Texas

Case law framework; factor structure: 9 (Holley); 7 (§ 153.134(a)).

Authority

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002; Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976)

Source framework

Case law

Factor structure

9 (Holley); 7 (§ 153.134(a))

Operative language

shall (standard)

Catch-all language

§ 153.134(a)(7)

Presumptions in the original survey

Two distinct presumptions apply in different settings. In parent-versus-nonparent suits, a parent is presumed to act in the child’s best interest and the child’s care, custody, and control by a parent is presumed to be in the child’s best interest. A nonparent may rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence that denying the requested relief would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development; a court granting relief must state supporting facts and the extent the presumption was overcome. This 2025 amendment applies to suits pending in a trial court on or after September 1, 2025, or filed on or after that date (§ 153.002(b)–(c); SB 2052 §§ 2, 4–5). Separately, § 153.131(b) presumes appointment of parents as joint managing conservators is in the child’s best interest, a finding of a history of family violence involving the parents removes that presumption (§ 153.131(b)).

Child's voice / age rule

12

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"Insupportability," § 6.001; living apart three years, § 6.006

Authority

Tex. Fam. Code §§ 6.001 to 6.007 ; § 6.702

Grounds without a misconduct showing

"Insupportability," § 6.001; living apart three years, § 6.006

Other grounds and proof conditions

Cruelty § 6.002, adultery § 6.003, conviction of felony § 6.004, abandonment one year § 6.005, confinement in mental hospital three years § 6.007 (5)

Separation

3 years "without cohabitation," § 6.006; statute silent on one roof

Timing

Ordinarily no divorce before the 60th day after filing (§ 6.702(a)). The waiting period does not apply if the court finds either: (1) the respondent was finally convicted of, or received deferred adjudication for, an offense involving family violence against the petitioner or a member of the petitioner’s household; or (2) the petitioner has an active Title 4 protective order or an active magistrate’s emergency-protection order under Code of Criminal Procedure article 17.292, based on a family-violence finding, against the respondent because of family violence committed during the marriage (§ 6.702(c)).

Relief without dissolution

No formal legal-separation status. The State Bar of Texas family-law guide confirms this. Temporary orders, support, custody proceedings and agreements are different remedies.

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Where imposed, the conservatorship order’s geographic restriction controls where the child may reside; § 153.134(b) also permits an order without a geographic restriction. Section 105.006 information-update notice is a separate duty and supplies no consent or objection procedure.

Authority

Tex. Fam. Code 153.134(b) (Lenz)

Court test

judicial relocation factors

Burden classification

burden on the party seeking modification (no relocation-specific allocation)

Notice classification

no

Trigger classification

set by the custody order (geographic restriction)

Effect of silence

No deemed-consent procedure specified in §§ 105.006 or 153.134; an existing geographic restriction requires compliance or modification

What the court weighs

Best interest of the child is the primary consideration (§ 153.002). Lenz holds no bright-line test can be formulated and surveys other states' factors. Courts of appeals apply non-exclusive Lenz factors: reasons for and against the move. Education, health and leisure opportunities. The child's special needs or talents. Effect on extended family relationships. Effect on visitation and communication with the noncustodial parent. The noncustodial parent's ability to relocate. The child's age (as listed in In re S.I.S.F. (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2026) (mem. op.), citing K.L.W. and Lenz). In re K.L.W., 301 S.W.3d 423, 425-26 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009) (published) applied the Lenz factors to an original divorce decree granting the right to designate residence without a geographic restriction. Modification requires best interest plus a material and substantial change since the order or mediated agreement, or a 12+ child's in-chambers preference, or six months' voluntary relinquishment by the primary-residence conservator. § 156.101(a)

Who carries the burden

The party seeking modification bears the burden under the general modification rule. Stone v. Stone, No. 03-23-00801-CV (Tex. App.-Austin April 18, 2025) (mem. op.) puts it on the father who sought to modify possession and access. That passage does not concern lifting a geographic restriction and says nothing about shifting. No authority identified addresses a shift.

Notice and safety exceptions

No generally applicable relocation-specific notice period identified. Under § 105.006(b), subject to subsection (c), the final order directs each party to report an intended change in required information, including residence address, to the other parties, court and state case registry while a person remains obligated for support or entitled to possession or access. Notice is due on the earlier of 60 days before the change or the fifth day after learning of it if timely advance notice was not possible. After notice and hearing, the court may limit disclosure when it finds the specified risk of harassment, harm, abuse or family violence (§ 105.006(c)). This is an information-update duty, not a consent or objection procedure.

Which moves trigger the rule

Set by the conservatorship order, not by statute. When the court appoints joint managing conservators it must designate who holds the exclusive right to determine the child's primary residence and either set a geographic area within which the residence must be kept or specify no geographic restriction. A move outside the area requires modification. § 153.134(b)(1)(A)-(B)

Objections and the effect of silence

None by statute. The other parent's remedy is a motion to modify or to enforce the geographic restriction. Silence has no statutory effect: without an order lifting the restriction the parent may not move the child outside it.

The modification threshold

Yes for modification under § 156.101(a)(1) (material and substantial change since the order or mediated agreement). Courts of appeals hold a relocation is not automatically a material and substantial change, but a move of significant distance may be one, judged by fact-intensive factors (distance, the noncustodial relationship and access, motives for and against the move, feasibility of substitute visitation, travel): Bates v. Tesar, 81 S.W.3d 411, 430 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.), as quoted and followed in In re P.M.G., 405 S.W.3d 406 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2013) (191-mile move supported an implied finding) and Arredondo v. Betancourt, 383 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012). No Texas Supreme Court holding on the point was found.

Other qualifications

Geographic restrictions in conservatorship orders can control where the child may reside; § 153.134(b) permits a court to specify no geographic restriction. The separate § 105.006 address-update requirement is not a consent or objection procedure.

Important qualification

Where imposed, the conservatorship order’s geographic restriction controls where the child may reside; § 153.134(b) also permits an order without a geographic restriction. Section 105.006 information-update notice is a separate duty and supplies no consent or objection procedure.

Burden summary

Ordinary modification

Notice summary

No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required

Trigger summary

Set by the custody order

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