This reference compares the structures used in private custody and parenting-time determinations between parents. It preserves the existing Martino Law Brief survey's distinctions among statutory factors, case-law frameworks, presumptions, and rules for considering a child's stated wishes.
Case law framework; factor structure: 12 considerations (unnumbered). No numeric age. Devine considers a child's preference when the child has sufficient age and maturity. Section 30-3-152 separately adds joint-custody considerations.
Authority
Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Ala. Code §§ 30-3-131, -152
Source framework
Case law
Factor structure
12 considerations (unnumbered)
Operative language
must
Catch-all language
yes
Presumptions in the original survey
Joint custody if both parents request; DV rebuttable
Mandatory rebuttable domestic-violence presumption against legal decision-making and parenting time. The parent must rebut it by clear and convincing evidence for sole/joint decision-making or unsupervised time, and by a preponderance for supervised time (§ 25-403.03(C)–(G), (M)).
The wishes of a child of suitable age and maturity remain a factor under § 25-403(A)(4). Under § 25-403.03(F)(3), however, a preference to reinstate, maintain or increase contact with the parent who committed domestic violence is irrelevant to the domestic-violence presumption; this is not a general exclusion of the child’s wishes.
No enumeration framework; factor structure: n/a. A change in the law alone is not a material change in circumstances for custody modification.
Authority
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101
Source framework
No enumeration
Factor structure
n/a
Operative language
may
Catch-all language
n/a
Presumptions in the original survey
In an original child-custody determination in a divorce or paternity matter, joint custody is rebuttably presumed to be in the child's best interest. Rebuttal routes are: clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the child's best interest; agreement on all custody issues; one party not requesting sole, primary, or joint custody; or a subsection (c) or (d) presumption established by the evidence. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv).
Section 3011(a) has five numbered provisions, four substantive factors; § 3040.5 separately requires consideration of relevant, admissible human-trafficking evidence.
Authority
Cal. Fam. Code §§ 3011, 3040.5
Source framework
Statutory
Factor structure
5 (4 substantive) in § 3011(a); § 3040.5 separately requires consideration of relevant, admissible evidence that a parent caused human trafficking of the child or the other parent.
Operative language
shall
Catch-all language
preamble
Presumptions in the original survey
Domestic-violence presumption under Cal. Fam. Code § 3044 applies after a qualifying court finding that a parent perpetrated domestic violence within the preceding five years and is rebuttable. Rebuttal is child-specific; a finding in a separate proceeding involving a different child does not automatically bind another parent (In re Marriage of Jessica and Sammer Z. (2026), pp. 26–32).
Child's voice / age rule
No minimum age for considering a sufficiently mature child’s wishes. At 14 or older, a child who wishes to address the court generally must be allowed to do so, subject to a best-interest finding stated on the record; younger children may also be heard (§ 3042(a), (c)–(d)).
Joint custody is rebuttably presumed to be in the child's best interest, except on the findings specified in § 16-914(a)(2); a contrary rebuttable presumption then applies. The statutory triggers are an intrafamily offense, child abuse, child neglect, or parental kidnapping, with the judicial findings and preponderance standard specified there.
No presumption favoring either parent or any form of custody under (a)(1); age-14 selection is separately presumptive, subject to best interests, under (a)(5).
Child's voice / age rule
14 (presumptive selection, subject to best interests); 11–13 considered
Statutory framework; factor structure: 16. Factors (5) and (11) in § 571-46(b) are not considered when the court determines that a parent committed family violence. Section 571-46(a)(9) separately creates a rebuttable presumption against sole custody, joint legal custody or joint physical custody with the perpetrator.
Statutory framework; factor structure: 11, (3)(a)–(k). Subsection 3 of § 598.41 does not apply when the parents agree to joint custody under subsection 4.
Authority
Iowa Code § 598.41(3)
Source framework
Statutory
Factor structure
11, (3)(a)–(k)
Operative language
shall
Catch-all language
none — closed
Presumptions in the original survey
If the court finds a history of domestic abuse, a rebuttable presumption against joint custody arises; an unrebutted finding outweighs the other subsection 3 factors in a custody determination under subsection 2.
An agreed parenting plan is presumed in the child’s best interests, subject to specific contrary findings (§ 23-3202). Neither parent has a vested custody or residency interest against the other, and no presumption favors the mother of an infant or young child (§ 23-3204). A conditional rebuttable presumption against custody or residency applies to a parent residing with a person subject to specified offender-registration requirements or convicted of specified child abuse (§ 23-3205). Joint, then sole legal custody are listed in an order of preference (§ 23-3206).
Where joint custody is decreed, physical custody is to be shared equally unless the court determines equal sharing is not feasible or not in the child’s best interest (R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(b), as amended by Act 605, effective August 1, 2026).
Statutory framework; factor structure: 19. Separately, § 1653(6-B) provides a rebuttable presumption concerning jeopardy and contact when the court finds specified child-related sexual-offense convictions or an adjudication of sexual abuse. The conditions and an age exception appear in the statute.
Authority
Me. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1653(3), (4), (6-B)
Source framework
Statutory
Factor structure
19
Operative language
shall
Catch-all language
yes, (3)(N)
Presumptions in the original survey
None identified in the original survey; § 1653(4) bars parental preference based on parent’s gender or child’s age or gender.
Statutory framework; factor structure: 16. Maryland Rule 9-204.2(d), as amended effective July 1, 2026, requires the court reviewing the parties' joint statement to address the § 9-201(a) factors and articulate findings under § 9-201(b).
Authority
Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 9-201, 9-103 (2025)
Source framework
Statutory
Factor structure
16
Operative language
may consider, shall make findings
Catch-all language
yes, § 9-201(a)(16)
Presumptions in the original survey
None in § 9-201
Child's voice / age rule
No fixed preference age; “age-appropriate” under § 9-201(a)(15); at 16, child may petition to modify an existing order under § 9-103
Child's voice qualification
No fixed preference age; “age-appropriate” under § 9-201(a)(15). At sixteen, a child subject to an existing custody order may petition to modify it in the child's own name under § 9-103. The court must hold a hearing, but the requested placement does not control.
Statutory custody standards with specified mandatory considerations, rather than one comprehensive numbered factor list. Section 56 limits reliance on certain out-of-state laws and findings concerning gender-affirming health care, subject to its Massachusetts-law exception. It also requires consideration of likely disruption or cessation of care in the stated circumstances when a court alters custody, parenting time or visitation. It is not a general enumerated custody factor.
Statutory standards; no single comprehensive numbered factor list
Factor structure
No single comprehensive numbered list. Sections 208:31 and 31A require specified custody considerations, including living conditions and abuse; § 209C:10(a) requires residence and parent-child relationship considerations in nonmarital custody.
factors to be considered, evaluated and determined
Catch-all language
yes, (l)
Presumptions in the original survey
An order changing an established custodial environment requires clear and convincing evidence that the change serves the child’s best interests, § 722.27(1)(c). When a modification does not change that environment, the best-interest standard is a preponderance of the evidence.
Joint legal custody is rebuttably presumed in the child’s best interests upon either or both parents’ request. There is no presumption for or against joint physical custody except the domestic-abuse presumption: if domestic abuse, as defined in § 518B.01, occurred between the parents, joint legal or joint physical custody is rebuttably presumed not to be in the child’s best interests. In deciding rebuttal, the court must consider the abuse’s nature and context and its implications for parenting and the child’s safety, well-being and developmental needs. Disagreement alone over sole or joint custody does not establish inability to cooperate (§ 518.17, subd. 1(b)(7), (9)).
Case-law framework; ten editorial groupings of Albright’s unnumbered considerations, including a catch-all.
Authority
Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-5-24, 93-11-65(1)(a)
Source framework
Case law
Factor structure
10 editorial groupings of an unnumbered paragraph
Operative language
must address
Catch-all language
yes, grouped with the final stability consideration
Presumptions in the original survey
Joint custody and equal parenting time presumed, rebuttably, for initial temporary and initial final custody orders entered after July 1, 2026, not modifications; no maternal presumption; separate family-violence presumption
12 (preference may be considered when the statutory fitness conditions are met)
Child's voice qualification
Twelve. A chancellor may consider the preference when both parties are fit and either can adequately provide for the child. The court must explain why the child's wishes were or were not honored.
Frequent contact is a best-interest consideration subject to a detriment finding in (1)(l); (4) separately supplies rebuttable vexatious-action presumptions.
Hybrid framework; factor structure: 6 + 5 mandates. The burden and special written findings in § 43-2932 depend on the specified factual findings. Section 43-2932 is not an unqualified presumption against every parent.
Authority
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2923(6)
Source framework
Hybrid
Factor structure
6 + 5 mandates
Operative language
shall
Catch-all language
preamble
Presumptions in the original survey
None; § 43-2932 shifts burden to an offending parent
Joint legal presumption (§ 125C.002) and joint physical preference (§ 125C.0025) apply when the parents agree to the respective award or a parent has demonstrated an intent to establish a meaningful relationship with the child, or attempted to do so but was frustrated by the other parent. Domestic-violence presumptions concern physical custody. After an evidentiary hearing and clear and convincing findings of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child, or another person residing with the child, §125C.003(1)(c) creates a rebuttable presumption against joint physical custody when a parent perpetrated it; §125C.0035(5) creates a rebuttable presumption against sole or joint physical custody by the perpetrator, including another person seeking physical custody. The mutual-violence and primary-physical-aggressor rules in §125C.0035(6), and the §125C.210 exception, apply. This is not an exhaustive list of custody presumptions.
Statutory framework; factor structure: 13. RSA 461-A:6, I-b, effective September 13, 2026, limits consideration as an adverse factor of a parent's raising a child consistent with the child's biological sex, including the examples in the statute. It does not limit consideration of other legally relevant best-interest factors.
Authority
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 461-A:6(I)
Source framework
Statutory
Factor structure
13
Operative language
shall
Catch-all language
yes, (I)(m)
Presumptions in the original survey
No presumption, but findings required if approximately equal time is rejected (¶ I-a, eff. Jan. 1, 2025)
Statutory framework; factor structure: 5 + 9. Sections 40-4-9(A) and 40-4-9.1(B) address different inquiries. The nine joint-custody factors are not necessarily required to modify an existing joint-custody arrangement. See Davis v. Voss, No. A-1-CA-43097, ¶ 13 (N.M. Ct. App. 2026) (non-precedential).
Authority
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-4-9(A), 40-4-9.1
Source framework
Statutory
Factor structure
5 under § 40-4-9(A); 9 additional joint-custody factors under § 40-4-9.1(B) when determining whether joint custody is in the child’s best interests.
Operative language
shall
Catch-all language
preamble
Presumptions in the original survey
Joint custody in initial determinations, § 40-4-9.1(A)
No numbered general factor list. Section 50-13.2(a) requires all relevant factors, including domestic violence and child and party safety.
Authority
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(a)
Source framework
No enumeration
Factor structure
No numbered general list; § 50-13.2(a) requires consideration of all relevant factors, including domestic violence between the parties, the child’s safety, and either party’s safety from domestic violence by the other.
Operative language
shall
Catch-all language
all relevant factors, statutory preamble
Presumptions in the original survey
Express anti-presumption; joint custody considered on request
If the court finds credible evidence of domestic violence, as defined in § 14-07.1-01, plus one incident causing serious bodily injury or involving a dangerous weapon, or a pattern within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding, a rebuttable presumption bars residential responsibility for the perpetrating parent. Rebuttal requires clear and convincing evidence that the child’s best interests require that parent to have residential responsibility. The court must make specific protective findings (§ 14-09-06.2(1)(j)).
10 listed factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); 5 additional shared-parenting factors under (F)(2), which also incorporates R.C. 3119.23; both lists are nonexclusive
No enumeration framework; factor structure: n/a. Separately, § 110.1 states that the court may provide substantially equal access on a parent's request unless it finds shared parenting detrimental to the child. Duggan v. Duggan describes § 110.1 as an equal-access presumption in a joint-custody modification case.
Authority
Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 109(A); preference at § 113
Source framework
No enumeration
Factor structure
n/a
Operative language
shall
Catch-all language
n/a
Presumptions in the original survey
A court finding of child abuse, domestic violence, stalking, or harassment triggers a rebuttable presumption against custody or a shared parenting plan with the perpetrator and in favor of residence with the nonperpetrating parent (§ 109(I)(1)).
No presumption between parents, § 5327(a); in a parent–nonparent dispute, a presumption favors the parent and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, § 5327(b).
Case law framework; factor structure: 8. Parker describes the eight factors as nonexclusive, and Pettinato requires considering the combination and interaction of all relevant factors.
Authority
Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1990); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16
Express anti-preference; § 25-4A-11 provides an initial twelve-month-primary-caregiver arrangement unless the parties agree otherwise and states that imposing standard guidelines creates no presumption as to the custody award at a hearing.
Case law framework; factor structure: 9 (Holley); 7 (§ 153.134(a)).
Authority
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002; Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976)
Source framework
Case law
Factor structure
9 (Holley); 7 (§ 153.134(a))
Operative language
shall (standard)
Catch-all language
§ 153.134(a)(7)
Presumptions in the original survey
Two distinct presumptions apply in different settings. In parent-versus-nonparent suits, a parent is presumed to act in the child’s best interest and the child’s care, custody, and control by a parent is presumed to be in the child’s best interest. A nonparent may rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence that denying the requested relief would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development; a court granting relief must state supporting facts and the extent the presumption was overcome. This 2025 amendment applies to suits pending in a trial court on or after September 1, 2025, or filed on or after that date (§ 153.002(b)–(c); SB 2052 §§ 2, 4–5). Separately, § 153.131(b) presumes appointment of parents as joint managing conservators is in the child’s best interest, a finding of a history of family violence involving the parents removes that presumption (§ 153.131(b)).
Statutory framework; factor structure: 3 mandatory + 18 discretionary (including catch-all). Subsection (10) separately requires consideration of domestic violence evidence and primary consideration of safety and well-being. H.B. 303 § 4 added coercive control, with a special effective-date clause in its § 10.
No separate catch-all factor; § 665(b) requires consideration of at least the nine listed factors.
Presumptions in the original survey
When parents cannot agree to divide or share parental rights and responsibilities, § 665(a) directs a primary or sole award. Discrete legal responsibilities may be allocated between parents with supported best-interest findings (Gordon, 2025 VT 24, ¶¶ 15–16).
Statutory framework; factor structure: 10. Under § 20-124.2(B), a person's legal possession or consumption of substances authorized under Title 4.1 or Chapter 34 of Title 54.1 alone is no basis to restrict custody or visitation, unless other facts establish that the possession or consumption is not in the child's best interest.
The original seven-factor entry identifies no general presumption; §§ 26.09.191 and .192 limitations can be dispositive. Section .192 separately provides specified rebuttable safety presumptions and mandatory restraints concerning sexual abuse or sex offenses against children.
Joint legal custody is presumed in the child’s best interests under § 767.41(2)(am). If the court finds by a preponderance that a party engaged in a qualifying pattern or serious incident of statutory interspousal battery or domestic abuse, § 767.41(2)(d) instead creates a rebuttable presumption against joint or sole legal custody for that party. Rebuttal requires a preponderance of evidence that the party successfully completed batterer treatment through a certified program or provider, is not abusing alcohol or any other drug, and that an award to that party is in the child’s best interests under the statutory factors. If both parties qualify, the presumption concerns the primary physical aggressor determined under (d)2–3; it does not apply if neither was the primary physical aggressor. Subdivision (d)3 governs the case where only one party has the specified domestic-abuse conviction.
Statutory framework; factor structure: 11. The list is open, with a catch-all at (a)(xi). The absence of an express child-preference factor does not make a child's preference always irrelevant under the catch-all or case law. Subsections (b)–(d) separately address gender, abuse and safety, and custody-form neutrality.
Statutory framework; factor structure: 13 (art. 604). Separately, in domestic-violence protection proceedings, Law 54 art. 2.9, as amended by Act 120-2026 § 3, requires consideration of any Department of the Family evaluation before a court authorizes or modifies contact between minors and the respondent.
Shared custody is considered as a first option when it serves the child’s best interests; it is not compulsory and Act 223-2011 art. 9 exclusions apply.
Legislative visitation policy under §8404(a)(8): for children and noncustodial parents living on Guam, the court shall, to the greatest degree possible, order more or less equal non-working, non-sleeping, non-school time, subject to (A)–(J). Lanser limits this policy to both parents living on Guam; it is not a general equal-custody presumption.
Case law framework; factor structure: 5. Within its court-finding-of-domestic-violence context, §109(c)(3) bars weighing an absence or relocation caused by the other parent’s violence against the parent in custody or visitation.
Authority
16 V.I.C. § 109; James v. Faust, 65 V.I. 349 (V.I. 2016)
Source framework
Case law
Factor structure
5
Operative language
mandatory if relevant
Catch-all language
expressly non-exhaustive
Presumptions in the original survey
When a marriage is declared void or dissolved, § 109(a) permits future-custody orders for minor children of the marriage. In that setting, a court finding of domestic violence raises a rebuttable presumption favoring the child’s residence with the nonperpetrator parent in that parent’s chosen location within or outside the territory, or with a legal guardian (§ 109(b)). The text also applies the presumption when a parent has been convicted for the other parent’s death or the child was conceived by rape.
No enumeration framework; factor structure: n/a. 8 CMC § 1311 permits custody orders according to justice and the best interests of all concerned. Robinson holds that the best interests of the child control, while courts must take into account the interests of all concerned. Robinson enumerates no factors. Subject to the confirmation procedure in § 1105, § 1104 excludes adoptions, annulments and divorces effected in accordance with local custom from this division.
On the specified judicial domestic- or family-violence finding, §1931 creates a rebuttable presumption against sole or joint custody with the perpetrator; §1933 creates a rebuttable best-interest presumption favoring the child’s residence with the nonperpetrator parent in that parent’s chosen location, within or outside the Commonwealth. Section 1932 supplies separate safety factors and relocation protection.
