New York

Case law framework; factor structure: n/a.

Authority

N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240(1)(a); Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167 (1982); Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89 (1982)

Source framework

Case law

Factor structure

n/a

Operative language

discretion

Catch-all language

n/a

Presumptions in the original survey

Express anti-presumption: no prima facie right in either parent

Child's voice / age rule

none

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Irretrievable breakdown for at least six months, asserted under oath by one spouse, with § 170(7) ancillary issues resolved before judgment. Conversion routes now require six months living apart after a qualifying decree or agreement, with the specified compliance and filing requirements.

Authority

N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 170, 200. 2025 N.Y. Laws ch. 673 and 2026 N.Y. Laws ch. 73.

Grounds without a misconduct showing

Irretrievable breakdown for at least six months, asserted under oath by one spouse, with § 170(7) ancillary issues resolved before judgment. Conversion routes now require six months living apart after a qualifying decree or agreement, with the specified compliance and filing requirements.

Other grounds and proof conditions

Cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment for at least one year, imprisonment for three consecutive years after marriage, and adultery.

Separation

Six months for the conversion routes in covered actions commencing on or after February 17, 2026. The six-month breakdown condition does not itself require separate residences.

Timing

No general filing-to-decree minimum in § 170. Breakdown duration, conversion separation and resolution of ancillary issues are distinct requirements.

Relief without dissolution

Yes, Dom. Rel. Law § 200 (separation from bed and board). For actions commenced on or after February 17, 2026, § 200(6) permits separation based on an irretrievable breakdown for at least six months stated under oath; a judgment requires resolution of applicable, timely and relevant economic issues, which may include the specified support, fees, custody and visitation issues.

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Court-made relocation factors; moving parent bears the best-interest burden. No general advance-notice period identified; order-specific restrictions may apply.

Authority

Case law (Tropea 1996)

Court test

judicial relocation factors

Burden classification

burden on the relocating parent

Notice classification

no

Trigger classification

none defined by statute or rule

Effect of silence

No deemed-consent procedure identified; existing order restrictions remain separate

What the court weighs

Tropea (1996) rejected the 'meaningful access / exceptional circumstances' formulas. Each request is decided on its own facts with 'predominant emphasis' on the child's best interests, considering: each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move. The quality of the child's relationships with each parent. The impact on contact with the noncustodial parent. Economic, emotional and educational enhancement. And the feasibility of preserving the relationship through visitation. No presumption either way.

Who carries the burden

On the parent seeking to relocate, by a preponderance, to show the move is in the child's best interests (Elya L., 2026, restating settled Appellate Division law). No shift.

Notice and safety exceptions

No generally applicable relocation-specific statutory notice period identified. Elya L. involved an order barring relocation outside Tompkins County or a contiguous county without consent or judicial permission, followed by a petition for permission under Family Court Act article 6. That order-specific restriction is distinct from an advance-notice period.

Which moves trigger the rule

No statutory trigger or mileage threshold identified. Case law addresses a custodial parent’s proposed move affecting the other parent’s access. The Third Department treats the proposed relocation as the change in circumstances permitting review (Elya L., quoting Megan NN.).

Objections and the effect of silence

None statutory. The other parent opposes in the relocation proceeding. No deadline. Silence does not authorize a move contrary to an existing order.

The modification threshold

Yes, in the Third Department: a custodial parent’s proposed relocation supplies the change in circumstances for considering modification (Elya L., citing Matter of Megan NN., 210 A.D.3d 1357).

Other qualifications

Tropea supplies a fact-specific best-interest inquiry. No general relocation-specific advance-notice period identified; Elya L. illustrates an individual order’s consent-or-judicial-permission restriction.

Burden summary

On the moving parent

Notice summary

No general advance period established; order-specific restrictions may apply

Trigger summary

No statutory or rule trigger

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