(5), MCR 3.211(C)(3)). A restricted move needs the other parent's consent or the court's permission after the 722.31(4) factors.
Which moves trigger the rule
Statute: change of the child's legal residence to a location more than 100 miles from the child's legal residence when the action commenced (722.31(1)). Not restricted if the order grants one parent sole legal custody, if the residences were already more than 100 miles apart at commencement, or if the move brings them closer (722.31(2)-(3)). Domestic-violence safe-location exception (722.31(6)). Rule: MCR 3.211(C)(1) requires every custody order to provide that the minor's domicile or residence may not be moved from Michigan without the judge's approval, whatever the distance or legal-custody arrangement.
Objections and the effect of silence
No objection deadline. The move is conditioned on consent or court permission. Silence is not addressed and does not supply consent.
The modification threshold
Not a separate gate in the Rains steps for the domicile motion. When a parent instead moves to change custody because of a move, the MCL 722.27(1)(c) threshold of proper cause or change of circumstances applies first (Brausch v. Brausch, 283 Mich. App. 339 (2009), used only for the general rule because the move there was to Canada). Not every move alters the established custodial environment (Brausch). A cross-country move was enough to reopen custody in Rittershaus, as described in Spires.
Other qualifications
A sole legal custodian is outside the 100-mile statute, but MCR 3.211(C)(1) still requires court approval before the child’s domicile or residence moves from Michigan. Brecht and Spires involved sole legal and physical custody. In Sulaica v. Rometty, 308 Mich. App. 568, 583 (2014), the parents shared physical custody and the court had to assess whether the proposed move would change an established custodial environment; if it would, § 722.27(1)(c) requires a clear-and-convincing best-interests showing.
Burden summary
On the moving parent
Notice summary
Court approval for out-of-state move; prompt address report to friend of the court
The mover ordinarily bears the burden. A finding that the mover was the other parent’s domestic-abuse victim shifts the burden to the objector.
Authority
Minn. Stat. 518.175, subd. 3
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
out-of-state only
Effect of silence
no (consent or court order required)
What the court weighs
Best interests standard with eight non-exclusive factors in subd. 3(b) (relationships, age and needs, feasibility of preserving the relationship, child's preference, pattern of promoting or thwarting, quality of life, reasons, domestic abuse). Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279 (Minn. 2008): the court applied § 518.18(d) to a sole physical custodian’s request to remove a locale restriction from the custody order; it expressly left the validity of a restriction providing automatic custody transfer upon relocation for another day. Minn. Stat. 518.18(e): the 518.18(d) standard does not govern modification of a joint custody order when the party is asking permission to move the child to another state. Minn. Stat. 518.18(d)(v), added by the same 2006 act, makes it a ground to modify custody that the court denied the primary custodial parent's request to move the child to another state and that parent relocated anyway.
Who carries the burden
On the parent requesting the move (subd. 3(c)). If the court finds the mover was a victim of domestic abuse by the other parent, the burden is on the parent opposing the move.
Notice and safety exceptions
No statutory notice period. Subd. 3(a): the parent with whom the child resides may not move the child's residence to another state without a court order or the other parent's consent, if the other parent has been given parenting time by the decree.
Which moves trigger the rule
Move of the child's residence to another state by the parent with whom the child resides, where the other parent has decree parenting time. In-state moves are outside subd. 3. Not triggered where the only order is a grandparent-visitation order and no parenting-time order exists for the other parent (Ewald v. Nedrebo, Minn. Ct. App. 2023).
Objections and the effect of silence
No objection deadline. Consent or an order is required. Silence is not addressed. If the purpose of the move is to interfere with the other parent's decree parenting time, the court shall not permit it.
The modification threshold
Subdivision 3 supplies the relocation standard; in Goldman, a sole physical custodian’s request to remove a locale restriction was governed by § 518.18(d)’s modification standard, requiring changed circumstances and necessity to serve the child’s best interests and retaining the prior arrangement unless a listed statutory exception applies. Section 518.18(e) separately addresses requests to modify a prior joint custody order and excepts a request for permission to move a child to another state from that paragraph (d) standard.
Other qualifications
Covers only moves to another state, a domestic-abuse finding flips the burden from the mover to the objector, and moving after a denied request is itself a ground to modify custody (518.18(d)(v)).
Important qualification
The mover ordinarily bears the burden. A finding that the mover was the other parent’s domestic-abuse victim shifts the burden to the objector.
Burden summary
Usually the mover. Domestic-abuse finding shifts the burden to the objector.
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
General best-interest factors. Ordinary modification. No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required.
Authority
Case law (Riley, Porter)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
no general statutory relocation threshold identified
Effect of silence
No generally applicable deemed-consent procedure identified; existing order terms remain separate
What the court weighs
General modification test: material change in circumstances since the decree that adversely affects the child, judged on the totality of the circumstances, then best interest under the Albright factors (Riley v. Doerner, 677 So. 2d 740 (Miss. 1996)). Sole physical custodian: 'the mere moving of the custodial parent does not constitute a material change' (Giannaris v. Giannaris, 960 So. 2d 462, 468 (Miss. 2007)). The effect of the move on the child and the custody arrangement is dispositive (Culver v. Culver, 371 So. 3d 726 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), quoting Smith v. Smith, 318 So. 3d 484 (Miss. Ct. App. 2021), which quotes the Court of Appeals in Welton (2015) and Pearson (2009)). Joint physical custody: a move that makes the arrangement impractical satisfies the adverse-material-change standard and triggers an Albright analysis (Porter v. Porter, 23 So. 3d 438 (Miss. 2009), citing Lackey v. Fuller, 755 So. 2d 1083 (Miss. 2000)).
Who carries the burden
On the party seeking modification (preponderance) to show a material change adverse to the child and then that the child's best interest requires the change. No relocation-specific shifting (Riley, Culver).
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable relocation-specific advance-notice statute or rule identified; individual orders and rules may impose notice.
Which moves trigger the rule
No generally applicable statutory trigger identified. Relocation may be relevant to modification of custody. A pre-move petition may be heard before the move occurs (Porter v. Porter, 23 So. 3d 438 (Miss. 2009)).
Objections and the effect of silence
No generally applicable relocation-specific objection procedure identified. A parent may seek custody modification or respond to that request, including before an anticipated move; existing order terms remain separate.
The modification threshold
Yes, this is the frame: material and adverse. A sole physical custodian's move alone is not enough. A move that makes joint physical custody impractical is (Porter, Miss. 2009). Anticipated moves may be litigated before they occur.
Other qualifications
No generally applicable relocation notice statute or rule identified; a court may change custody before the move happens, and the 2026 equal-time presumption expressly stays out of modification cases.
Burden summary
Ordinary modification
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
For child relocation, the mover proves good faith and best interests; ordinarily notice is sixty days and a parent’s motion window is thirty days after receipt. Whether a temporary parent-only move requires notice remains unresolved; the cases read construe child moves and the temporary-absence exclusion. Abraham (S.D. 2011) requires strict compliance with the notice requirement and declares conflict with the 'absolute right' reading in Baxley.
Authority
Mo. Rev. Stat. 452.377
Court test
hybrid (relocation statute, no factor list)
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
child residence for ninety days or more; parent-only notice interaction unresolved
Effect of silence
Yes, for child relocation under § 452.377.8 after required notice and absent a timely parent motion
What the court weighs
The relocating party must prove good faith and the child's best interest (§ 452.377.10). Pasternak, quoting Swisher, describes good faith by the relocating parent's motive or purpose being something other than disrupting or depriving the other parent of contact. Pasternak permits consideration of the § 452.375.2 custody factors because they are equally relevant to relocation; O'Brien applies that rule. Allen, quoting Mantonya, states that § 452.377.10 does not expressly require statutory best-interest findings; that findings statement is distinct from the permitted use of custody factors. Allen also applies Stowe's rejection of the pre-1998 Michel four-part test. If relocation is allowed, § 452.377.11 requires sufficient frequent, continuing and meaningful contact unless the child's best interest warrants otherwise, allocation of transportation costs, and a child-support adjustment as appropriate considering transportation costs.
Who carries the burden
On the relocating party throughout (good faith and best interest), § 452.377.10. No shift. A parent who objects in good faith cannot be ordered to pay the mover's costs and fees (§ 452.377.15).
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. Written notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to any party with custody or visitation rights, at least 60 days before the proposed relocation, absent exigent circumstances found by a court. Contents: new address (or city if unknown), phone if known, move date, specific reasons for the proposed child relocation if applicable, a proposed revised custody/visitation schedule if applicable, and notice of the other parent's right to move to prevent relocation within 30 days. Continuing duty to update. The court may limit disclosure for safety. Address-confidentiality participants may withhold the address subject to in camera review (§ 452.377.2-5,.13). After August 28, 1998, every court order establishing or modifying custody or visitation must include the statutory notice warning (§ 452.377.12). Subsection 2 separately refers to relocation of a party’s residence. No authority identified resolves its interaction with subsection 1’s child-residence duration and temporary-absence definition for a temporary parent-only move.
Which moves trigger the rule
Section 452.377.1 defines 'relocate' or 'relocation' as a change in the child's principal residence for ninety days or more, excluding a temporary absence. Subsection 2 separately requires notice of a proposed relocation of the residence of the child or any party entitled to custody or visitation. There is no mileage or state-line threshold in this text. No authority identified resolves how subsection 1's child-residence definition and duration interact with subsection 2's parent-only notice language. Dent (E.D. 2008) held that overnight stays by a parent and the children at a fiancé's home, with the principal residence maintained, were a 'temporary absence' requiring no notice; Baxley (W.D. 2002) read the statute's permission as directed at 'the parent's relocation with the child'; Gaudreau (E.D. 2014) read the section as presupposing a designated principal residence of the child. None decides a temporary parent-only move, and no duration rule for one is stated here.
Objections and the effect of silence
A parent may file a motion seeking an order to prevent relocation within thirty days after receiving notice, accompanied by an affidavit stating the specific good-faith factual basis supporting a prohibition. The person seeking relocation must respond within fourteen days, unless extended by the court for good cause, with a counter-affidavit supporting relocation and a proposed revised parenting plan. Under § 452.377.8, the child's residence may be relocated sixty days after providing notice as required by the section unless a parent files the motion within thirty days after receipt. If relocation of the child is proposed, a third party entitled by court order to legal custody or visitation, who is not a parent, may seek a revised schedule but shall not prevent relocation (§ 452.377.9).
The modification threshold
Not required for the relocation ruling itself, which is decided under § 452.377. Failure to give notice is a factor in modifying custody, a basis for ordering the child's return, and grounds for fee-shifting (§ 452.377.6). A violation of the section or a relocation order 'may be deemed a change of circumstance under section 452.410' (§ 452.377.14). Separately, § 452.411 deems either parent's change of residence to another state a change of circumstances under § 452.410; Couzens v. Post (W.D. Mar. 10, 2026) applied it as satisfying the change-of-circumstances step without mandating modification, while Baxley (W.D. 2002) held that a relocation permitted under § 452.377 cannot itself be the substantial change.
Other qualifications
Section 452.377.8 permits relocation of the child’s residence 60 days after required notice unless a parent moves to prevent relocation within 30 days after receipt, with an affidavit stating the specific good-faith factual basis. A good-faith objector is shielded from paying the mover's fees (§ 452.377.15).
Statutory relocation factors. On the moving parent. 30 days; exceptions apply.
Authority
Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-217, 40-4-219
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
yes
What the court weighs
Decided as an amendment of the parenting plan: there must be a change in circumstances, and amendment must be necessary to serve the child's best interest (§ 40-4-219(1)), considering the potential impact on the § 40-4-212 criteria and whether, under § 40-4-219(1)(a), the parents agree to the amendment, the child has been integrated into the petitioner's family with the parents' consent, a child age 14 or older desires the amendment, or one parent has willfully and consistently refused to allow any contact with the other parent or attempted to frustrate or deny that contact. When a parent's move significantly affects contact, § 40-4-219(1)(b) adds four factors: feasibility of preserving the relationship through suitable visitation given logistics and finances. Each parent's reasons. The mover's willingness to promote the child's relationship with the other parent. And reasonable alternatives to the move. The mover's right to travel is a consideration but does not outweigh the other parent's rights (Solem, G.M.N.).
Who carries the burden
The Solem majority states that the parent seeking amendment bears the § 40-4-219(1) burden and that, in parental-move cases, the objecting party also has a responsive evidentiary burden to bring case-specific facts explaining why amendment should not be granted (2020 MT 141, ¶¶ 8, 11). In discussing Cole's initial-plan context, ¶ 11 describes a shift after the moving party's best-interest showing. Justices Baker and McKinnon dissented on the allocation and application of the burden (¶¶ 26-34, 38-39, 53).
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. A parent who intends to change residence must give written notice to the other parent, unless precluded under § 40-4-234 (§ 40-4-217(1)). If the move will significantly affect the child's contact with the other parent, the mover must file a motion to amend the residential schedule, with a proposed revised schedule, served personally or by certified mail (and on counsel of record) not less than 30 days before the move (§ 40-4-217(2)(a)). Notice is insufficient without the statutory 21-day warning (§ 40-4-217(2)(b)).
Which moves trigger the rule
Under § 40-4-217(1), a parent who intends to change residence must give written notice to the other parent unless precluded under § 40-4-234. The motion-to-amend requirement applies when the change will significantly affect the child's contact with the other parent. No mileage or state-line test appears in § 40-4-217.
Objections and the effect of silence
The parent served with the motion has 21 days to respond; an objecting response must include an alternate revised residential schedule (§ 40-4-217(3)). Failure to respond after proper service constitutes acceptance of the proposed revised residential schedule (§ 40-4-217(4)). The required warning says relocation may be permitted and the revised schedule may be ordered by the court without further proceedings (§ 40-4-217(2)(b)); it does not state an unconditional authorization to move. A person entitled to object may do so regardless of proper notice (§ 40-4-217(5)).
The modification threshold
Yes in practice. Solem treats a co-equal parent's election to move out of state as the § 40-4-219(1) change in circumstances. Amendment still requires a best-interest finding, and the move alone does not compel amendment.
Other qualifications
A parent properly served with the move motion who does not respond within 21 days is deemed to accept the proposed revised residential schedule; the statutory warning says relocation may be permitted and the court may order that schedule without further proceedings. Military-service modifications are generally temporary under § 40-4-219(10)(a), subject to the parent's consent options in (10)(b).
Farnsworth’s out-of-state removal framework is case-law based; a complaint-to-modify statute and parenting-plan address notice also apply. No general relocation advance period identified.
Authority
Case law (Farnsworth), Neb. Rev. Stat. 42-364(6)
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
out-of-state removal
Effect of silence
No generally applicable deemed-consent procedure identified; existing orders remain separate
What the court weighs
Two-part framework: (1) the custodial parent must show a legitimate reason for leaving the state. (2) the custodial parent must show that it is in the child's best interests to continue living with him or her after the move, which is the paramount prong. Farnsworth's three broad considerations are non-exhaustive: each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move. The move's potential to enhance the quality of life for the child and custodial parent. And the impact on the noncustodial parent's contact, given reasonable visitation (Korth 2021, Franklin M. 2022). Farnsworth lists nine non-hierarchical quality-of-life considerations under the second consideration: the child's emotional, physical and developmental needs. The child's preference. Enhancement of the custodial parent's income or employment. Improved housing or living conditions. Educational advantages. The quality of the child's relationship with each parent. The strength of the child's ties to the present community and extended family. The likelihood that allowing or denying the move would antagonize hostilities between the parents. And the custodial parent's living conditions and employment opportunities (257 Neb. at 250-51). The threshold burden generally applies in dissolution cases in both initial and later proceedings (Kalkowski 2000, as described in Franklin M.). It does not apply to an initial custody determination in a paternity case (State on behalf of Pathammavong v. Pathammavong, 2004, reaffirmed in Franklin M. 2022), to an initial dissolution award of custody to a parent who never lived in Nebraska (Taylor-Couchman 2021, Neb. App.), or to intrastate moves (Bohnet). The general Farnsworth considerations still inform best interests in each of those settings.
Who carries the burden
On the custodial parent seeking removal, for both prongs. No formal shift. In an ordinary modification, the moving party must show a material change in circumstances and that the change is in the child's best interests.
Notice and safety exceptions
No general relocation-specific advance-notice period identified. Section 43-2929(2) requires parenting plans to provide reciprocal address-change notice, with county and state only for a party living or moving to an undisclosed safety location. Farnsworth supplies the case-law out-of-state removal framework; § 42-364(6) requires a complaint to modify for removal from the court’s jurisdiction and addresses mediation under the Parenting Act.
Which moves trigger the rule
Case law: a custodial parent's request to move the child out of Nebraska ('removal'). Intrastate moves are not analyzed under Farnsworth: Bohnet v. Bohnet, 22 Neb. App. 846, 862 N.W.2d 99 (2015) (148-mile in-state move, further review denied), reaffirmed in Perlman v. Perlman (Neb. Ct. App. 2023, memorandum opinion). In-state moves go through ordinary material-change modification.
Objections and the effect of silence
The other parent contests the removal request or complaint to modify in court. No general relocation-specific objection deadline or deemed-consent procedure identified; existing plan and order terms remain separate.
The modification threshold
Removal of a child from the state, without more, is not a change of circumstances warranting a change of custody, but a move considered with other facts can be (Korth headnote 25). A removal request under an existing decree proceeds as a complaint to modify (§ 42-364(6)). For in-state moves, the trial court in Perlman stated that an intrastate move is not in itself a material change.
Other qualifications
The Farnsworth two-part framework for out-of-state removal is case-law based. Section 42-364(6) provides a complaint-to-modify procedure for removal from the court's jurisdiction, and § 43-2929(2) requires parenting plans to include address-change notice, subject to the safety provision. The second prong asks whether continuing to live with the custodial parent after the move serves the child's best interests.
Burden summary
On the moving parent
Notice summary
Plan address-change notice; no general relocation advance period established
Statutory relocation factors. On the moving parent. No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required.
Authority
NRS 125C.006 to 125C.0075
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
functional (move that significantly affects the parenting arrangement)
Effect of silence
no (consent or court order required)
What the court weighs
Threshold (all three required): (a) a sensible, good-faith reason not intended to deprive the other parent of parenting time. (b) the child's best interests are served. (c) the child and the relocating parent will benefit from an actual advantage (§ 125C.007(1)). If met, the court weighs six factors (§ 125C.007(2)): quality-of-life improvement. The mover's motives. Likely compliance with substitute visitation. The objector's motives, including financial advantage. A realistic opportunity for adequate visitation. And any other factor. Monahan (2022): the threshold is proved by a preponderance, and (1)(b) requires specific best-interest findings, which should include applicable custody factors tied to the conclusion. Johnson (2025): the ultimate § 125C.007(3) burden is also a preponderance.
Who carries the burden
On the relocating parent at all times: 'the burden of proving that relocating with the child is in the best interest of the child' (§ 125C.007(3)), by a preponderance. A court must decide the relocation petition before any contingent countermotion for primary custody, to avoid shifting the burden (Johnson v. Bennett, 2025). No shift.
Notice and safety exceptions
No fixed-day notice statute. Before relocating with the child, the primary custodian (or, under joint physical custody, the relocating parent) must attempt to obtain the other parent's written consent and, if refused, petition the court before moving (§§ 125C.006(1), 125C.0065(1)).
Which moves trigger the rule
Applies where primary or joint physical custody 'has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court' and the parent intends to relocate outside Nevada, or within Nevada at a distance that would substantially impair the other parent's ability to maintain a meaningful relationship, and wants to take the child (§§ 125C.006(1), 125C.0065(1)). Which section applies turns on the custody label in the order, not the de facto timeshare (Johnson v. Bennett, 2025). Pelkola (2021) applies § 125C.006 to a move from one out-of-state location to another.
Objections and the effect of silence
Consent must be written. On refusal, the mover petitions for permission (primary custody) or for primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating (joint custody). No objection deadline. Silence is not written consent. The court may award fees against a parent who refused consent without reasonable grounds or to harass (§§ 125C.006(2), 125C.0065(2)). Relocating without consent or permission exposes the parent to NRS 200.359 (§§ 125C.006(3), 125C.0065(3)).
The modification threshold
Not a modification standard. The relocation petition is a distinct statutory proceeding with no changed-circumstances showing. Under joint physical custody the mover must seek primary physical custody (§ 125C.0065), which effectively converts the request into a custody change.
Other qualifications
If a parent relocates unlawfully, 'the court shall not consider any post-relocation facts or circumstances' about the child's or mover's welfare, and the other parent recovers fees (§ 125C.0075). Self-help also carries criminal exposure under NRS 200.359.
Burden summary
On the moving parent
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Statute, no factor list. Shifting burden. 60 days; exceptions apply.
Authority
RSA 461-A:12
Court test
hybrid (relocation statute, no factor list)
Burden classification
burden shifts to the objecting parent after a threshold showing
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
Silence does not dispense with § 461-A:12(II-a)’s court-order requirement; safety exception applies
What the court weighs
The parent seeking to relocate must first prove by a preponderance that the move is for a legitimate purpose and that the location is reasonable in light of that purpose (¶ V). If met, the burden shifts to the other parent to prove by a preponderance that the relocation is not in the child's best interest (¶ VI). The court may not give undue weight to a temporary relocation order (¶ VII) or consider a parent's declaration that she will not move if relocation is denied (¶ VIII). If relocation is agreed or authorized, the schedule may be modified on a best-interest finding (¶ IX).
Who carries the burden
Initial burden on the relocating parent (legitimate purpose, reasonable location). If carried, the burden of persuasion shifts to the objecting parent to prove the move is not in the child's best interest.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. Before relocating, the parent must give the other parent reasonable notice. 60 days is presumed reasonable unless other factors are present or the parents have a written agreement. Shorter notice is justified for safety or when the current abode becomes unavailable for reasons beyond the parent's control (§ 461-A:12, III). No statutory form of service specified.
Which moves trigger the rule
Relocation of any residence where the child lives at least 150 days a year, at any time after a parenting or divorce petition is filed. It does not apply if the move brings the residence closer to the other parent or anywhere within the child's current school district (§ 461-A:12, I-II). No mileage test.
Objections and the effect of silence
At either parent's request the court must hold an evidentiary hearing: within 30 days in an open case, or within 30 days of service of a petition to re-open. A temporary hearing may be followed by a final hearing within 60 days. Either party may seek ex parte orders under § 461-A:9 to prevent or allow the move (¶ IV). A parent 'shall not relocate a child without a court order' unless needed for safety (¶ II-a), so silence does not authorize the move.
The modification threshold
Not required. § 461-A:12 is its own proceeding, and § 461-A:11, II expressly excepts 'a request to relocate the residence of a child' from the general modification rule (Ndyaija, 2020). ¶ IX then permits schedule changes on a best-interest finding.
Other qualifications
A flat statutory bar on self-help ('shall not relocate a child without a court order' except for safety), combined with mandatory 30-day hearing deadlines and a rule that the court may not consider a parent's statement that she will stay if relocation is denied.
Bisbing applies best interests to parents sharing legal custody. The survey found no published post-Bisbing decision resolving sole legal custody.
Authority
N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 (Bisbing)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
out-of-state
Effect of silence
Section 9:2-2 does not specify a deemed-consent rule; the statute sets different consent language for a child of suitable age and a younger child.
What the court weighs
Bisbing (2017): in all interstate relocation disputes where parents share legal custody (primary/alternate residence or equal time), 'cause' under § 9:2-2 is decided by weighing the § 9:2-4 factors and other relevant considerations to determine whether relocation is in the child's best interests. This replaced the Baures two-part test (good-faith reason, and not inimical to the child's interests). Since January 20, 2026 the § 9:2-4 framework has been rewritten (P.L.2025, c.316): child safety is a 'threshold issue,' the policy preamble puts children's 'protection and welfare' as paramount, and the court must state reasons when it rejects a child's expressed preference. 'Geographical proximity of the parents' homes' remains a factor. Bisbing's holding is expressly limited to parents who share legal custody (230 N.J. at 312-13; slip op. Part III.D). No published decision since 2017 identified that states the standard when the relocating parent has sole legal custody.
Who carries the burden
Where the parents share legal custody, the parent seeking to relocate must show 'cause' by a best-interest analysis (Bisbing). No presumption for the primary-residence parent after Bisbing. No formal shift. Bisbing does not state the rule where the relocating parent holds sole legal custody.
Notice and safety exceptions
No statutory notice period or form is specified in § 9:2-2. Its text provides that a child of suitable age may not be removed from the jurisdiction against the child’s consent; while the child is under that age, removal is barred without both parents’ consent, unless the court orders otherwise upon cause shown. Bisbing addresses the cause standard in the shared-legal-custody posture.
Which moves trigger the rule
Removal out of New Jersey of a child of divorced, separated or separately living parents where the Superior Court has custody jurisdiction and the child is a New Jersey native or has lived there five years (§ 9:2-2). Bisbing addresses interstate relocation. In-state moves are outside § 9:2-2: an intrastate move by the parent of primary residence is not a statutory 'removal' requiring court approval, but it may be a substantial change of circumstances supporting modification (Schulze v. Morris, 361 N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 2003)). After Bisbing, the Baures factors no longer apply to that question; the objecting parent of alternate residence must show that the move is a change in circumstances affecting the children's best interests, and if a prima facie case is made the court applies the § 9:2-4 factors (A.J. v. R.J., 461 N.J. Super. 173 (App. Div. 2019)).
Objections and the effect of silence
Section 9:2-2 specifies no separate objection deadline or deemed-consent procedure. It permits a court order upon cause shown and authorizes security, writs and processes. In a contested interstate relocation where parents share legal custody, Bisbing requires the mover to seek a cause determination under the best-interest standard.
The modification threshold
Not a separate requirement for the relocation ruling. Bisbing treats a permanent interstate relocation as governed by § 9:2-2 'cause' and best interests. Custody arrangements are otherwise modifiable on changed circumstances.
Other qualifications
§ 9:2-2 applies only to children born in New Jersey or resident five years, and it lets a child 'of suitable age' withhold consent to removal.
Important qualification
Bisbing applies best interests to parents sharing legal custody. The survey found no published post-Bisbing decision resolving sole legal custody.
Burden summary
On the moving parent
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
equal burden (neither parent favored)
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
no (consent or court order required)
What the court weighs
Joint custody: no presumption for or against the relocating parent, and neither parent bears the burden of showing the move is or is not in the child's best interests. Each parent must persuade the court to adopt his or her proposed arrangement or parenting plan, and the court may adopt whatever arrangement best serves the child (Jaramillo, 1991). Sole custody: Newhouse (1988) held that a sole custodian has the right to move with the children and cannot be deprived of it without findings that the move is in bad faith or contrary to the children's interests. Jaramillo describes this as a presumption favoring the relocating sole custodian, with the burden on the other parent, and in fn. 3 says the presumption 'may be open to some question' but expressly declines to decide its continued vitality. No published decision revisiting that question identified. Hopkins (2019) applies Jaramillo to a move of the primary residence out of state.
Who carries the burden
Joint custody: equal footing. The party seeking to change the decree must show the existing arrangement is unworkable (usually met by the move itself), then neither side bears the burden on whether relocation serves the child. Sole custody: the Newhouse presumption for the relocating custodian as described in 1991. Its current status is unresolved.
Notice and safety exceptions
For joint custody, § 40-4-9.1(J)(4)(a) requires a parent planning to change home city or state to give the other parent thirty days’ written notice stating the date and destination. No generally applicable sole-custody relocation-notice period identified.
Which moves trigger the rule
A joint-custody parent's change of home city or state of residence (any distance) triggers the notice. The case-law relocation analysis applies to a proposed relocation of the child. No mileage test.
Objections and the effect of silence
In joint custody, neither parent may make a major change in the child's life until it has been discussed and the parents agree, and if one parent objects 'no change shall occur until the issue has been resolved' (§ 40-4-9.1(J)(3)). Section 40-4-9.1(J)(5) lists the methods: agreement, family counseling, conciliation or mediation, binding arbitration, allocating the decision to one legal custodian, terminating joint custody and awarding sole custody, a special master, or the district court. Either party may initiate a proceeding to alter the arrangement (Jaramillo). No objection deadline.
The modification threshold
A proposed relocation will 'in almost every case' establish the substantial and material change needed to revisit joint custody (Jaramillo), though not automatically.
Other qualifications
The notice provision identified is in the joint-custody statute: thirty days before changing a parent’s home city or state. Jaramillo places joint custodians on equal footing for the best-interest inquiry and expressly reserves the continued vitality of the older sole-custodian Newhouse presumption.
Court-made relocation factors; moving parent bears the best-interest burden. No general advance-notice period identified; order-specific restrictions may apply.
Authority
Case law (Tropea 1996)
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
none defined by statute or rule
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent procedure identified; existing order restrictions remain separate
What the court weighs
Tropea (1996) rejected the 'meaningful access / exceptional circumstances' formulas. Each request is decided on its own facts with 'predominant emphasis' on the child's best interests, considering: each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move. The quality of the child's relationships with each parent. The impact on contact with the noncustodial parent. Economic, emotional and educational enhancement. And the feasibility of preserving the relationship through visitation. No presumption either way.
Who carries the burden
On the parent seeking to relocate, by a preponderance, to show the move is in the child's best interests (Elya L., 2026, restating settled Appellate Division law). No shift.
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable relocation-specific statutory notice period identified. Elya L. involved an order barring relocation outside Tompkins County or a contiguous county without consent or judicial permission, followed by a petition for permission under Family Court Act article 6. That order-specific restriction is distinct from an advance-notice period.
Which moves trigger the rule
No statutory trigger or mileage threshold identified. Case law addresses a custodial parent’s proposed move affecting the other parent’s access. The Third Department treats the proposed relocation as the change in circumstances permitting review (Elya L., quoting Megan NN.).
Objections and the effect of silence
None statutory. The other parent opposes in the relocation proceeding. No deadline. Silence does not authorize a move contrary to an existing order.
The modification threshold
Yes, in the Third Department: a custodial parent’s proposed relocation supplies the change in circumstances for considering modification (Elya L., citing Matter of Megan NN., 210 A.D.3d 1357).
Other qualifications
Tropea supplies a fact-specific best-interest inquiry. No general relocation-specific advance-notice period identified; Elya L. illustrates an individual order’s consent-or-judicial-permission restriction.
Burden summary
On the moving parent
Notice summary
No general advance period established; order-specific restrictions may apply
Neither parent is favored on best interests after the modification movant establishes the required substantial change.
Authority
Case law (Ramirez-Barker), G.S. 50-13.2
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
equal burden (neither parent favored)
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
none defined by statute or rule
Effect of silence
No generally applicable deemed-consent procedure identified; existing order terms remain separate
What the court weighs
Best interest governs (§ 50-13.2(a)). When relocation is sought, courts apply the non-exhaustive Ramirez-Barker factors: the advantages of the move in improving the child's life. The custodial parent's motives. The likelihood the custodial parent will comply with visitation orders once outside North Carolina. The integrity of the noncustodial parent in resisting. And the likelihood of a realistic visitation schedule that preserves the relationship. Explicit findings on every factor are not required, but findings must address material issues and relate the relevant facts to the child's best interests. Cohen vacated and remanded an initial permanent order for inadequate findings; Parente remanded a modification order for further findings (Cohen 2026, Parente 2026). To modify an existing permanent order, the movant must first show a substantial change affecting the child's welfare, with nexus findings (§ 50-13.7, Shipman, Parente).
Who carries the burden
The movant bears the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances when modifying an existing order (Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 362 (1974)). On the best-interest question itself, 'there is no burden of proof on either party' (Ramirez-Barker, 107 N.C. App. at 78).
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable relocation-specific notice requirement identified. A custody order may impose its own terms; relocation can be raised in the custody action or a motion to modify (§ 50-13.7).
Which moves trigger the rule
No statutory trigger or mileage threshold. The Ramirez-Barker factors are used when a parent seeks to move the child out of North Carolina (Parente: 'the significance of an out-of-state relocation'). In-state moves are ordinary custody questions.
Objections and the effect of silence
No general relocation-specific statutory objection procedure or deadline identified. The other parent contests in the custody proceeding or seeks modification. Silence does not authorize a move contrary to an existing order.
The modification threshold
Required only to modify an existing permanent custody order. Tuel (2020) reviewed an initial permanent-custody order permitting relocation. Cohen (2026) reviewed a permanent custody order permitting relocation in an initial custody proceeding; it did not decide a substantial-change issue. A relocation may itself constitute a substantial change when it affects the child's welfare. Ramirez-Barker says it 'will be a rare case where the child will not be adversely affected' when a move requires substantially altering a working arrangement (107 N.C. App. at 79). Under Pulliam the change may also be beneficial. The order must find the nexus to the child's welfare: In Parente (2026), the findings about the mother's remarriage and relocation opportunity did not adequately connect the changes to the child's welfare; the court remanded for further findings.
Other qualifications
§ 50-13.2(e): time spent on electronic communication may not be used 'to justify or support relocation by the custodial parent out of the immediate area or the State.' Military note: § 50-13.2(f) bars using a parent's deployment as the only basis for a best-interests decision.
Important qualification
Neither parent is favored on best interests after the modification movant establishes the required substantial change.
Burden summary
Neither parent favored on best interests, after a substantial change is established.
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Court-made relocation factors. On the moving parent. No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required.
Authority
N.D.C.C. 14-09-07
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
out-of-state only
Effect of silence
no (consent or court order required)
What the court weighs
Stout-Hawkinson four factors, all under a best-interest heading: (1) prospective advantages of the move in improving the custodial parent's and child's quality of life. (2) integrity of the custodial parent's motive (not to defeat visitation). (3) integrity of the noncustodial parent's motives in opposing. (4) potential negative impact on the noncustodial parent-child relationship, including a realistic opportunity for substitute visitation and the likelihood each parent will comply (Hawkinson restated factor 4). Stout expressly rejected a presumption for or against removal. No single factor is dominant (Stai-Johnson v. Johnson, 2015 ND 99, para. 6, quoted in Green 2018, Nelson 2024 and McCay 2024). A line running from Gilbert (2007) and Hruby (2009) says that when the custodial parent wants to move to live with a new spouse, 'that fact becomes dominant in favor of allowing the move.' Norby (2020) set it against Green's no-dominant-factor statement without resolving the tension, and Nelson (2024 ND 31, para. 7) recites both rules side by side, citing Norby para. 12 for the new-spouse sentence. Nelson ¶ 28 states that the court must give credence to all four factors but may give more weight to a move to be with a spouse; it held that the trial court did not create a “super factor” because it did not rely solely on the new marriage and considered all factors. When initial residential responsibility and relocation are decided together, the court applies the best-interest factors first, then Stout-Hawkinson (Sayler 2023 ND 156 ¶ 20, Emme 2026 ND 60).
Who carries the burden
On the moving parent, by a preponderance, to show the move is in the child's best interests (Stout ¶ 34, Nelson 2024 ND 31 ¶ 7 and McCay 2024 ND 130, both quoting Larson 2016 ND 76 ¶ 21, read directly). No burden shift.
Notice and safety exceptions
No statutory notice period. Section 14-09-07 instead requires the other parent's consent or a court order before a parent with primary residential responsibility moves the child to another state (if the other parent was given parenting time by the decree). A parent with equal residential responsibility needs consent or an order allowing the move AND awarding that parent primary residential responsibility. No order is needed if the other parent has not exercised parenting time for a year, or has moved out of state and is more than 50 miles away (subsec. 3).
Which moves trigger the rule
Change of the child's primary residence to another state only. Moves within North Dakota are not covered by § 14-09-07. The section applies only once an order establishing residential responsibility exists (Sayler 2023).
Objections and the effect of silence
No statutory objection deadline. When § 14-09-07 applies, consent or a court order is required; silence alone is not consent. Subsection (1) is conditioned on the other parent having been given parenting time, and subsection (3) supplies exceptions.
The modification threshold
The relocation decisions read (Sayler, Nelson, McCay) decide a § 14-09-07 request under Stout-Hawkinson with no separate material-change finding. A change of primary residential responsibility is a separate question (material change plus best interests after the two-year bar, § 14-09-06.6(6)). On competing motions, a custodial parent's proposed move counts as a change of circumstances for a companion custody motion only if that parent will move without the children (Larson v. Larson, 2016 ND 76, ¶ 17, quoting Wright v. Wright, 431 N.W.2d 301, 304 (N.D. 1988)). A trial court may hear a dependent relocation motion after the custody motion (Larson ¶ 19).
Other qualifications
For a covered out-of-state move, a parent with equal residential responsibility needs the other parent’s consent or a court order permitting the move and awarding primary residential responsibility (§ 14-09-07(2)); subsection (3) supplies exceptions.
Burden summary
On the moving parent
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
General best-interest factors. Ordinary modification. Notice required; no fixed day count.
Authority
R.C. 3109.051(G)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
not addressed in R.C. 3109.051(G)
What the court weighs
No relocation-specific standard. Under (G)(1) the court revises only the parenting-time schedule, on best interest under the R.C. 3109.051(D) factors. No change in circumstances is needed for that (Braatz). A trial court may not use the (D) factors to decide whether to permit or bar the move itself (Hezebicks 2026). Reallocating custody, including changing the residential-parent designation under a shared-parenting decree, needs a change in circumstances plus best interest under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) (Fisher v. Hasenjager 2007).
Who carries the burden
Not allocated for relocation. The residential parent needs no court permission to move unless the decree restricts moving. A parent seeking to reallocate custody must show a change in circumstances and that the change serves the child's best interest.
Notice and safety exceptions
The residential parent must file notice of an intended move from the residence specified in the parenting-time order with the issuing court under R.C. 3109.051(G). The court generally sends the other parent a copy, subject to the domestic-violence and abuse exceptions in (G)(2)–(4). The statute sets no number of days. Local rules and the custody order require a separate check.
Which moves trigger the rule
Any move to a residence other than the one specified in the order. The statute has no mileage or state-line threshold.
Objections and the effect of silence
No objection deadline. On receipt of the notice the court, on its own motion or the other parent's motion, 'may' schedule a hearing on whether to revise the parenting time schedule in the child's best interest. Hezebicks holds that R.C. 3109.051(G)(1) gives no authority to deny relocation; L.G. describes that conclusion as one courts have reached while addressing a pending reallocation motion. Where the decree expressly or impliedly restricts moving from the area, Hezebicks ¶ 34 quotes Salisbury for the rule that moving the child out of state requires a best-interest finding. Separately, Valentine ¶ 27, citing Acus ¶ 14, states that absent a prior agreement or court order the court may revise parenting time but cannot prohibit the residential parent from relocating with the children. The other parent may also move to reallocate custody.
The modification threshold
Fact-dependent at the appellate level. Zinnecker held that a move which directly and demonstrably affects the children, there the loss of close extended-family ties in Ohio, is a change of circumstances, while a move with no direct impact is inconsequential. Valentine affirmed a finding of no change where the other parent's time was not reduced and no extended family testified. L.G. n.3 describes cases that split on the facts: Zinnecker v. Zinnecker, 133 Ohio App.3d 378 (12th Dist. 1999) (relocation a substantial change on those facts) and Valentine v. Valentine, 2012-Ohio-426 (12th Dist.) (relocation alone not a change). For parenting time, no change of circumstances is required (Braatz). No Ohio Supreme Court decision on relocation as a change in circumstances found.
Other qualifications
The notice goes to the court, which forwards it to the other parent, and courts of appeals read the statute as giving the court no power to bar the move unless the decree itself restricts moving. The statute has no day count or mileage trigger.
burden shifts to the objecting parent after a threshold showing
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
yes
What the court weighs
Court considers eight factors, § 112.3(J)(1)(a)-(h): relationships with each parent, siblings and others. Child's age, needs and likely impact. Feasibility of preserving the relationship through visitation. Child's preference. Pattern of promoting or thwarting the other parent's relationship. Enhancement of quality of life for the custodial party and child. Each person's reasons. Any other best-interest factor. The court may not consider a declaration that the relocating person will not move if relocation is denied ((J)(2)(b)). A proposed relocation may be a factor in a change of custody ((I)).
Who carries the burden
Relocating person must prove the relocation is made in good faith. If that is met, the burden shifts to the nonrelocating person to show it is not in the child's best interest (§ 112.3(K), Boatman ¶ 8). Arulkumar (2022 OK 90) applied it and affirmed a denial. Walters (2025 OK CIV APP 3) applied it and affirmed a grant.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. The person with the right to establish the child's principal residence must notify every other person entitled to visitation, by mail to the last-known address, no later than the 60th day before the move, or the 10th day after learning the facts if the person could not have known in time and cannot delay (§ 112.3(B)-(C)). Contents: new address, date, reasons, proposed revised visitation, and a warning that objection must be made within 30 days. Adults with visitation must also give notice of a change in their own primary residence address. To the extent the section conflicts with an existing custody order or enforceable agreement, it does not apply to that order’s or agreement’s terms governing relocation (§ 112.3(N)(2)).
Which moves trigger the rule
'Relocation' is a change in the child's principal residence of more than 75 miles from the current principal residence for 60 days or more, excluding temporary absence (§ 112.3(A)(5)). Only a sole custodian or a joint custodian designated primary physical custodian can invoke the statute (Boatman 2017).
Objections and the effect of silence
A proceeding seeking a temporary or permanent order to prevent the relocation must be filed within 30 days of receipt of the notice. If none is filed, the relocation is authorized ((C)(2)(g), (D), (G)(1), (G)(4)). Only a parent entitled to visitation may object. A nonparent may seek revised visitation only ((G)(3)). Silence authorizes the move.
The modification threshold
Section 112.3 governs relocation directly and does not require a change of circumstances. It says a proposed relocation 'may be a factor' in a change of custody ((I)). Joint custody: a joint custodian who is not the primary physical custodian cannot invoke the relocation statute until the court names one (Boatman ¶¶ 6-7, Williamson). Boatman treated the mother's relocation as an 'obvious change of circumstances' requiring the court to modify the joint plan and appoint a primary physical custodian.
Other qualifications
The court is barred from considering a relocating parent's statement that he or she will stay if the request is denied, and 30 days of silence authorizes the move.
No general relocation burden allocation identified. Cooksey’s attributed result remains that the moving parent offered no evidence of benefit to the child; ordinary custody-modification requirements are separate.
Authority
ORS 107.159
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
no general relocation allocation identified
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent procedure specified in § 107.159; existing order terms remain separate
What the court weighs
A request to relocate is decided on the child's best interests under ORS 107.137(1) (emotional ties, interest in and attitude toward the child, continuity, abuse, primary caregiver, willingness to foster the other parent's relationship) and case law (Cooksey, 2005, read: the question is whether the child is 'better served' by relocating, and a relocation-only dispute over a parenting plan needs no substantial change in circumstances). The court must not focus on distance to the exclusion of the other factors (Stancliff, 2022). No relocation factor list.
Who carries the burden
For a change of custody, the moving party must prove a change of circumstances and that a change is in the child's best interests (Boldt, 344 Or at 9). For a relocation request, no case read states a formal burden. Cooksey (2005) rejected a mover's argument that a move must be allowed absent proof of harm and affirmed a restraint because the mother did not show the move would benefit the child.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes, but only through the order. Every court order or judgment granting custody of a minor child and parenting time or visitation rights must include a provision that neither parent may move to a residence more than 60 miles further distant from the other parent without giving the other parent reasonable notice of the change of residence and providing a copy of the notice to the court. Orders under ORS 107.700 to 107.735 are excepted. No number of days. A court may suspend the requirement for good cause on ex parte or other motion (ORS 107.159(2)).
Which moves trigger the rule
A move to a residence more than 60 miles further distant from the other parent. Slaughter and Harris confirms notice is legally required only for such a move.
Objections and the effect of silence
Section 107.159 does not specify a relocation-objection deadline or deemed-consent scheme. A parent may seek custody or parenting-time modification; existing order terms remain separate.
The modification threshold
A parent's move alone does not support a change of custody. The court must find the move significantly and adversely affects a parent's capacity to care for the child. Lack of advance notice is not by itself a basis (Slaughter and Harris, 2018). Joint custody modification needs changed circumstances and best interest (ORS 107.169(5)).
Other qualifications
§ 107.159 requires a notice term in the specified custody/parenting-time order, measured as added distance from the other parent rather than distance from the old home. Its protective-order exclusion and good-cause suspension remain separate.
Important qualification
No express allocation was found. Cooksey nevertheless upheld a restraint where the moving parent offered no evidence that relocation would benefit the child.
Statutory relocation factors. On the moving parent. 60 days; exceptions apply.
Authority
23 Pa.C.S. 5337, Pa.R.C.P. 1915.17
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
functional (move that significantly affects the parenting arrangement)
Effect of silence
yes
What the court weighs
Ten factors in § 5337(h), giving weighted consideration to factors affecting the child's safety: child's relationships. Age, needs and likely impact. Feasibility of preserving the relationship. Child's preference. Pattern of promoting or thwarting the relationship. Enhancement of the parent's quality of life ((h)(6)) and, separately, the child's ((h)(7)). Each party's reasons. Abuse and risk of harm. Other best-interest factors. When relocation and custody modification are both in play, courts weigh both § 5337(h) and § 5328(a) (E.C.-S. 2021). Carrero (2023) holds the older Gruber test was superseded.
Who carries the burden
The party proposing relocation must show relocation serves the child's best interest under the (h) factors. Each party must prove the integrity of his or her motives ((i)(1)-(2)). If a party relocates before the hearing, the court gives no presumption in favor of relocation ((l)). Where neither party relocates but custody would move the child a long distance, each parent shares the burden (White v. Malecki 2023).
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. The party proposing relocation must notify every other individual with custody rights by certified mail, return receipt requested, no later than the 60th day before the move, or the tenth day after learning of it if the party could not reasonably have known earlier and cannot reasonably delay. Subject to § 5336 and if available, the notice must include the new address, names and ages of people in the new home, school, date, reasons, a proposed revised schedule, a counter-affidavit form and a warning that failing to object within 30 days forecloses objection (§ 5337(c), Rule 1915.17(a)).
Which moves trigger the rule
'Relocation' means a change in a residence of the child which significantly impairs the ability of a nonrelocating party to exercise custodial rights (§ 5322(a), Rule 1915.17(a)). No fixed mileage. If no objection follows notice, the change is not treated as a 'relocation' under the rule (Rule 1915.17(c)).
Objections and the effect of silence
A counter-affidavit is filed with the court and served by certified mail, return receipt requested, within 30 days of receipt. If notice was proper and no objection is filed, consent is presumed (§ 5337(d)(3)). If a properly notified party fails to object within 30 days and later petitions for review of custodial arrangements, the court shall not accept testimony challenging the relocation (§ 5337(d)(4)). Where no objection is filed, the proposing party must file the specified confirmation materials before relocation (§ 5337(e)). A timely objection gets an expedited full hearing before the move, except that exigent circumstances permit provisional approval pending a hearing (§ 5337(g)(1), (3)).
The modification threshold
No separate change-of-circumstances requirement in the text: a custody order may be modified 'to serve the best interest of the child' (§ 5338(a)), and a court that approves relocation must modify the order or set custody terms ((g)(4)).
Other qualifications
The statute prints the counter-affidavit form. If a properly notified party fails to object within 30 days and later petitions for review of custodial arrangements, the court shall not accept testimony challenging the relocation (§ 5337(d)(4)). Section 5337(a) includes relocation subject to the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act.
Court-made relocation factors. Initial custody: equal burdens; post-judgment allocation unresolved in the cited cases. No general advance notice period identified; conditional 48-hour address notice and permanent-removal restrictions apply.
Authority
Case law (Dupre 2004)
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
initial determination: equal; post-judgment allocation unresolved in cited cases
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
no general distance threshold identified; pending-case permanent interstate removal restricted
Effect of silence
Section 15-5-14.1(d) requires written consent or a court order; no deemed-consent rule is specified there
What the court weighs
Dupré factors, with the child's best interests paramount: (1) nature, quality and duration of the child's relationship with each parent. (2) likelihood relocation enhances quality of life for child and relocating parent. (3) probable impact on the child's development. (4) feasibility of preserving the relationship through visitation. (5) extended family and support in both places. (6) each parent's reasons. (7) Hague status if international. (8) Pettinato factors as relevant. Not exhaustive and none dispositive. No presumption either way. A 'compelling reason' test was rejected (Dupré 2004).
Who carries the burden
Initial custody and placement determinations (including those that decide a relocation request): the parents come before the court 'on an equal footing' and share the burden equally. Dupré, 857 A.2d at 260-61; McDonough v. McDonough, 962 A.2d 47, 53 n.10 (R.I. 2009) (relocation decided with initial placement in the divorce); Valkoun v. Frizzle, 973 A.2d 566 (R.I. 2009) (initial custody determination in a paternity case). McDonough's footnote states that the court's precedent 'does not establish burdens or presumptions for an initial determination ... (as opposed to post-final judgment relocation)' without deciding the latter. Post-judgment relocations: the Supreme Court has affirmed four post-judgment relocation rulings on deferential review, applying the Dupré factors, without allocating a burden: DePrete v. DePrete, 44 A.3d 1260 (R.I. 2012); Andrade v. Andrade, 252 A.3d 755 (R.I. 2021), where the trial justice found the relocating mother 'failed to sustain her burden of proof'; Leon v. Krikorian, 271 A.3d 985 (R.I. 2022); Dawson v. Ojeda (R.I. 2023). These decisions do not establish a post-judgment burden or burden-shifting rule.
Notice and safety exceptions
No general advance relocation-notice period identified. In proceedings covered by § 15-5-14.1(a), the automatic orders take effect for the plaintiff upon signing the complaint and for the defendant upon service, with the statute also addressing waiver and acceptance of service. Subsection (d) bars permanent removal of minor children from Rhode Island without the other party’s written consent or a court order. If the parties share children, subsection (h) requires a party vacating the family residence to notify the other party or that party’s attorney in writing within 48 hours of the move of an address for receiving communication, unless a prior contradictory court order applies.
Which moves trigger the rule
No distance is defined. After judgment, reported cases are motions for leave to relocate out of state (Massachusetts, North Carolina, Indiana, Florida, New Jersey, Texas). During a pending case, § 15-5-14.1(d) reaches any permanent removal from the state.
Objections and the effect of silence
The cited relocation cases proceed by a motion and opposition at hearing. Section 15-5-14.1(d) requires written consent or a court order for permanent removal while its automatic orders apply; it specifies no separate objection deadline or deemed-consent procedure.
The modification threshold
Unclear. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 738 A.2d 1081 (R.I. 1999), affirmed denial of a mother's request for placement and relocation for lack of a substantial change in circumstances (as described in Dupré). Later relocation decisions apply the Dupré factors without discussing a change requirement. By statute, a relocation due to military activation or deployment is not by itself enough to modify custody (§ 15-5-16(g)(7)).
Other qualifications
Dupré supplies a nonexclusive, case-specific relocation framework, rejects a compelling-reason requirement, and applies best interests. During a pending covered proceeding, § 15-5-14.1(d) also restricts permanent removal without written consent or court order; (h) requires address notice after a parent leaves the family residence.
Burden summary
Initial: equal; post-judgment: no allocation stated.
Notice summary
No general advance period identified; conditional 48-hour address notice
Trigger summary
No general distance threshold; pending-case interstate restriction
General best-interest factors. Ordinary modification. No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required.
Authority
Case law (Latimer 2004), S.C. Code 63-15-240(B)(16)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
none defined by statute or rule
Effect of silence
No generally applicable deemed-consent procedure identified; existing order terms remain separate
What the court weighs
Latimer (2004) overruled McAlister's presumption against relocation. In all custody cases, including relocation cases, the controlling consideration is the child's welfare and best interests. Latimer did not adopt a separate relocation-specific factor list; § 63-15-240(B) supplies general custody factors. The courts have noted factors other states use without endorsing them (Walrath v. Pope, 384 S.C. 101, 681 S.E.2d 602 (Ct. App. 2009) ). Courts say the authority to prohibit an out-of-state move should be exercised sparingly (Rice v. Rice, 335 S.C. 449, 517 S.E.2d 220 (Ct. App. 1999), decided while the McAlister presumption still stood and finding it rebutted). The Latimer factors are instructive, not mandatory (Lacefield, unpublished).
Who carries the burden
No burden shift. The burden follows the party who asks to modify the order. A noncustodial parent seeking a change in custody must prove a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare and that a change is in the child's overall best interest (Latimer, 360 S.C. at 381). In Latimer, the agreement was silent on moving out of state, and the court said there was no relocation agreement to modify; the noncustodial parent seeking a custody change bore the substantial-change burden (n.3). A custodial, relocating parent who asks to modify the order, for example to alter the visitation schedule, bears the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances (Latimer n.3, distinguishing Pitt v. Olds, 333 S.C. 478, 511 S.E.2d 60 (1999), as described in Latimer).
Notice and safety exceptions
No general relocation-specific advance-notice period identified. Latimer’s footnote 3 concerned an agreement silent on moving out of state and distinguished a noncustodial parent’s custody-modification request from a custodial parent’s request to modify visitation. Existing order terms and the relief requested remain important.
Which moves trigger the rule
None identified in statute for a permission or notice rule. Factor (B)(16) concerns whether a parent relocated more than 100 miles from the child's primary residence in the past year, unless the relocation was for safety reasons.
Objections and the effect of silence
No general relocation-specific objection procedure or deadline identified. Latimer involved requests for restraint or transfer of custody; the ordinary modification burden depends on which parent seeks what relief.
The modification threshold
No. Relocation is one factor in considering a change in circumstances but is not alone a sufficient change (Latimer, 360 S.C. at 382).
Other qualifications
Section 63-15-240(B)(16) considers whether a parent relocated more than 100 miles from the child's primary residence in the past year, unless the parent relocated for safety reasons. Section 63-15-40(B) separately provides that a parent’s absence or relocation from the home, if caused by domestic violence by the other parent and the absent parent was not the primary aggressor, is not sufficient by itself to deny that parent custody. No general relocation-notice statute identified.
Burden summary
Ordinary modification
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Parent-residence notice ordinarily requires forty-five days, subject to the existing-order/agreement condition and statutory exceptions. No general relocation burden allocation identified; § 25-4A-19 states the objection/hearing and best-interest directions.
Authority
SDCL 25-4A-17 to -19
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
no general relocation allocation identified
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
yes
What the court weighs
If an objection is filed, the court considers the 'traditional best interest of the child factors' for a proposed relocation that would substantially alter the existing parenting time arrangement (25-4A-19, sentence added 2020). Before 2020 the section set no standard at all. In Kolbach, the Supreme Court declined to consider proposed relocation-specific factors without appellate advocacy on both sides (2016 SD 30, n.4). The new family unit is one factor among others (Brosnan, 2013 SD 81 ¶ 28). The reasons for a notice-exempt move may still be weighed in a custody determination (Shelstad, 2019 S.D. 24 ¶¶ 33-34).
Who carries the burden
Unclear. The statute is silent. In Brosnan the circuit court asked whether the relocating parent had met her burden to show best interests. The Supreme Court reviewed for abuse of discretion. No statement of an allocation identified.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes, where no existing custody order or enforceable agreement expressly governs relocation of the child's principal residence. A parent intending to change that parent’s principal residence gives reasonable written notice by certified mail or admission of service to the other legal parent, at least 45 days before the move or a shorter period if reasonable on the facts. Proof is filed with the court unless the court waives notice (25-4A-17). Contents (25-4A-18): new address and phone if known, purpose, why the move is in the child's best interest, proposed visitation plan. If notice is given in compliance with § 25-4A-17(3) or (4), the notice may satisfy the address requirement by stating the city and state of the new residence (§ 25-4A-18).
Which moves trigger the rule
A parent intends to change the parent's principal residence where no existing custody order or enforceable agreement expressly governs relocation of the child's principal residence. No mileage or state-line trigger in the text. No notice needed if the move brings the child closer to the noncustodial parent, is within the child's current school district, a protection order protects the child or custodial parent (unless the other parent has a later parenting-time order), or the nonrelocating parent was convicted in the past 12 months of a protection-order violation, criminal assault, child abuse or domestic violence against the child or custodial parent, unless the noncustodial parent has a valid parenting-time order established after the conviction (25-4A-17(1)-(4)). Section 25-4A-19 directs consideration of traditional best-interest factors when an objection is filed and the proposed move would substantially alter the existing parenting-time arrangement.
Objections and the effect of silence
At the nonrelocating parent's request made within 30 days of the notice, the court shall hold a hearing. If no request comes within 30 days, the relocation is presumed to be consented to (25-4A-19).
The modification threshold
Unclear. Relocation runs through 25-4A-17 to -19. Whether a proposed relocation alone can support modification of custody was not found.
Other qualifications
Notice is not required when the move brings the child closer to the other parent or stays within the child's current school district (25-4A-17(1)-(2)), and § 25-4A-19 directs consideration of traditional best-interest factors when an objection is filed and the proposed move would substantially alter the existing parenting-time arrangement.
Burden summary
No general allocation identified
Notice summary
45 days; exceptions apply
Trigger summary
Parent residence change; order/agreement and statutory exceptions apply
Statutory relocation factors. No general post-2018 burden allocation identified. Notice is ordinarily 60 days; the petition and response procedure remains separate.
Authority
Tenn. Code Ann. 36-6-108
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
no general post-2018 allocation identified
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
yes
What the court weighs
If an opposition is timely filed, the court decides whether relocation is in the child's best interest using eight statutory factors: (1) nature, quality, extent and duration of the child's relationships with both parents, siblings and significant persons. (2) age, developmental stage and needs, and likely impact on physical, educational and emotional development. (3) feasibility of preserving the non-relocating parent's relationship through suitable visitation, considering logistics and finances. (4) child's preference at 12 or older (younger child on request). (5) whether the relocating parent has an established pattern of promoting or thwarting the other parent's relationship. (6) whether the move enhances general quality of life for both relocating parent and child. (7) each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing. (8) any other best-interest factor, including § 36-6-106(a). If approved, the court modifies the plan for the distance. If denied, it enters a modified plan effective only if the parent moves anyway. Court must consider alternative arrangements, transport costs and a possible child-support deviation. Either parent may recover reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses in the court's discretion. The 2018 amendment removed the former presumption toward relocation and the equal-time and reasonable-purpose analysis (2018 Pub. Ch. 853 § 2; Grace v. Grace (Tenn. Ct. App. 2025), n.3; Dungey v. Dungey (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020), as quoted in Mosby v. Meachem (Tenn. Ct. App. 2026)). The amended statute states no presumption and no burden allocation.
Who carries the burden
Section 36-6-108 does not expressly allocate the burden of proof. No 2019–2026 opinion identified resolves a general post-2018 burden allocation. Grace v. Grace (Tenn. Ct. App. 2025), n.3, states that the 2018 revision removed the presumption toward relocation and abrogated much of the earlier case law; Dungey v. Dungey (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020), as quoted in Mosby, states that the equal-time and reasonable-purpose concepts were removed. Neither opinion allocates a burden under the amended statute. The pre-2018 framework was replaced by the 2018 amendment.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. Not later than 60 days before the move (unless excused by the court for exigent circumstances). To the other parent at the last known address by registered or certified mail. Notice must state intent to move, the new location, the reasons, and that absent agreement or objection within 30 days of the mailing the move will be permitted. § 36-6-108(a)
Which moves trigger the rule
After custody or co-parenting is set by a permanent parenting plan or final order, a parent 'spending intervals of time' with the child who desires to relocate outside the state, or more than 50 miles from the other parent within the state. The same procedure and best-interest standard apply to a parent under an injunction under § 36-6-116(a)(4) or § 36-4-106(d)(1)(E). § 36-6-108
Objections and the effect of silence
Objection or agreement window is 30 days from the date the notice is sent. Absent agreement on a new schedule or on a timely objection, the relocating parent files a petition seeking approval. The other parent then has 30 days to file a response in opposition. If no response is filed within 30 days the relocating parent 'shall be permitted' to move. Silence authorizes the move. Mosby v. Meachem (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2026) holds the 30-day response period remains mandatory after the 2018 amendment, applies it to parents with equal parenting time, and finds no good cause for a Rule 6.02 extension. Grace v. Grace (Tenn. Ct. App. 2025) holds the filing of the opposition, not the notice, triggers the court's best-interest duty. § 36-6-108(b)
The modification threshold
A relocation petition under § 36-6-108 does not require a separate material-change threshold before the court applies the relocation procedure and best-interest factors. A request to change custody or the parenting plan raises a distinct modification question. This reference does not rely on the noncitable memorandum opinion Hight or its account of Sanko.
Other qualifications
Silence for 30 days after a relocation petition authorizes the move, and the response deadline is treated as mandatory even for a parent with equal parenting time (Mosby, 2026).
Where imposed, the conservatorship order’s geographic restriction controls where the child may reside; § 153.134(b) also permits an order without a geographic restriction. Section 105.006 information-update notice is a separate duty and supplies no consent or objection procedure.
Authority
Tex. Fam. Code 153.134(b) (Lenz)
Court test
judicial relocation factors
Burden classification
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
set by the custody order (geographic restriction)
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent procedure specified in §§ 105.006 or 153.134; an existing geographic restriction requires compliance or modification
What the court weighs
Best interest of the child is the primary consideration (§ 153.002). Lenz holds no bright-line test can be formulated and surveys other states' factors. Courts of appeals apply non-exclusive Lenz factors: reasons for and against the move. Education, health and leisure opportunities. The child's special needs or talents. Effect on extended family relationships. Effect on visitation and communication with the noncustodial parent. The noncustodial parent's ability to relocate. The child's age (as listed in In re S.I.S.F. (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2026) (mem. op.), citing K.L.W. and Lenz). In re K.L.W., 301 S.W.3d 423, 425-26 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009) (published) applied the Lenz factors to an original divorce decree granting the right to designate residence without a geographic restriction. Modification requires best interest plus a material and substantial change since the order or mediated agreement, or a 12+ child's in-chambers preference, or six months' voluntary relinquishment by the primary-residence conservator. § 156.101(a)
Who carries the burden
The party seeking modification bears the burden under the general modification rule. Stone v. Stone, No. 03-23-00801-CV (Tex. App.-Austin April 18, 2025) (mem. op.) puts it on the father who sought to modify possession and access. That passage does not concern lifting a geographic restriction and says nothing about shifting. No authority identified addresses a shift.
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable relocation-specific notice period identified. Under § 105.006(b), subject to subsection (c), the final order directs each party to report an intended change in required information, including residence address, to the other parties, court and state case registry while a person remains obligated for support or entitled to possession or access. Notice is due on the earlier of 60 days before the change or the fifth day after learning of it if timely advance notice was not possible. After notice and hearing, the court may limit disclosure when it finds the specified risk of harassment, harm, abuse or family violence (§ 105.006(c)). This is an information-update duty, not a consent or objection procedure.
Which moves trigger the rule
Set by the conservatorship order, not by statute. When the court appoints joint managing conservators it must designate who holds the exclusive right to determine the child's primary residence and either set a geographic area within which the residence must be kept or specify no geographic restriction. A move outside the area requires modification. § 153.134(b)(1)(A)-(B)
Objections and the effect of silence
None by statute. The other parent's remedy is a motion to modify or to enforce the geographic restriction. Silence has no statutory effect: without an order lifting the restriction the parent may not move the child outside it.
The modification threshold
Yes for modification under § 156.101(a)(1) (material and substantial change since the order or mediated agreement). Courts of appeals hold a relocation is not automatically a material and substantial change, but a move of significant distance may be one, judged by fact-intensive factors (distance, the noncustodial relationship and access, motives for and against the move, feasibility of substitute visitation, travel): Bates v. Tesar, 81 S.W.3d 411, 430 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.), as quoted and followed in In re P.M.G., 405 S.W.3d 406 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2013) (191-mile move supported an implied finding) and Arredondo v. Betancourt, 383 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012). No Texas Supreme Court holding on the point was found.
Other qualifications
Geographic restrictions in conservatorship orders can control where the child may reside; § 153.134(b) permits a court to specify no geographic restriction. The separate § 105.006 address-update requirement is not a consent or objection procedure.
Important qualification
Where imposed, the conservatorship order’s geographic restriction controls where the child may reside; § 153.134(b) also permits an order without a geographic restriction. Section 105.006 information-update notice is a separate duty and supplies no consent or objection procedure.
Burden summary
Ordinary modification
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
General best-interest factors; no general relocation burden allocation identified. Written notice at least 60 days before the intended relocation, with the statute’s safety and court-order qualifications.
Authority
Utah Code 81-9-209
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
no general relocation allocation identified
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent effect identified in the relocation statute; court-order terms remain separate
What the court weighs
At the hearing the court determines whether the custodial parent's relocation is in the child's best interest, considering 'any other factors that the court considers relevant' (no enumerated relocation factors, no presumption). If not in the child's best interest and the custodial parent relocates, the court may order a change of custody (Pingree: no separate best-interest analysis needed for that change). If in the child's best interest, the court sets parent-time and allocates transportation costs, considering the reason for the move, added cost or difficulty, both parents' resources and other relevant factors. If a parent relocates because of domestic or family violence by the other parent, the court must make specific findings and orders on the section's application (subsection (8)). Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a statutory minimum parent-time schedule applies on relocation for children 5 to 18 (alternating holiday blocks, half of summer, one weekend per month at the noncustodial parent's option and expense), plus at least twice-weekly telephone contact and virtual parent-time if equipment is reasonably available, at reasonable hours and for a reasonable duration. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the relocating party pays the child’s holiday travel and half of the child’s summer travel if the noncustodial parent is current on support. § 81-9-209(5)-(9), (13), (17). Pingree v. Pingree, 2015 UT App 302, 365 P.3d 713 Since May 6, 2026, § 81-9-204(10)(d) also provides that when a parent relocates because of domestic or family violence by the other parent, the court may not require that parent to disclose the parent's address to the other parent.
Who carries the burden
No express relocation burden allocation was identified in §81-9-209 or the named cases. Kelly’s additional-best-interest-analysis holding does not establish a general burden allocation.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. Written notice to the other parent at least 60 days before the intended relocation. Notice must affirm that the statutory minimum parent-time schedule (or an agreed schedule) will be followed and that the parent will not interfere with the other's parental rights under a court-ordered or mutually approved parent-time schedule. A parent who fails to give the notice 'is in contempt of the court's order.' § 81-9-209(2), (3), (20)
Which moves trigger the rule
'Relocation' means moving 150 miles or more from the residence of the other parent (no in-state or out-of-state distinction). The best-interest and change-of-custody provisions speak of 'the relocation of a custodial parent.' § 81-9-209(1), (5), (6). Kelly v. Johnson (2025) applied the statute in a joint physical custody case.
Objections and the effect of silence
No objection deadline. On motion of any party or on its own motion the court 'shall schedule a hearing' to review the notice and the parent-time schedule and costs. The hearing may be expedited. The statute does not say silence authorizes the move and does not require a hearing absent a motion: unclear. § 81-9-209(4), (19)
The modification threshold
Kelly v. Johnson, 2025 UT App 175, ¶¶ 22–24, applies Pingree to hold that no additional best-interest analysis is required before changing custody when the custodial parent relocates after the move is found not to be in the child's best interest. Kelly did not decide whether a separate material-and-substantial-change finding is ever required. The trial court had alternatively found one. Before the relocation statute governed, Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ¶¶ 22-23, 989 P.2d 491, upheld a changed-circumstances finding resting on both parents' remarriages and moves too far apart for daily contact plus the child starting school.
Other qualifications
150-mile trigger and a full statutory default parent-time package. Failure to give the 60-day notice is deemed contempt, and the court may apply the section to any preexisting decree of divorce. Military: when an issue before the court involves custodial responsibility in the event of deployment of one or both service-member parents and the service member has not yet been notified of deployment, the court resolves that issue based on §§ 81-10-306 to -309 under § 81-9-208(9).
General best-interest factors. Ordinary modification. No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required.
Authority
Case law (Hawkes, Quinones), 15 V.S.A. 668
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
ordinary modification thresholds; no relocation-specific mileage test identified
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent procedure identified in § 668 or the cited relocation decisions
What the court weighs
For ordinary § 668(a) modification, two steps: first a 'real, substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances' (§ 668(a), Quinones ¶ 11, LaFlam ¶ 12), then best interests under the § 665(b) factors. A parent seeking to transfer physical rights bears a 'heavy burden' of showing changed circumstances (Hawkes ¶ 20, quoted in LaFlam ¶ 11), and a noncustodial parent seeking a change based solely on the custodial parent's relocation faces a 'high hurdle' (Quinones ¶ 22). Generally the custodial parent, not the court, decides where to live. The court decides which parent should have physical responsibility in light of the move and fashions a contact order, rather than deciding whether the move itself is in the child's interest (Quinones ¶¶ 13-24, Lane v. Schenck, 158 Vt. 489, 614 A.2d 786 (1992), and McCart v. McCart, 166 Vt. 629, 697 A.2d 353 (1997) (mem.)). In an initial award the court compares the child's proposed life in the new place with life with the other parent and cannot direct where the parents live (Gordon v. Fogell, 2025 VT 24, citing Gazo and Paine v. Buffa). No general relocation presumption is stated in the ordinary-modification provisions; special § 665(f) orders have separate restrictions.
Who carries the burden
Moving party bears the burden on both steps (Lane, citing Hayes). The 'heavy burden' in Hawkes ¶ 20 (quoted in LaFlam 2022) is the burden of showing changed circumstances for a custody change, which is higher than the threshold for altering parent-child contact. A noncustodial parent must prove the children's best interests would be so undermined by relocation with the custodial parent that a transfer is necessary (Lane). Does not shift.
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable relocation-notice requirement identified. A parent seeking a new contact schedule files a motion to modify.
Which moves trigger the rule
Ordinary custody modification requires a real, substantial and unanticipated change under § 668(a); the effect of a relocation is evaluated under Hawkes and later cases, with no relocation-specific mileage test identified in those cases. Hawkes ¶ 20 recognizes a lower changed-circumstances threshold for modifying parent-child contact. Special § 665(f)/§ 668(c) orders have the distinct restrictions described under Material change.
Objections and the effect of silence
No statutory mechanism. The other parent opposes the movant's motion to modify or files his or her own. Quinones holds a family court may not effectively bar a custodial parent's move by refusing to modify parent-child contact once it finds the move is an unanticipated change and custody stays with that parent.
The modification threshold
For ordinary custody modification, required. Hawkes v. Spence, 2005 VT 57, ¶¶ 9-19, adopted ALI Principles § 2.17(1): a relocation is a substantial change only when it significantly impairs either parent's ability to exercise responsibilities the parent has been exercising or attempting to exercise under the parenting plan, weighing the custodial responsibility actually exercised, the distance and duration of the move, and alternative contact arrangements. Relocation alone is not per se a change but may be one. A custodial parent's relocation can be the unanticipated change (Quinones ¶¶ 1, 21) but is not if the earlier order considered the move (LaFlam, 2022 VT 57). In an initial award, a parent who says she will move makes a later consistent move anticipated (Gordon v. Fogell, 2025 VT 24 ¶ 12). Section 668(c) states that final orders under § 665(f)(1) are not modifiable and motions under § 665(f)(2) require an extraordinary, real, substantial and unanticipated change. These are special sexual-assault, sexual-exploitation or trafficking orders, rather than ordinary relocation orders. Section 665(f)(4), added in 2017 when the legislature struck § 665(f)(2)'s own modification clause without amending § 668(c), bars any parent-child contact order once a § 665(f) order issues, terminates existing contact orders, and states that an order under that subdivision is permanent and nonmodifiable. Whether § 665(f)(4) reaches the § 665(f)(2) rights-and-responsibilities order that § 668(c) still allows to be modified has not been decided. Hawkes ¶ 20 distinguishes the lower changed-circumstances threshold for altering parent-child contact from the heavy custody-change threshold.
Other qualifications
No general advance relocation-notice period identified. In the Quinones posture, after finding an unanticipated change and leaving physical responsibility with the custodial parent, the court could not effectively prevent the move by refusing to adapt contact. Hawkes adopted ALI § 2.17(1)’s significant-impairment test for custody modification, with a lower threshold for modifying contact.
Burden summary
Ordinary modification
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Trigger summary
Modification thresholds; no mileage test identified
General best-interest factors. On the moving parent. 30 days; exceptions apply.
Authority
Va. Code 20-124.5
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
not addressed in § 20-124.5
What the court weighs
Best interests of the child control a custodial parent's request to move the children (Cloutier, following Simmons, Bostick and Stockdale, Bostick v. Bostick-Bennett, 23 Va. App. 527, 478 S.E.2d 319 (1996) read: a court may forbid or permit removal, and the child's best interest decides), guided by the § 20-124.3 factors (including each parent's propensity to support the child's relationship with the other). Wheeler requires a material change in circumstances first, then best interests, with attention to substantially maintaining the child's relationship with the non-custodial parent. A benefit to the parent counts only if the move independently benefits the children. Virginia declined New Jersey's 'unity of interests' approach (Cloutier). No presumption for either parent.
Who carries the burden
The party requesting permission to remove the child bears the burden of proof (Cloutier, citing Bostick and Hughes v. Gentry). Hughes v. Gentry, 18 Va. App. 318, 443 S.E.2d 448 (1994): the parent seeking a transfer of custody bears the burden to show a change in circumstances since the last award. No shift found.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes, as a term of the order. In any custody or visitation proceeding the court 'shall include as a condition' of the order a requirement that 30 days' advance written notice be given to the court and the other party by any party intending to relocate and of any intended change of address, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. The court may prescribe the form and contents. § 20-124.5
Which moves trigger the rule
Any intended relocation or change of address. No mileage threshold.
Objections and the effect of silence
None in the statute (no deadline, no deemed consent). The opposing parent files a motion or cross-motion (in Cloutier the father cross-moved). Whether silence permits the move is not addressed by § 20-124.5: unclear.
The modification threshold
Yes, as a threshold when a decree is modified (Wheeler, citing Hughes v. Gentry, § 20-108). In Wheeler the finding rested on the custodial parent's economic decline, so whether a proposed move alone suffices is not shown: unclear.
Other qualifications
The notice is a condition written into each custody order (30 days, to the court and the other party) rather than a self-executing statutory right. No objection window and no presumption.
Statutory relocation factors and a qualifying-move presumption; no presumption where each parent has at least 45 percent of residential time. Hauk, 7 Wn.3d 1 (2026), measures residential time at service of the relocation notice; the slip and revised texts are compared in Sources and limits.
Authority
RCW 26.09.405 to .560
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
presumption for the move
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
yes
What the court weighs
Relocating person states reasons. Rebuttable presumption that the relocation will be permitted. An objecting person rebuts it by showing the detrimental effect of the relocation outweighs the benefit of the change to the child and the relocating person, based on eleven unweighted factors (relationship strength, prior agreements, relative detriment of disrupting contact, RCW 26.09.191 limitations, reasons and good faith, child's age, development and needs, quality of life and opportunities in each location, alternative arrangements, alternatives to relocation and feasibility of the other party moving, financial impact and logistics, for temporary orders, time before trial). Where each parent has at least 45 percent of the child's residential time (counting only time spent with parents and using the amount designated in the court order unless there is an ongoing pattern of substantial deviation, both parents agreed to it, and the deviation is not based on circumstances beyond either parent’s ability to control), the presumption does not apply and the court decides on best interest using the same factors. RCW 26.09.520,.525,.530
In In re Marriage of Hauk, 7 Wn.3d 1, 594 P.3d 679 (2026), reconsideration denied Sept. 16, 2026, the court held that residential time is calculated when notice of the proposed move is served, so in a phased plan only the phase then in place counts, not future phases not yet in effect. The court reversed and remanded for findings on the service date and the 45 percent threshold. Four justices dissented and would have counted the entire plan.
Who carries the burden
Objecting person bears the burden to rebut the presumption (relocating person must give reasons). No presumption, and a best-interest determination on the same factors, when the relocating person has substantially equal time. RCW 26.09.520,.525
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. A person with whom the child resides a majority of the time, or who has substantially equal residential time, must notify every other person entitled to residential time or visitation. Notice by personal service or any mail requiring a return receipt, at least 60 days before the intended relocation (or within 5 days after learning the information if it could not reasonably have been known in time). Notice must include an address for service, reasons, and a warning that an objection must be filed and served within 30 days, plus specified details and a proposed residential schedule if available. Moves within the same school district need only actual notice by any reasonable means. RCW 26.09.430,.440,.450
Which moves trigger the rule
'Relocate' means a change in principal residence either permanently or for a protracted period, or a change in residence where parents have substantially equal residential time (45 percent or more each). No mileage threshold. Within-school-district moves get lighter notice and cannot be objected to (the other parent may still seek modification). RCW 26.09.410,.450,.525
Objections and the effect of silence
Objection must be filed and served within 30 days of receipt of the notice. The relocating person may not change the child's principal residence during the objection period without a court order (ex parte order available) and, if a hearing is noted within 15 days of service of the objection, pending the hearing. If no objection is filed in 30 days the relocation 'shall be permitted' except for good cause, and the proposed schedule may be entered ex parte. Silence authorizes the move. RCW 26.09.480,.500
The modification threshold
No. A petition to modify a parenting plan in a relocation proceeding may be filed 'without a showing of adequate cause other than the proposed relocation itself.' RCW 26.09.260(6)
Other qualifications
The statute does not apply the relocation presumption when each parent has at least 45 percent of residential time. In In re Marriage of Hauk, 7 Wn.3d 1 (2026), a 5–4 court held that residential time is calculated as of service of the relocation notice, so for a phased plan the phase then in place controls rather than future phases not yet in effect. Reconsideration was denied September 16, 2026.
Important qualification
The presumption does not apply where each parent has at least 45% of residential time. Hauk, 7 Wn.3d 1 (2026), calculates residential time at service of notice; the court did not address calculations based on deviations from the court-ordered schedule under RCW 26.09.525(2).
Burden summary
Presumption for a qualifying move; substantially equal residential time is an exception.
Statute, no factor list. On the moving parent. 90 days; exceptions apply.
Authority
W. Va. Code 48-9-403
Court test
hybrid (relocation statute, no factor list)
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
any move (no distance threshold)
Effect of silence
no (consent or court order required)
What the court weighs
The relocating parent must prove: (A) the reasons are legitimate and in good faith. (B) relocation with the child is in the child's best interests under § 48-9-102. And (C) no reasonable alternative to the proposed relocation is available that would be in the child's best interests and less disruptive. Statutory legitimate-purpose examples include being close to immediate family, substantial health reasons, protecting the child or another household member from significant risk of harm, significant employment or educational opportunity, or being with a spouse or significant other with whom the relocating parent has cohabited for at least a year and who is established or pursuing a significant employment or educational opportunity in another location. The relocating parent may also prove the legitimacy of another purpose. A move with a legitimate purpose is unreasonable unless the purpose is not substantially achievable without moving and a less disruptive location is not feasible. When legitimate, in good faith and impractical to keep the same proportion of custodial responsibility, the court modifies the plan per the child's best interests. Otherwise it may modify, including reallocating primary custody effective if the parent moves. The court shall minimize impairment through alternative arrangements. A separate 2022 rebuttable presumption favors equal (50-50) custodial allocation (§ 48-9-102a). In an initial allocation, § 48-9-206(b) directs the court to apply § 403 principles if a parent relocates or proposes to relocate at a distance that impairs the custodial responsibility that would otherwise be ordered (Robert F., 2024). § 48-9-403(c)-(d)
Who carries the burden
Relocating parent bears the burden on all three elements. No presumption or shift for a majority-time parent since the 2021 amendment (Katherine A., 248 W. Va. 672 (Ct. App. 2023)). § 48-9-403(d)
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes, by petition. A parent with responsibility under a parenting plan who changes or intends to change residences must file a verified petition to modify the plan at least 90 days before the relocation and have the summons served at least 60 days in advance, on the other parent and anyone else allocated custodial time, unless impracticable. The petition must state the proposed date, new address, specific reasons, a proposed revision of custodial responsibility, and a request for hearing. Non-compliance may count against good faith and may support reallocating primary residence and a fee award. § 48-9-403(b). Family Court Rule 52 (last amended December 1, 2005; unchanged on the official judiciary page as of October 30, 2026, which shows other rules amended through December 29, 2025) requires a parent who changes residence for more than 90 days to file and provide a 'notice of relocation which complies with the requirements of W. Va. Code, § 48-9-403.' The rule therefore adopts the statute's filing requirements, but it keeps the pre-2021 residence-duration trigger and provides for a hearing on either parent's request. The Supreme Court of Appeals' approved form SCA-FC-131 (August 5, 2021) is a single verified 'Petition and Notice of Relocation' citing § 48-9-403. Rule 1 states that the rules apply if they conflict with a statute; no decision has applied it to this pairing, and this entry does not decide whether the rule's duration trigger or hearing-on-request provision limits the statute.
Which moves trigger the rule
A parent with responsibility under a parenting plan who changes or intends to change residence. No mileage threshold. Relocation is by statute a substantial change in circumstances when it impairs either parent's ability to exercise responsibilities they have been exercising, or impairs the court-ordered custodial schedule. Not considered until an initial permanent parenting plan exists (absent extraordinary circumstances). § 48-9-403(a), (b), (f)
Objections and the effect of silence
No objection deadline and no deemed consent. A hearing on the petition 'shall be held' at least 30 days before the proposed date; an expedited hearing may be requested. If the hearing occurs fewer than 30 days before that date, the court’s order must state factual findings explaining why it was not held at least 30 days before the petition’s proposed date. The relocating parent's petition itself requests the hearing. Parties may instead file a signed modified plan for court approval. Silence does not authorize the move. § 48-9-403(c), (e). Rule 52 lets either parent request a hearing, with a scheduling order within five days of the request.
The modification threshold
Yes by statute: relocation is a substantial change of circumstances under § 48-9-401(a) when it impairs either parent's exercised responsibilities or the ordered schedule. § 48-9-403(a)
Other qualifications
Relocating parent must also prove there is no reasonable alternative to the move. The 2021 act removed the earlier presumption for a parent exercising 70 percent or more of custodial responsibility.
Important qualification
Rule 52 incorporates § 48-9-403's requirements by reference but retains a 'more than 90 days' residence-duration trigger and a hearing-on-request provision; whether either limits the statute under Rule 1 is not adjudicated. Initial allocation under § 48-9-206(b) has its own application of relocation principles.
The mover ordinarily bears the burden. Statutory presumptions favor relocation where the objector has not significantly exercised placement or the move relates to abuse.
Authority
Wis. Stat. 767.481
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
burden on the relocating parent
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
mileage threshold
Effect of silence
yes, qualified
What the court weighs
At the final hearing: (a) if the move only minimally changes or does not change the placement schedule, the court shall approve it and set transport arrangements. (b) otherwise the court applies the § 767.41(5) best-interest factors plus (i) a presumption to approve the relocating parent's plan if the objecting parent has not significantly exercised court-ordered placement and (ii) a presumption to approve if the relocation is related to child abuse, a pattern or serious incident of interspousal battery, or domestic abuse. (c) if the objecting parent files a responsive motion for a substantial placement change or a custody change, the same factors apply plus a presumption against transferring custody or residence to a parent who significantly failed to exercise placement. (e) if the relocation motion is withdrawn or denied, the court proceeds on the objecting parent's responsive motion under § 767.451. All decided in the best interest of the child. § 767.481(4)
Who carries the burden
Movant bears the burden in a contested relocation motion and any related modification motion, except where a presumption applies, in which case the objecting parent must show the plan is not in the child's best interest. § 767.481(4)(d)
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes, in two forms. (1) If both parents have court-ordered physical placement and one intends to relocate and reside with the child 100 driving miles or more from the other, that parent must file a motion for permission with a relocation plan (date, municipality and state, reason, any proposed new schedule, transportation-cost allocation), any request for a change in legal custody, a notice that the other parent must object no later than 5 days before the initial hearing, and a court objection form. (2) If the parents already live more than 100 driving miles apart, written notice at least 60 days before the move stating the date and new address. Separate duty to notify before removing the child from the residence for more than 14 consecutive days. During a pending action, relocating more than 100 driving miles without consent or a court order is barred (§ 767.117(1)(c)). § 767.481(1), (6)
Which moves trigger the rule
One parent intends to relocate and reside with the child 100 driving miles or more from the other parent, where both parents have court-ordered placement. 'Driving miles' means actual distance by road (2025 Wis. Act 81). Applies to cases commenced on or after April 5, 2018, and older cases modified on or after that date. Older cases otherwise keep the 2015 rules. § 767.481(1)(a), (7). § 767.001(1fm)
Objections and the effect of silence
Initial hearing within 30 days of the motion. The child may not be relocated pending it. Objection and any alternate proposal due no later than 5 days before the initial hearing. If the other parent was properly served and does not appear or does not object, the court approves the plan unless it finds the plan not in the child's best interest. If the parent objects, further proceedings follow (mediation referral, guardian ad litem, final hearing). Silence leads to approval subject to a best-interest check. § 767.481(2)
The modification threshold
No for a § 767.481 relocation motion. A competing modification under § 767.451 needs a substantial change of circumstances (and within two years of judgment, a showing of harmful conditions). A move may be considered on a separate modification motion (Hughes v. Hughes, 223 Wis. 2d 111, 588 N.W.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1998), decided under former §§ 767.325 and 767.327).
Other qualifications
Court permission by motion is required before moving 100 or more driving miles when both parents have placement, and the child may not move before the initial hearing. Abuse-related relocations carry a statutory presumption for the relocating parent. Military: none found in the text read.
Important qualification
The mover ordinarily bears the burden. Statutory presumptions favor relocation where the objector has not significantly exercised placement or the move relates to abuse.
Burden summary
Usually the mover. Presumptions favor the move for abuse-related relocation or substantially unexercised placement.
Notice summary
60 days if parents already live over 100 driving miles apart; separate motion route
burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
planned change of home city or state
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent effect identified in the notice statute; modification and order terms are separate
What the court weighs
Modification requires a material change in circumstances since the order and that modification is in the child's best interests under the § 20-2-201(a) factors, which include the quality of each parent-child relationship, each parent's ability to provide care, willingness to support the other's relationship, and 'geographic distance between the parents' residences.' Arnott (2012) rejected any presumption favoring the relocating custodial parent. Case law adds non-exclusive 'relocation factors' that 'may inform' the best-interest decision (how the children fared under the existing arrangement, the relocating parent's motives, whether reasonable visitation is possible for the remaining parent) (Paden, Walsh ¶ 18, citing Arnott). Callaway (2026), an initial custody decision in a divorce, considered a proposed move among the statutory best-interest factors; the Supreme Court affirmed the custody award (¶¶ 30–32, 54). § 20-2-201(a), § 20-2-204(c)
Who carries the burden
Party seeking modification must show the material change and best interests (statute: 'a showing by either parent'). Arnott ¶ 41 places the evidentiary burden on best interests on the parent seeking modification. No shift. § 20-2-204(c). Arnott
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes. In ordering visitation the court shall require either parent who plans to change their home city or state of residence to give written notice 30 days before the move, to the other parent and to the clerk of the district court, stating the date and destination. Domestic-abuse confidentiality carve-out. § 20-2-202(a)(iii)
Which moves trigger the rule
A parent’s plan to change home city or state of residence triggers the §20-2-202(a)(iii) notice requirement. No mileage threshold appears in that provision; ordered domestic-abuse confidentiality remains. Other court-order terms and ordinary modification proceedings are separate.
Objections and the effect of silence
None in the statute. The other parent may petition to modify (§ 20-2-204(c)). Silence has no statutory effect.
The modification threshold
Yes, required, and a relocation can supply it. Arnott ¶ 40 holds a relocation by the primary physical custodian, and factors derivative of it (including the difficulties added distance imposes), may constitute a material change, overruling Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999), to the extent of the conflict. Watt had attributed a strong relocation presumption to Love v. Love, but Arnott ¶ 33 expressly found no such presumption in Love; ¶¶ 21-22 describe the presumption as established in Watt. It is fact-specific, not automatic. A material change does not by itself require a custody change (Kelly ¶ 12). Later cases found or accepted the move as a material change (Paden, Walsh, Kelly v. Kelly, 2023 WY 48, where the mother admitted it). Cornell v. Mecartney, 2025 WY 97 ¶¶ 28-31: applying the Arnott factors, a custodial parent's three-year-old move from Jackson to Pinedale was not a material change.
Other qualifications
§20-2-202(a)(iii) requires 30-day notice to the other parent and district court clerk for a planned change of home city or state, subject to ordered confidentiality. Modification follows the ordinary test; Arnott (2012) rejected Watt’s presumption for the moving custodial parent. Military: § 20-2-205 allows only temporary modification for a service member's temporary duty, deployment or mobilization, and makes the deployment a neutral factor that cannot alone be a material change on return.
Three statutory conditions and twenty factors; Article 3 notice conditions apply. OGP English is an unofficial compilation; Spanish wording and scope limits are explained.
Authority
Act 102-2018, 32 L.P.R.A. 3371-3378
Court test
statutory relocation factors
Burden classification
no allocation found
Notice classification
yes
Trigger classification
more than ninety days; off-island context, intrajurisdictional scope not resolved
Effect of silence
no (consent or court order required)
What the court weighs
Article 6(A) requires proof of three conditions: the move is not to impede the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent or interested person; there is a 'razón válida y determinante' (our translation: 'valid and determinative reason'; the government-hosted OGP English compilation says 'valid and specific'); and it will offer a 'mejor oportunidad de vida' (our translation: 'better opportunity in life') for both the custodial parent or guardian and the child. The OGP English compilation instead says 'enhance the quality of life.' Article 6(B) lists twenty best-interest factors, including applicable shared custody in factor 7; factor 11 permits the court to order a destination social study, which must include crime analysis if ordered. Factors also address the child's preference where entitled to be heard, relationships and emotional ties, development, the move's impact, contact, finances and responsibility, school and childcare, workplace and household, landlord and employment/studies certification, the social worker's recommendation, health insurance, and other factors the judge deems necessary taking equity between the parties as a principle. In Jusino (2023), after the child's circumstances changed over several years, the Supreme Court reversed exclusions of the updated interagency report and relevant witnesses and remanded for the corresponding social report and a merits hearing; it did not decide whether relocation should be approved.
Who carries the burden
Article 6(A) says 'si se prueba' (our translation: 'if it is proved') without expressly identifying the proving party or a standard of proof. Article 3 requires the custodial parent or guardian to obtain sworn consent or seek court authorization; attributing the proof obligation to the applicant is an inference from that structure, not express burden-allocation text. The checked Jusino and Navas decisions do not announce a separate burden-shifting rule. P. del S. 1344's proposed language and the September 30, 2026 status record are historical legislative materials, not proof of enacted law or current bill status.
Notice and safety exceptions
Yes, where the court has already set parenting time (art. 3, last paragraph). Custodial parent or guardian gives written notice to the non-custodial parent entitled to visitation and to the court, by certified mail at least 30 calendar days before relocating, filing a copy by motion simultaneously. Late notice only for urgency (work, studies, or another reason the court finds meritorious). Art. 4 lists nine required contents (intent, new address, reasons, school, day care or caregiver, workplace, household members, landlord, employment or education certification). If no case is pending, art. 8 lets parents proceed by joint affidavit with the art. 4 information and a detailed parenting schedule. The Judiciary's OAT 1435 form tracks these items and certifies certified-mail service.
Which moves trigger the rule
Article 2(e) defines 'relocalización' as a change in the minor's principal residence for more than ninety days; it contains no express geographic qualifier. The Statement of Motives discusses moves outside Puerto Rico, and Navas Vidal (2021) describes the Act in that off-jurisdiction setting. Navas denied certiorari from a provisional move to Tampa, with jurisdiction and possible return retained; it did not decide an intrajurisdictional move. The October 2023 OAT 1435 form is expressly for relocation outside Puerto Rico. These sources support an off-island context, but no authority identified establishes that the definition excludes every move within Puerto Rico.
Objections and the effect of silence
Non-custodial parent (or joint-custody parent, per art. 7's title) answers by certified mail within 20 calendar days stating a position (art. 7). Silence does not authorize the move: art. 3 requires the non-custodial parent's sworn consent with a detailed parenting schedule, signed by both, and without it the custodial parent must ask the court for authorization.
The modification threshold
Article 5 allows the noncustodial parent or person with visitation rights to bring an action requesting a custody change if the custodial parent or guardian moves 'sin previa notificación y autorización' (our translation: 'without prior notice and authorization') and noncompliance with the Act is shown. It permits contempt when previously established parent-child relations have been denied, and discretionary application of Article 121 of Act 146-2012. The OGP English compilation uses 'or' where this Spanish sentence uses 'y' ('and'); no independent sanctions-trigger interpretation is selected here. Jusino explains that custody determinations may be revised on later facts and circumstances in the child's best interest; its ruling concerns updated evidence and a remand, not whether a proposed relocation alone satisfies a material-change threshold.
Other qualifications
Act 102 provides thirty-calendar-day certified-mail notice subject to Article 3's scope and urgency conditions, a twenty-calendar-day certified-mail response, sworn consent or court authorization, three Article 6(A) conditions and twenty Article 6(B) factors. The Judiciary's saved OAT 1435 form addresses requests to relocate children outside Puerto Rico. This description does not assert that Puerto Rico is uniquely regulated among the territories.
Important qualification
OGP's Spanish and English compilations are government-hosted but expressly unofficial, with different April 2024 revision dates. Our translations are labeled; the geographic-scope and later-law review limits remain explicit.
Section 4122 permits a custodial residence change subject to judicial restraint protecting the child’s rights or welfare. No general relocation burden allocation or separate advance-notice procedure identified.
Authority
19 GCA 4122
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
no allocation found
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
no general distance or off-island threshold identified
Effect of silence
No generally applicable deemed-consent procedure identified; court-order terms remain separate
What the court weighs
Sec. 4122: a parent entitled to custody "has a right to change his residence, subject to the power of the proper court to restrain a removal which would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child." Sec. 8404(a)(1): custody by the best interest of the child. (a)(6): custody awards modifiable whenever the child's best interests require or justify. Lanser v. Lanser, 2003 Guam 14 paras. 10-11: the legislative equal-time visitation policy (then sec. 8404(h), now (a)(8)) applies only when both parents live on Guam, so it does not apply once the custodial parent and children live off-island. No case interpreting sec. 4122 in a relocation dispute was found.
Who carries the burden
No relocation-specific burden allocation identified. Section 4122 states a right to change residence subject to judicial restraint of a removal prejudicing the child’s rights or welfare, but no authority identified establishes an objector burden from that wording. Koji discusses the father’s burden as the party seeking custody modification, not a general relocation-objector burden.
Notice and safety exceptions
No separate relocation notice rule identified. The title of the Family Court Rules states current as of December 31, 1994, and Rule 18 concerns custody investigations and reports. No relocation-notice rule identified in the Local Rules of the Superior Court of Guam (October 13, 2025 edition, updated through Promulgation Order No. 06-006-30 of September 26, 2025). Court-order restrictions require a separate check.
Which moves trigger the rule
Sec. 4122 speaks of a custodial parent's change of residence and the court's power to restrain a "removal." Sec. 8404(a)(16) mentions a child "removed from Guam without prior Court authorization," but only as a proviso inside the family-violence clause. No general distance or off-island threshold.
Objections and the effect of silence
No general relocation-specific objection deadline identified. Section 4122 permits judicial restraint of a removal prejudicing the child’s rights or welfare; custody-modification relief has its own conditions.
The modification threshold
Koji v. Neves, 2016 Guam 36 ¶¶3,7,26–30: the parties initially agreed to joint legal and physical custody; the May 2014 order left physical custody with the mother. The father sought modification to become primary physical custodian. Modifying physical custody based solely on his planned move to California, without additional factual findings, was an abuse of discretion. The court reversed, vacated and remanded. Lanser, 2003 Guam 14 n.2, states a persuasive showing of changed circumstances is generally required; the parties apparently stipulated to changed circumstances, although this was not reflected in the appellate record and the issue was not raised on appeal.
Other qualifications
Section 4122 states a custodial parent’s right to change residence, subject to judicial restraint of a removal that would prejudice the child’s rights or welfare.
Burden summary
No general allocation identified
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
No generally applicable relocation notice procedure identified. Section 109(b) separately provides a conditional residence presumption in its marriage/future-custody setting; §109(c)(3) addresses violence-caused absence or relocation. No general relocation burden allocation identified.
Authority
Case law (Jung 2013, James 2016)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
no general relocation allocation identified
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
no general distance or duration trigger identified; conditional residence provisions apply
Effect of silence
No general deemed-consent procedure identified; court and order terms remain separate
What the court weighs
Jung (2013) stated that no V.I. statute supplied relocation or custody factors. Separately, §109(b) supplies a conditional child-residence presumption in its subsection (a) future-custody setting, and §109(c)(3) addresses relocation caused by the other parent’s domestic violence. The court declined to adopt ALI Principles sec. 2.17 or other states' relocation tests, saying the choice of criteria is for the Legislature, and affirmed permission to relocate under abuse-of-discretion review (additional findings would have been "helpful and even desirable"). Cabret, J., dissented. James (2016): the Superior Court must consider, if relevant, at least a set of factors, the first being the home environments "including the degree to which relocation between those respective environments will impact the child's best interests" (citing Jung), under the Tutein two-step (state the factors, explain the findings). Chinnery (2026) affirmed a primary-custody award after applying best-interest factors to unresolved school and related weekday-residence issues in a dispute involving a relocation motion and a partial mediated settlement agreement.
Who carries the burden
Unclear. No V.I. Supreme Court decision allocating a relocation burden was identified in the original survey. Jung declined to adopt ALI or other-state burden rules. Chinnery’s procedural account states that the September 2024 status-quo order followed, in part, Hill’s failure to establish her burden on her emergency relocation motion; the opinion does not specify a relocation burden standard or decide its general allocation.
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable separate relocation notice rule identified. Section 109(b) provides a conditional residence presumption and §109(c)(3) addresses a violence-related absence or relocation; neither is a general notice procedure.
Which moves trigger the rule
No general distance or duration trigger identified. Section 109(b) supplies a conditional child-residence presumption in future-custody determinations under subsection (a); §109(c)(3) addresses absence or relocation caused by the other parent’s domestic violence. Relocation also reaches the court in the specific motion or custody contexts described in Jung and Chinnery.
Objections and the effect of silence
None found by rule in the original survey. In Chinnery, the other parent filed an opposition to the relocation motion (Chinnery: King's August 1, 2024 opposition).
The modification threshold
A substantial change in circumstances is required before custody is modified: James I, 62 V.I. 554 (2015), citing Jung, 59 V.I. at 1066-67 (Cabret, J., dissenting, noting the majority acknowledged the rule). In Jung the mother's job loss and move were treated as the change and the modification was affirmed. No decision says whether a proposed relocation alone suffices.
Other qualifications
Section 109(b) provides a conditional rebuttable child-residence presumption, including the nonperpetrator parent’s chosen location within or outside the territory, in the future-custody determination under subsection (a) when a marriage is declared void or dissolved. It also applies upon conviction of a parent for the other parent’s death or conception of the child by rape. Within its court-finding-of-domestic-violence context, §109(c)(3) bars weighing an absence or relocation caused by the other parent’s violence against the parent in custody or visitation. These provisions are distinct from a generally applicable relocation notice procedure.
Important qualification
The survey relies on Supreme Court opinions and reproduced statutory text. The reproduced 2025 and 2026-labeled code texts do not rule out later enactments. The opinions do not settle a general relocation burden.
Burden summary
No general allocation identified
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Trigger summary
No general threshold identified; conditional residence rules apply
No general relocation procedure identified. Section 1933 separately supplies a conditional violence-related child-residence presumption, and §1932(b) protects violence-caused relocation. No general relocation burden identified.
Authority
None found (8 CMC 1311, 1933 general)
Court test
no general relocation procedure found; conditional violence-related residence presumption
Burden classification
no general relocation allocation identified
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
no general distance or duration threshold identified; conditional residence protections apply
Effect of silence
No generally applicable deemed-consent procedure identified; existing orders remain separate
What the court weighs
No generally applicable relocation procedure identified. Section 1311 supplies general custody authority. Separate family-violence protections do apply: § 1932(b) protects a parent who relocated because of family violence from a custody or visitation penalty. In a child-custody dispute, a Superior Court determination that domestic or family violence occurred raises §1933’s rebuttable best-interest presumption favoring the child’s residence with the nonperpetrator parent in that parent’s chosen location, within or outside the Commonwealth.
Who carries the burden
No general relocation burden allocation identified. Section 1933’s rebuttable residence presumption has its own domestic-or-family-violence finding predicates; it is not a general relocation burden rule.
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable relocation-specific advance-notice procedure identified. The conditional violence-related residence protections and individual court orders are separate.
Which moves trigger the rule
None found. Only the family-violence residence presumption (sec. 1933) speaks of a child living "within or outside the Commonwealth."
Objections and the effect of silence
None found.
The modification threshold
None found on relocation. Sec. 1311 permits revision of custody at any time upon motion. Secondary websites say CNMI courts require a substantial change of circumstances. Not confirmed from a case and not relied on.
Other qualifications
In a child-custody dispute, a Superior Court determination that domestic or family violence occurred raises a rebuttable presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to reside with the parent who is not a perpetrator, in that parent’s chosen location within or outside the Commonwealth (§1933). This is a conditional child-residence presumption, not an unconditional entitlement of a victim parent.
Important qualification
Least certain classification in the survey. General custody provisions coexist with express family-violence residence protections.
Burden summary
No general allocation identified
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Trigger summary
No general threshold identified; conditional residence protection applies
No relocation-specific rule was found. General custody decisions apply best interests. The code text is from a bar-association reproduction.
Authority
None found (A.S.C.A. 42.0210 general)
Court test
no relocation-specific rule found
Burden classification
no allocation found
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
no relocation-specific trigger identified
Effect of silence
No deemed-consent procedure identified in § 42.0210 or the named custody decisions
What the court weighs
General custody standard only, not relocation: Tapeni v. Tapeni, 6 Am. Samoa 3d 81, 84-86 (App. Div. 2002): best interest of the child is the cornerstone. Between natural parents no presumption arises. Fit parents hold a rebuttable presumption against third parties. Tapeni says §42.0210 may be broadly interpreted as supporting a best-interest test (children there were living off-island in Hawaii with relatives, but relocation was not the issue). L.F. v. D.F. (2005) applies Tapeni. Cox v. Paslov, 5 Am. Samoa 3d 150 (Trial Div. July 17, 2001), quotes an older Trial Division tender-years statement (Stevens v. Stevens, 21 A.S.R.2d 76 (1992)). The Tapeni opinion states that natural parents start on equal footing; it does not discuss Stevens or expressly resolve the older tender-years statement. No relocation-specific rule identified.
Who carries the burden
None found.
Notice and safety exceptions
None found.
Which moves trigger the rule
None found.
Objections and the effect of silence
None found.
The modification threshold
None found on relocation. Cox v. Paslov (child present in American Samoa, Montana decree) modified a foreign decree on an emergency and best-interest basis. UCCJEA/PKPA jurisdiction is out of scope. The court there said American Samoa lacked a UCCJA statute.
Other qualifications
None stated.
Important qualification
No relocation-specific rule was found. General custody decisions apply best interests. The code text is from a bar-association reproduction.
Burden summary
No allocation found
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
