Vermont

Statutory framework; factor structure: 9.

Authority

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 665(b)

Source framework

Statutory

Factor structure

9

Operative language

shall

Catch-all language

No separate catch-all factor; § 665(b) requires consideration of at least the nine listed factors.

Presumptions in the original survey

When parents cannot agree to divide or share parental rights and responsibilities, § 665(a) directs a primary or sole award. Discrete legal responsibilities may be allocated between parents with supported best-interest findings (Gordon, 2025 VT 24, ¶¶ 15–16).

Child's voice / age rule

n/a — no preference factor

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Lived apart "six consecutive months" and "resumption of marital relations is not reasonably probable," § 551(7)

Authority

15 V.S.A. § 551

Grounds without a misconduct showing

Lived apart "six consecutive months" and "resumption of marital relations is not reasonably probable," § 551(7)

Other grounds and proof conditions

Adultery, intolerable severity, willful desertion or seven years' absence, refusal to support (4) ; plus two status grounds: sentence of three years or more and actually confined, permanent mental incapacity (§§ 631 to 637)

Separation

Six consecutive months apart with resumption of marital relations not reasonably probable. LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 2014 VT 65, citing Scott v. Scott, 155 Vt. 465, 468, 586 A.2d 1140 (1990), recognizes that separate lives can occur under one roof.

Timing

A decree nisi ordinarily becomes absolute 90 days after entry; the court may fix an earlier date, and death before expiration makes it absolute immediately before death (§ 554(a)). Section 592(a) ordinarily requires either party’s six months of Vermont residence to file and one year next preceding the final hearing, with specified temporary-absence provisions. Section 592(b)–(c) provides a limited stipulated nonresident procedure for a Vermont marriage neither party’s state recognizes for divorce, with no minor children born or adopted during the marriage and the other statutory conditions; it is not a general residency waiver.

Relief without dissolution

Yes, legal separation "forever or for a limited time," § 555

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General best-interest factors. Ordinary modification. No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required.

Authority

Case law (Hawkes, Quinones), 15 V.S.A. 668

Court test

general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)

Burden classification

burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)

Notice classification

no

Trigger classification

ordinary modification thresholds; no relocation-specific mileage test identified

Effect of silence

No deemed-consent procedure identified in § 668 or the cited relocation decisions

What the court weighs

For ordinary § 668(a) modification, two steps: first a 'real, substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances' (§ 668(a), Quinones ¶ 11, LaFlam ¶ 12), then best interests under the § 665(b) factors. A parent seeking to transfer physical rights bears a 'heavy burden' of showing changed circumstances (Hawkes ¶ 20, quoted in LaFlam ¶ 11), and a noncustodial parent seeking a change based solely on the custodial parent's relocation faces a 'high hurdle' (Quinones ¶ 22). Generally the custodial parent, not the court, decides where to live. The court decides which parent should have physical responsibility in light of the move and fashions a contact order, rather than deciding whether the move itself is in the child's interest (Quinones ¶¶ 13-24, Lane v. Schenck, 158 Vt. 489, 614 A.2d 786 (1992), and McCart v. McCart, 166 Vt. 629, 697 A.2d 353 (1997) (mem.)). In an initial award the court compares the child's proposed life in the new place with life with the other parent and cannot direct where the parents live (Gordon v. Fogell, 2025 VT 24, citing Gazo and Paine v. Buffa). No general relocation presumption is stated in the ordinary-modification provisions; special § 665(f) orders have separate restrictions.

Who carries the burden

Moving party bears the burden on both steps (Lane, citing Hayes). The 'heavy burden' in Hawkes ¶ 20 (quoted in LaFlam 2022) is the burden of showing changed circumstances for a custody change, which is higher than the threshold for altering parent-child contact. A noncustodial parent must prove the children's best interests would be so undermined by relocation with the custodial parent that a transfer is necessary (Lane). Does not shift.

Notice and safety exceptions

No generally applicable relocation-notice requirement identified. A parent seeking a new contact schedule files a motion to modify.

Which moves trigger the rule

Ordinary custody modification requires a real, substantial and unanticipated change under § 668(a); the effect of a relocation is evaluated under Hawkes and later cases, with no relocation-specific mileage test identified in those cases. Hawkes ¶ 20 recognizes a lower changed-circumstances threshold for modifying parent-child contact. Special § 665(f)/§ 668(c) orders have the distinct restrictions described under Material change.

Objections and the effect of silence

No statutory mechanism. The other parent opposes the movant's motion to modify or files his or her own. Quinones holds a family court may not effectively bar a custodial parent's move by refusing to modify parent-child contact once it finds the move is an unanticipated change and custody stays with that parent.

The modification threshold

For ordinary custody modification, required. Hawkes v. Spence, 2005 VT 57, ¶¶ 9-19, adopted ALI Principles § 2.17(1): a relocation is a substantial change only when it significantly impairs either parent's ability to exercise responsibilities the parent has been exercising or attempting to exercise under the parenting plan, weighing the custodial responsibility actually exercised, the distance and duration of the move, and alternative contact arrangements. Relocation alone is not per se a change but may be one. A custodial parent's relocation can be the unanticipated change (Quinones ¶¶ 1, 21) but is not if the earlier order considered the move (LaFlam, 2022 VT 57). In an initial award, a parent who says she will move makes a later consistent move anticipated (Gordon v. Fogell, 2025 VT 24 ¶ 12). Section 668(c) states that final orders under § 665(f)(1) are not modifiable and motions under § 665(f)(2) require an extraordinary, real, substantial and unanticipated change. These are special sexual-assault, sexual-exploitation or trafficking orders, rather than ordinary relocation orders. Section 665(f)(4), added in 2017 when the legislature struck § 665(f)(2)'s own modification clause without amending § 668(c), bars any parent-child contact order once a § 665(f) order issues, terminates existing contact orders, and states that an order under that subdivision is permanent and nonmodifiable. Whether § 665(f)(4) reaches the § 665(f)(2) rights-and-responsibilities order that § 668(c) still allows to be modified has not been decided. Hawkes ¶ 20 distinguishes the lower changed-circumstances threshold for altering parent-child contact from the heavy custody-change threshold.

Other qualifications

No general advance relocation-notice period identified. In the Quinones posture, after finding an unanticipated change and leaving physical responsibility with the custodial parent, the court could not effectively prevent the move by refusing to adapt contact. Hawkes adopted ALI § 2.17(1)’s significant-impairment test for custody modification, with a lower threshold for modifying contact.

Burden summary

Ordinary modification

Notice summary

No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required

Trigger summary

Modification thresholds; no mileage test identified

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