Best interests, Divorce grounds, Parental relocation in one jurisdiction reference.
Research dates are shown separately in each topic.
Hawaii · May 21, 2026
A Hawaiʻi Supreme Court order amended Family Court Rules 6 and 77 effective July 1, 2026, revising holiday terminology for time computation and clerk-office hours.
Hawaii · July 9, 2025
The order revises wording in Rules 103 and 118, including name information for married people and civil-union partners.
Hawaii
Statutory framework; factor structure: 16. Factors (5) and (11) in § 571-46(b) are not considered when the court determines that a parent committed family violence. Section 571-46(a)(9) separately creates a rebuttable presumption against sole custody, joint legal custody or joint physical custody with the perpetrator.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-46(b)
Statutory
16
shall
preamble
Family-violence rebuttable, (a)(9)
none
Hawaii
Four grounds: irretrievable breakdown, expiration of a qualifying bed-and-board separation decree, at least two years apart under a separate-maintenance decree, or two years apart with no reasonable likelihood of resumed cohabitation and the additional statutory findings.
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 580-41, -42, -45, -71.
Four grounds: irretrievable breakdown, expiration of a qualifying bed-and-board separation decree, at least two years apart under a separate-maintenance decree, or two years apart with no reasonable likelihood of resumed cohabitation and the additional statutory findings.
none (0)
No separation prerequisite for breakdown. The two-year routes and the decree-expiration route are alternatives. The hardship and public-interest proviso belongs to the fourth ground.
Section 580-45 permits the court to set effectiveness at entry or a date within one month. This is not a mandatory one-month waiting period.
Yes, separation from bed and board up to 2 years, § 580-71
Hawaii
Fisher declines a requested primary-caretaker preference and gives no single factor presumptive paramount weight. No modern decision allocates a general relocation burden; Gillespie’s 1953 burden statement was narrowed by Estrella in 1959, and later-treatment review is limited. Electronic visitation cannot justify relocation.
HRS 571-46 (Fisher, Waldecker)
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
no general modern allocation identified
no
no relocation-specific distance threshold identified
No deemed-consent procedure identified in the custody provisions or named opinions
Hawaii applies the child's best interests under HRS § 571-46. Fisher v. Fisher, 111 Haw. 41, 137 P.3d 355 (2006), rejected a primary-caretaker preference and refused to give any single factor presumptive paramount weight. It did not establish a formal relocation burden rule. Under § 571-46(a)(16)(B), remote electronic visitation cannot justify or support a custodial parent's relocation. DJ v. CJ (2020) requires procedural fairness where an out-of-state move affects the other parent's substantive liberty interest.
No modern Hawaii appellate decision allocates a general relocation burden of persuasion. The modern cases state the standard rather than a burden: the governing consideration is whether relocation is in the child’s best interests (DJ v. CJ, 2020), with no statutory presumptions or ‘super-factors’ and no single factor given presumptive paramount weight (Fisher, 2006; KP v. EM, 2025). Gillespie v. Gillespie, 40 Haw. 315 (1953), did place on the parent seeking to remove the children the burden to show the change would clearly serve their best interests, on a post-decree record with no proof of benefit; Estrella v. Estrella, 43 Haw. 210 (1959), confined Gillespie to that record, rejected a near-necessity reading, and made the child’s welfare the ‘pole star,’ with each case decided on its own facts. Maeda (App. 1990) upheld a custody award conditioned on the mother proving in court that a move would serve the child. No later majority has reaffirmed or overruled Gillespie’s burden sentence. Waldecker (2016) separately requires a best-interest finding before enforcing an automatic custody transfer and rejects a separate material-change prerequisite. DJ reproduces a trial court’s ‘carried her burden’ finding without reviewing the custody merits; KP’s affirmance is record-specific.
No general advance relocation-notice period was identified in § 571-46, § 571-46.1 or the named opinions. Section 571-46.1 addresses joint custody, not the claimed statewide 60-day notice rule. DJ’s own decree required 60 days’ written notice, an order-specific obligation.
None defined by statute. Relocation is litigated in a custody or post-decree proceeding, typically a request to move the child out of state or to the mainland.
No relocation objection deadline or deemed-consent procedure identified in the custody provisions. Tetreault’s statement about filing an objection and requesting a hearing concerns attorney fees, not the relocation merits burden. Applicable orders and generally applicable motion procedures require separate attention.
No separate material-change threshold. Waldecker (2016) overruled Nadeau and Hollaway to the extent they require a material change before the court considers the child's best interests in modifying custody. It requires one best-interest inquiry under HRS § 571-46, and held that the court could not enforce the decree's automatic transfer from joint physical custody to the father's sole physical custody without finding that transfer was in the child's best interests at the expected relocation.
No general advance relocation-notice period identified. Section 571-46(a)(16)(B) bars using electronic visitation to justify or support a custodial parent’s relocation. DJ addresses procedural fairness where an interstate move affects the other parent’s liberty interest; that decision did not review the underlying custody merits.
Fisher declines a requested primary-caretaker preference and gives no single factor presumptive paramount weight. No modern decision allocates a general relocation burden; Gillespie’s 1953 burden statement was narrowed by Estrella in 1959 and has not been reaffirmed or overruled. Later-treatment review is limited. Electronic visitation cannot justify relocation.
General modern allocation unresolved
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
No relocation-specific distance threshold identified
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